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Abstract 
For much of the Twentieth Century, the transition processes of 
democratizing states have followed a familiar pattern. Outgoing authoritarian 
regimes relinquished power after extracting the promise of amnesty from the 
incoming democratic leadership. These authoritarian leaders demanded amnesty for 
gross human rights violations. The incoming democratic leaders felt like they had 
no choice. Amnesty has consistently been viewed as a necessary price to pay for 
democracy. While expedient, in agreeing to amnesty the incoming democratic 
leaders agreed to sacrifice justice for democracy.  
This thesis examines the long-term consequences of the amnesty pact on the 
democratic state and questions whether justice can be sacrificed without ultimately 
undermining the basis of the democracy. While other studies have focused on the 
moral implications of amnesty, this work examines the functional realities. Rather 
than asking whether democratic elites should agree to amnesty, this work asks 
whether they actually can. Can measures of justice be sacrificed without 
fundamentally undermining the development and stability of democracy? Can the 
argument that amnesty is in the interest of the greater good subdue later demands 
for restoration or retribution? Case study methodology is employed in the 
examination of the political transitions of Brazil, Chile and South Africa. These 
countries have each employed different approach to amnesty, though all coming to 
the same general end. The political and social outcomes in each country speak to 
the fundamental consequences of amnesty legislation decades after the bargain was 
struck. The case studies inform my response to the larger theoretical question.  
This research posits the argument that there are fundamental 
incompatibilities between the injustice of amnesty and the fundamental requirement 
of justice that is characteristic of democracy; the current collapse of democracies in 
Brazil and South Africa, and the fundamental struggles in Chile, are, it is argued, 
the inevitable results of this impossible trade-off. Building on the data gained from 
in-country qualitative research, this thesis argues that democratic norms will either 
be fundamentally weakened by the continued existence and use of amnesty, or, 
alternatively, democratic norms will be forced to undermine the law or decree itself, 
compelling leaders to eventually repeal such legislation that ultimately makes 
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democracy, in its basic foundation in justice, impossible. Either situation is highly 
problematic, creating the potential for instability and the possibility of regime 
reversal. At its core, this research suggests that the long-term negative 
consequences of amnesty outweigh the immediate gains made during the transition. 
For democracy to work, it must be built on a foundation of justice. Amnesty 
legislation undermines that foundation, and this is simply more than a newly 
democratizing state can sustain.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Justice needs to be debated – especially in countries where people have lost 
faith in justice.1 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Patricio Aylwin, the first democratically elected president of Chile after 
the Pinochet regime, argued in a personal interview with me that by not seeking 
justice for crimes committed by the previous government, he had made a clear 
choice.2 It was, he said, the only way to guarantee democracy in Chile and the 
only way to guarantee stability. As a condition of the transition, Aylwin 
accepted the military’s self-granted amnesty and later defended the decree 
against attempts at legislative repeal. One of the key characteristics of the state 
transition by negotiation in the Twentieth and Twenty-first centuries has been 
the use of amnesty legislation to ‘grease the wheels’.3 Offering some level of 
impunity to the outgoing regime has become the norm in bargains for 
democracy. This amnesty can either be a pre-existing law that is then codified 
into the legal structure of the new regime,4 or part of the negotiation process 
itself, with democratization contingent on its introduction.5 Either way, amnesty 
legislation has become commonplace.   
Aylwin, like other leaders in his position, argued that state-granted 
immunity for politically motivated crimes committed by the previous regime 
was necessary to bring together "a nation of enemies".6 According to supporters 
of amnesty laws, civil unrest is a very real possibility when outgoing leaders 
																																																						
1 Howard Varney, Personal Interview, Cape Town, 21/02/2011. 
2 Patricio Aylwin, Personal Interview, Santiago, 18/05/2011. 
3 For an excellent empirical study on the use of amnesty legislation see: Mallinder, “Exploring the 
Practice of States in Introducing Amnesties.” 
4 This was the case in both Brazil and Chile, where amnesty laws were introduced by the military 
regimes during the authoritarian periods.  
5 Amnesty as part of the negotiation process was a key feature of the South African experience. 
6 Aylwin, Personal Interview. Other leaders have used similar justifications for putting forward or 
accepting amnesty laws 
	2	
feel threatened by potential prosecution.7 Reflecting on the transition 
experience of Chile and South Africa, among many others, conflict and even a 
regression into civil war were certainly possibilities.8 However, those opposed 
to the use of amnesty legislation argue that immunity creates a deficit in justice, 
one that is insurmountable regardless of the benefits of the new democratic state 
and implicitly incompatible with democracy.9 These opponents argue that 
demands for justice will continue in the democratic era, undermining system 
norms and creating a political environment that can be more easily 
manipulated.10 This research assesses these arguments with the benefit of 
hindsight. Do these arguments for and against amnesty hold up decades on? 
Can democracy be built on a legacy of injustice? 
At their core, amnesty laws mean that a section of society (victims and 
their families) will pay more than others for the transition to democracy. They 
will pay with their right to pursue justice for the state-sponsored crimes 
committed against them. The debate around amnesty often continues long after 
the transition is considered complete, as can be seen in Chile (which began the 
democratization process 27 years ago), Brazil (33 years) and South Africa (27 
years). The dominant amnesty discourse focuses on the normative question of 
whether or not forgiveness should be mandated by the state and whether or not 
crimes against humanity should be forgotten. There has been a significant 
increase in transitional justice scholarship over the last 25 years, coinciding 
with the tail end of Huntington’s ‘third wave’ of democratizations that included 
Brazil, Chile and South Africa.11 
While much of the discourse has focused on the question of whether 
amnesty should be used to negotiate in exchange for democracy, there has been 
some neglect on the question of whether it actually can coexist side-by-side 
with a democratic state, considering the core characteristics of a modern liberal 
																																																						
7 Markel, “The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States.” 
8 The risk of civil unrest was a real possibility in South Africa, with different factions using 
communal violence to further power interests during the negotiation period. In Chile, the threat of 
a second Pinochet-led coup was viewed as possible, though certainly not inevitable.  
9 Roht-Arriaza and Gibson, “The Developing Jurisprudence on Amnesty.” 
10 This opinion was expressed by several interview participants, most notably Kgokong, Personal 
Interview, Johannesburg, 01/02/2011. 
11 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. 
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democracy.12 Is there something inherent in democracy that excludes the use of 
amnesty? The question of compatibility needs to take a greater role in the 
discourse on amnesty legislation and its role in democratization. As they 
negotiate their way out of an authoritarian regime now, political elites in states 
like Fiji, for example, need to ask themselves if amnesty legislation, and its 
usual inclusion of impunity for gross human rights violations, can co-exist with 
a consolidated democratic state. This debate forms the heart of this research. 
Boiled down then, the key question of this thesis is: can justice be sacrificed 
for democracy? In other words, can amnesty legislation be effectively used 
during a transition without fundamentally undermining the democracy that 
emerges afterwards?  
For some, the question of whether or not amnesty is compatible with 
democracy is a moot point – the transition is oft described as an exceptional 
period, one that requires exceptional measures that have no place in the normal 
state of affairs.13 However, long after the transition period is considered 
finished by both the political elites and the public, the consequences of an 
amnesty law remain. These can include high profile members of the former 
regime, including torturers and assassins, continuing to work in the public 
sphere while receiving no punishment for the crimes they committed, or are 
alleged to have committed.14 Research also indicates that granting amnesty 
during a transition can foster a culture of impunity within state institutions such 
as the police.15  
Amnesty also often means that victims, or family members, are asked to 
put aside questions of justice, usually for patriotic or financial reasons. Few are 
willing to accept this in perpetuity, often leading to the emergence over time of 
advocacy groups, high profile court battles, public debate and, ultimately, direct 
challenges to state governability and the viability of democratic institutional 
structures.  
																																																						
12 The key characteristics used are those outlined by Diamond and Morlino, Assessing the Quality 
of Democracy. 
13 Ntoubandi, Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law; Markel, “The 
Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States.” 
14 One well known case of a victim encountering his alleged torturer decades later is discussed in 
Verdugo and Brett, De la tortura no se habla. 
15 Muntingh and Dereymaeker, “Understanding Impunity in the South African  Law Enforcement 
Agencies.” 
	4	
Considering the experiences of a number of states that have used amnesty 
legislation as part of the democratisation process, is the use of amnesty in this 
way tenable? Can the opposing structures of political amnesty and democracy 
co-exist? This research has two distinct components to its construction. 
First, is a normative approach – using theories of democracy and justice 
to examine spatial constructs that might allow for the use of amnesty legislation 
in emerging democratic states. It is necessary in this comparative theoretical 
analysis to pinpoint whether equality, as a key characteristic of both justice and 
democracy, can be absent in one sense (as an essential component of justice) 
without undermining the overall sense of equality inherent in the democratic 
regime.  
A second useful analytical approach involves a real-world context. By 
conducting a comparative case study analysis, the experiences of three states 
offer alternative perspectives as to whether amnesty might have a place in a 
consolidated democracy. The democratic governments that emerged after the 
transition have been disaggregated to pinpoint variables that may indicate 
problems with the use of amnesty in the context of liberal democratic 
consolidation. 
Both the normative and emperical approaches are used in this research to 
examine the impact of amnesty on consolidated democracies. This research 
calls on an extensive body of literature on theories of democracy and justice 
theory that can be applied to the questions of amnesty and also looks at a 
number of states that have chosen this trade-off (amnesty for democracy), with 
varying degrees of success.  
For the purposes of this research, Brazil, Chile and South Africa have 
been chosen as the case studies. Their experiences offer rich comparisons and 
contrasts regarding the long-term sustainability of amnesty legislation in the 
context of the real world. In terms of amnesty legislation, Brazil and Chile used 
similar models. The authoritarian regimes in both countries granted themselves 
blanket amnesty prior to the transition. The progress of each country’s 
transition pivoted on the maintenance of these amnesty decrees. However, 
during and after the transition the approaches of Brazil and Chile diverged, with 
Brazil opting for more complete silence on the past. In contrast Chile’s truth 
commission, held less than two years after the end of the Pinochet regime, 
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established an official record of what happened, although further measures of 
justice were limited. These two experiences differ from the South African 
experience. Amnesty in South Africa was heavily contested during the 
transition process. The truth commission was quasi-judicial with a courtroom 
atmosphere and process, though with no prosecutorial powers. There has been 
a persistent narrative around the crimes of the apartheid regime, however again 
few tangible measures of justice. Despite differences in the development and 
use of amnesty laws, in all three cases the subsequent democratic governments 
have actively resisted demands for justice, arguing that revocation of amnesty 
would destabilize the state. That said, in all three states demands for justice 
have remained, at times directly impacting on governability. While each case is 
an example of one of the different approaches to the use of amnesty legislation 
during a transition, there are also similarities in both the reasoning behind why 
amnesty was used, and the outcomes that have emerged since.  
United, the two approaches presented here in this research, (normative 
and comparative-empirical) offer a more complete picture as to whether justice 
can be traded for democracy in the long run. This introductory chapter presents 
the key hypotheses that guide the research before examining the place this 
research has within the wider literature. A literature review of the main themes 
in this research will explore and respond to the theoretical constructs around 
democracy, justice and amnesty, followed by an explanation of the 
methodology used in data collection. Finally, there will be a brief outline of the 
structure of this thesis with a brief chapter summary.  
 
1.2 Hypotheses 
The core question of this thesis is whether justice can be traded for 
democracy. As mentioned above, there are primarily two prongs used here to 
unravel this question. The theoretical literature on democracy and justice form 
the basic underpinning of this thesis. In addition to this, case studies and case 
study analysis will be employed in an attempt to give a clearer illustration of 
the impact of amnesty in a real-world setting. These case studies are structured 
around evidence gathered in response to the three hypotheses outlined below. 
This represents, then, a positivist approach to empirical evidence, and while not 
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entirely free from the criticisms of qualitative research, allows for a slightly 
more objective analysis than a purely constructivist research.16 
Each of the hypotheses represents an attempt to address the fundamental 
thesis question by examining an aspect of the ways in which, after the departure 
of an authoritarian regime, amnesty legislation and efforts towards justice are 
dealt with in a socio-political setting. As will be discussed at a later stage in 
this chapter, perceptions play an important role in the legitimisation of regimes, 
and as such, in regime longevity and effectiveness. The three hypotheses aim 
at understanding the undercurrent of opinion around the question of amnesty 
and whether this opinion has then been expressed in terms of legitimisation of 
the government, political discourse, or in the destabilisation of the democratic 
regime.    
The following three hypotheses have been tested against the experiences of 
Brazil, Chile and South Africa to better understand amnesty in practice, and the 
impact this has had on the socio-political experiences of each state. The data that 
informs each case comes from personal interviews, archival documents and 
secondary sources. 
 The first hypothesis (H0) is that amnesty legislation can be compatible with 
expectations and norms of an entrenched liberal democracy. This hypothesis 
uses the data to weigh the expectations of the different forms of amnesty 
(particularized or blanket) with the expectations of a robust democratic system. 
Can a democracy that fulfils Leonardo Morlino’s ‘quality of democracy’ 
indicators also maintain an amnesty law that restricts justice, equality and even 
government legitimacy? H0 is tested against the development of democracy in 
each case study, and how examines this state has incorporated its respective 
amnesty law into its democratic development. 
The second hypothesis (H1) is that amnesty is agreed to in good faith. 
Amnesty legislation requires all sides to commit to the bargain, without any 
plans on the side of the incoming democratic leadership to repeal the law once 
in power. Anything short of good faith would cause further instability in the 
transition.  
																																																						
16 Stake, “Case Studies.” 
	 7	
Finally, (H2) is that amnesty is widely acceptable with time as 
demographics shift.  This hypothesis takes into account the idea that future 
generations will move beyond expectations of justice, particularly as the 
collective memory of the regime fades. This hypothesis is tested against 
evidence of continued mass mobilization in the decades following the 
transition.  
Cumulatively, the hypotheses aim to examine whether 1) democracy 
requires that an element of justice be sustained, and 2) whether instrumentalist 
arguments can trump basic democratic norms.   
 
1.3 Situating the question in literature – transitional justice 
Can justice be traded for democracy? This question finds its space on the 
edge of the transitional and post-transitional justice literature. The majority of the 
pre-existing research focuses on the efforts to secure justice during and immediately 
after state transitions, without significant examination of the long-term 
consequences of these transitional changes. Broadly speaking, transitional justice 
is defined as "judicial and non-judicial measures ... implemented ... to redress 
the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of 
institutional reforms."17 Transitional justice, as part of the re-institution of 
democracy, is almost as old as the democratic ideal itself, with the first amnesty 
measures reportedly passed by Solon in 594 BC.18 The French utilised 
transitional justice measures in the form of amnesty in 1814 and again in 1815, 
but it was really only in the Twentieth
 
Century that transitional justice became 
widely used during state transitions.  Over the last 100 years, transitional justice 
has included elements of the following forms of justice: distributive justice 
(compensation), restorative justice (reconciliation) and procedural justice (fair 
and transparent process),19 as well as amnesty measures. Paige Arthur presents 
a conceptual matrix for complete transitional justice that includes justice, 
reparation, truth and institutional reform.20 Some of the more recent forms of 
																																																						
17 “What Is Transitional Justice?” 
18 Elster, Closing the Books. 
19 Gibson, “Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political 
Tolerance”; Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights.” 
20 Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights.” 
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transitional justice have included retributive justice in the form of public 
shaming, as opposed to criminal punishment. There is debate around the 
different approaches to questions of justice during state transitions, with a 
general acceptance that there is no 'one size fits all' model.21 In the end, every 
transitional justice effort has potential to sit somewhere within the space 
between Nuremburg style trials and complete amnesty.22 
Transitional justice as discussed herein comes under the banner of 
endogenous transitional justice, originally outlined by Jon Elster23 and 
discussed by Marek M. Kaminski and Monika Nalpea.24 The key features of 
this definition are that it is:  
implemented (1) by the country in transition itself, not by any power or court; (2) 
by the legislative or executive branches of the government rather than non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) or individuals; (3) shortly after the transition 
rather than decades later; and (4) that it targets the violations of rights that occurred 
before or during the transition, not after it is over.25 
 
One note should be made regarding this definition. While endogenous 
transitional justice is a base line, in a “global village” there is little possibility 
of state actions of this significance standing alone. There will always be 
international involvement at some level.  That said, endogenous transitional 
justice is markedly different from International Criminal Court (ICC) trials, 
which are driven almost solely by organisations outside of the state.26  
A fundamental branch of the body of literature involving transitional 
justice focuses on what has been described as the peace vs. justice dilemma.27 
“The “peace versus justice” debate centres on how societies emerging from political 
violence and repressive rule should address human rights abuses committed in the 
past.”28 Scholars have long debated whether the winning side in a conflict should 
seek retribution against the vanquished. However, the contemporary debate has 
coalesced around the International Criminal Court and its involvement in pursuing 
																																																						
21 “What Is Transitional Justice?” 
22 Markel, “The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States.” 
23 Elster, Closing the Books. 
24 Kaminski and Nalepa, “Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion for Evaluating Truth 
Revelation Procedures.” 
25 Kaminski and Nalepa. 
26 “What Does the International Criminal Court Do?” 
27 Sengupta, “Peace or Justice?: The Dilemma of the International Criminal Court.” 
28 Rodman, “Peace Versus Justice,” 824. 
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justice against leaders accused of committing crimes against humanity (CAH).29 
The discourse around “peace vs. justice” is markedly different from the research 
here, as it fails to take into account the expectations and norms of the incoming 
regime type. The interest is not in the long-term establishment of democracy, but 
rather the absence of conflict without specific reference to regime type. The focus 
is on whether peace and justice are mutually exclusive concepts during a state 
transition.  
Transitional justice is not without sceptics or significant debate. From a 
legal standpoint, one of the fundamental issues with transitional justice is the 
principal of retroactivity.30 Transitional justice involves holding the past 
accountable to present-day law.31 In a majority of instances where transitional 
justice is applied, the violations being investigated were legal according to the 
contemporary legislation. Apartheid, while morally repugnant, was legal in 
South Africa. Many of the political crimes now condemned in Chile and Brazil 
had a veneer of legality when they were committed under the umbrella of a 
national state of emergency. In a legal framework, retroactivity creates 
problems. Kaminski and Nalepa argue that retroactivity "can be justified on the 
grounds of natural or other law after demonstrating the lack of legitimacy of 
the past regime."32 On the other hand, the use of amnesty legislation as part of 
the process of transitional justice raises another set of concerns. These will be 
discussed in greater detail below, although it is worth noting that a majority of 
transitional justice efforts, such as truth commissions and other restorative 
justice measures following pacted transitions include amnesty as cornerstones 
of agreements.33 The use of amnesty has the potential to create a deficit in 
justice.  
A theory of post-transitional justice has developed to address the growing 
dissatisfaction with the measures achieved during the pacted negotiations and 
																																																						
29 Keller, “The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal Court”; 
Kersten, “Bringing Conflict into the Peace Versus Justice Debate”; Pillay and Sriram, Peace 
versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa; Portilla, “A Forgiveness Law: The 
Path to Solve the Peace Versus Justice Dilemma”; Rodman, “Peace Versus Justice.” 
30 Kaminski and Nalepa, “Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion for Evaluating Truth 
Revelation Procedures.” 
31 Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Post-communist States of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
32 Kaminski and Nalepa, “Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion for Evaluating Truth 
Revelation Procedures,” 389. 
33 Mallinder, “Exploring the Practice of States in Introducing Amnesties.” 
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to explain the amnesty reversals in the last 15 years.34 In explaining the concept 
of post-transitional justice (PTJ), Cath Collins outlines six characteristics of 
PTJ that separate this theoretical approach from traditional transitional justice 
theory. First, traditional transitional justice is concerned with the bare minimum 
that will ensure the stability of incoming democracy while PTJ measures are 
more concerned with questions of the perfectibility, quality and reach of the 
system. Second, PTJ questions the validity of the initial pacts that placed justice 
second to the political needs of the state. Third, PTJ is largely pushed forward 
by non-state actors. Fourth, PTJ efforts stem from a number of sources rather 
than a central effort. Fifth, the multiple sources of the efforts mean, in contrast 
with traditional transitional justice efforts, PTJ tends to have multiple aims. 
Sixth, PTJ is more likely to be more international in nature, in contrast with the 
endogenous transitional justice more commonly seen during the transition.35  
Transitional justice and PTJ measures are fundamentally concerned with the 
perceived deficit in justice that emerge during state transitions. Victims of a 
past regime are required to accept a bargain that ensures the path of 
democratisation at the expense of traditional justice for crimes committed 
against them. Transitional justice is the stop-gap measure to avoid complete 
collective forgetting. The emergence of PTJ paradigms reflect the failure of 
traditional transitional justice measures to satisfy the popular needs for justice.  
What marks the following study as different from the existing transitional 
and post-transitional justice literature is the examination of transitional justice 
in the context of democratic longevity. Rather than focusing on choices made 
during the transition as unique decisions made during a difficult period, the 
focus of this research is on the long-term consequences of these decisions, and 
their impact on the legitimacy of the democracy that amnesty effectively 
purchased.     ` 
 
1.4 Theoretical review 
Theories of democracy, justice and amnesty intersect and form the framework 
of this study. They are a response to the fundamental questions outlined above, and 
also inform this work’s key hypotheses. At the point of intersection of the three 
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main theories is the concept of equality. It is a characteristic that is fundamental to 
both justice and democracy, and without which serious concerns are raised about 
both concepts.36 However, of interest is not just that there is equality, but rather that 
it is perceived by the public to be present. Public perceptions of the presence of 
equality, justice and democracy legitimise and validate the choices made during and 
after the transition.37 
Do the general population believe that they have been granted or denied 
justice after a negotiation that “trades” the establishment of democracy for amnesty 
for human rights violators? Does the outcome of this perception challenge or 
confirm their perception of the legitimacy of the newly democratic government? 
Ultimately, political leadership can argue that exceptional times of a state transition 
call for exceptional measures, however the validity of this argument is dependent 
on how the actions are perceived by anyone involved. The long-term consequences 
of these trades rely on perceptions of them, and on whether the public supports a 
deficit in justice as a legitimate and sustainable choice. The question of legitimacy 
is central as, all definitions aside, it is considered one of the core drivers of any 
regime, as was observed by Max Weber.38  
 
1.4.1 The impact of perception on legitimacy 
One of the essential components of any political regime is the legitimacy 
of rule. At its most basic form, a state has political legitimacy when its authority 
to exercise political power and to make and enforce laws is generally 
accepted.39 Broadly, legitimacy requires the perception of legality, as well as 
the belief that the decision makers are doing what is in the interest of the wider 
public. Political legitimacy tends to break down when there is a belief that the 
leaders no longer represent the interests of the people and when the government 
loses the consent of the governed.40 One of the core drivers behind legitimacy 
is perception as perception can impact on how both the political elites and the 
public accept their governing regime.     
																																																						
36 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics; Saward, “Democratic Theory and Indices of 
Democratization”; Holden, Understanding Liberal Democracy. 
37 Barnard, Democratic Legitimacy : Plural Values and Political Power. 
38 Anter, Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State : Origins, Structure and Significance. 
39 Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy.” 
40 Buchanan. 
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An individual's perception of an event, issue or environment by no means 
translates into reality, it is a reflection of how each person senses and makes 
sense of their environment. Individual perception becomes the truth we each 
hold on to.41 Studies of perception, particularly in the field of psychology, have 
tended to show that a person's perception of justice and injustice can alter 
perceptions of fact.42 This can create challenges in the communication of events 
and processes, particularly in a political context. Each person and social group 
has the potential to sense an event or fact differently, based on ideology, 
situation and experience.43 
Public perceptions can have potentially volatile consequences. It is not 
just that each person perceives the world differently; individuals make 
decisions based on their perceptions, potentially placing how they sense the 
world above the reality of situations.  Perceptions of concepts such as 
democracy and justice hold significant weight as drivers of decision-making 
and behaviour. As such, perceptions can have an impact on the legitimacy of a 
state, regardless of regime type. Weber argues that legitimacy stems from three 
sources – traditional, legal and charismatic authority – with no single source 
entirely able to exist without elements of the others.44 Traditional authority is 
based on the idea that the institutional structure is how it has always been, and 
therefore legitimacy stems from the status quo. Legal authority is established 
through the widely acknowledged rules and laws of the state. Charismatic 
authority centres on the appeal of a leader. Citizens develop loyalty to the 
individual over the institutional structure.45 Similarly, John Fraser identifies 
two streams of thought regarding the term "legitimacy", one that focuses on 
legality and the other that focuses on psychology.46 The first looks at legality, 
traditionally understood in terms of a ruler's lineage with previous rulers. In a 
democratic environment, this has meant that governments are seen as legitimate 
																																																						
41 University of Chicago, “Perception.” 
42 Headey, “Distributive Justice and Occupational Incomes: Perceptions of Justice Determine 
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when following the legal structure of succession. However, simply assuming 
legality as a source of legitimacy may not be sufficient. Fraser argues that a 
second way of looking at legitimacy, as articulated by a number of other 
political scientists, is as a psychological concept.  As Fraser explains, 
In this sense, legitimacy doesn't refer to whether authorities or structure follow 
some concrete set of objective legal rules but to the extent to which members of 
the political system believe that the authorities and structures are adequate to meet 
the members’ own expectations as to how the political system ought to behave.47 
 
According to this explanation of political legitimacy, the public's 
perception of the behaviour of the government is more important than the 
institutional structure. If a person feels that the government is meeting his or 
her needs, this perception offers a higher level of legitimacy than if that person 
feels that there is a discrepancy between government actions and his or her own 
needs. The same can be said for collective groups, such as victim groups and 
other political actors during a transition.  
Collective memory can be said to play an important role in the 
development of individual perceptions. According to Holly Ryan, collective 
memory is “constructed within social structures and institutions such as the family, 
organization, and the nation-state…Collective or cultural memory to some degree 
determines what kinds of political ideas and practices become dominant in civil 
society.”48 While influencing the development of society in general, collective 
memory is particularly important in reference to understandings of authoritarian 
regimes, transitions and justice. Truth commissions are often an attempt to establish 
an official narrative of the past with the hope to influence the public’s collective 
memory.49 Justice and injustice can become central to a particular collective 
narrative, causing victims to embrace the identity of victimhood long after the state 
transition.50 This can then be passed from generation to generation, causing 
demands for justice and challenges to government legitimacy to long outlive the 
original victims and the original perpetrators. 
																																																						
47 Fraser, 118. 
48 Ryan, “From Absent to Present Pasts: Civil Society, Democracy and the Shifting Place of 
Memory in Brazil,” 162. 
49 Meiring, Chronicle of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Tutu, No Future Without 
Forgiveness; Ryan, “From Absent to Present Pasts: Civil Society, Democracy and the Shifting 
Place of Memory in Brazil.” 
50 Zalaquette, Personal Interview, Santiago, 08/05/2011. 
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Jean d’Aspremont argues that there are two important distinctions in the 
concept of legitimacy; legitimacy of origin (LO) and legitimacy of exercise 
(LE).51 According to d’Aspremont, LO refers to the source of power, while 
legitimacy of exercise refers to how that power is used.52 For non-democratic 
regimes, LO is often cultivated in providing a clear rational for the interruption 
of the previous institutional structure, for example, protection from a threat to 
national security or stability. LE can be provided by blending regime types. In 
the late Twentieth Century, a number of non-democratic regimes embraced, or 
at least claimed to embrace, elements of democracy to bolster public 
perceptions of legitimacy.53 In the context of real-politik, the actions of these 
regimes reflected the importance of perceived legitimacy for stable governance. 
However, over the last 50 years the most legitimate form of governance from 
both a domestic and international standpoint has been democracy.54 A key 
perception of democracy is that it provides for freedom of choice and human 
rights, and that it is thus deemed to be preferential over authoritarian regimes.55 
How accurate this perception is, particularly considering the pacts made to 
usher in the democratic institutional structure after an authoritarian regime, 
requires some analysis.  
 
1.4.2 Democracy Theory 
1.4.2.1 Defining democracy: the liberal democratic model 
Liberal democracy, defined broadly as a system that allows for both 
political liberties and democratic rule,56 requires both the expectation of human 
rights, as well as the expectation of certain electoral processes, government 
practices and law.57 It is this blend of liberalism and democracy that is most 
often seen as the 'success' of western states and the goal of democratizing 
nations. However, as proposed by T.F Rhoden, such rights belong more to 
liberalism than democracy itself. Without the rights ensconced in liberalism, 
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the outcome of rule by the people creeps closer to populist despotism than our 
current ideal.58 Equal rights place the liberal democratic model apart from other 
types of democratic regimes, such as delegative, participatory and electoral.   
Even at its most minimal definition, in a liberal democracy people have 
the right to vote and the expectation that their electoral choices will be 
translated to political representation. Liberal democracy also includes the 
expectation of a number of political rights, including free speech, freedom of 
expression, universal suffrage, the right to run for office and access to 
alternative sources of information.59 At its core is the expectation of legal and 
electoral equality.60 There is some debate around the level of economic 
development required to be defined as a liberal democracy,61 although the wider 
expectation has been that a free market goes hand in hand with this type of 
democratic development. This is, in part, due to the international push for 
democratisation that directly involves financial institutions including the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank).62 Research into the role 
economics plays in liberal democracies has found that "liberal-democratic 
societies are stable because this model of society is the most able to produce 
constant economic growth."63 Peter Kotzien argues that it is the economic 
growth of liberal democracies that fosters support of, and in turn support from 
the citizens. However, once economic growth is the norm, people will seek 
confirmation of their rights as expected from a liberal democracy. According to 
Kotzian, "economic growth may not be sufficient to make people fully satisfied, 
but without it support for democracy is at risk."64  
A liberal democracy can be built as a minimalist institutional structure 
with the basics listed above, or liberal democracy can become a way of life.65 
These broader or maximalist definitions of democracy require a number of core 
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characteristics beyond process to be present, including vertical and horizontal 
accountability and independence of elected officials from undue influence of 
outside institutions such as the military and government responsiveness.66 
Authors that promote this view of democracy argue that the top-down structural 
definition that places importance on process, institutions and law are not 
sufficient in identifying a democracy as such.67 Instead, a well-functioning 
democracy requires the presence of a number of characteristics that contribute 
to the quality of life of a democracy's citizens. 
 
1.4.2.3 What makes for a "good" democracy 
 Several authors have attempted to establish a method of assessing the 
quality of democracy, including David Beetham, Gerardo Munck, Jay 
Verkuilen, Tatu Vanhanen, Leonardo Morlino and Larry Diamond among 
others.68 These definitions of liberal democracy often include a description of 
characteristics required to be good or effective systems of governance. Such 
characteristics go beyond a traditional understanding of democracy discussed 
above by arguing that a good democracy must include a deep level of interaction 
between the government and the governed. This interaction, as well as the 
broader functioning of the democracy, is assessed via a number of quality 
indicators.69 Morlino offers three different potential meanings of the word 
quality when assessing democracy: procedure, content and result.70 Broadly, he 
argues that a widely legitimised regime offers quality of result. A moderate 
level of liberty and equality provides for quality in terms of content while a 
good democracy where citizens themselves can act as a check and balance to 
the power of the government provides for quality in terms of procedure.71 
Maximalist theorists attempt to present frameworks built around characteristics 
or qualities that “must be present” for a democracy to be effective. The quality 
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of democracy literature encompasses either quantitative or qualitative data 
measures, although they occasionally incorporate both. Quantitative 
assessments have traditionally involved survey data, assessing public 
perception of government action. Citizen audits of democracy, as advocated by 
O’Donnell and others, involve large-scale surveys gaging public perception of 
a particular state’s governance.72 Qualitative works have tended towards 
individual interviews and academic assessment of government action, as is 
presented in this research. The Quality of Democracy Index, produced by the 
Economic Intelligence Unit, uses both survey data and expert analysis to 
produce its assessment of global democracies.73 Brazil, Chile and South Africa 
have all been assessed as flawed democracies, at risk of following the global 
trend towards becoming hybrid regimes.74  
According to Morlino, eight qualities should to be present for a regime to 
be considered a good democracy. These are rule of law, electoral accountability, 
inter-institutional accountability, participation, competition, freedoms, 
equality and responsiveness.75 Other authors also present analytical frameworks 
incorporating both qualitative and quantitative research methods to assess the 
quality of democracy, in particular Arend Lijphart,76 and David Altman and 
Aníbal Perez-Liñan,77 although each author offers a different set of criteria for 
their assessment.78 The decision to utilise Morlino's framework for analysis is 
based on the potential for a qualitative analysis of a democracy using the eight 
criteria without the need of the addition of survey data. These eight qualities 
have been assessed against each case study by analysing available data, primary 
sources and interview responses.  
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The maximalist definition of democracy that includes an assessment of 
the quality of democracy is valuable for a number of reasons, it goes beyond 
the sometimes superficially applied regime labels. Maximalist understandings 
of democracy require a level of depth that may not necessarily be present in 
process orientated definitions of a democratic system. In some cases, including 
those of Brazil, Chile and South Africa, the regimes prior to the transition 
labelled themselves as democratic, embracing aspects of the process orientated 
definition including limited elections and some space for opposition.79 On the 
other hand, a number of aspects characteristic of authoritarian regimes, 
including state sponsored violence, continued to be present. The maximalist 
requirements of a good democracy are obviously much more difficult for 
authoritarian regimes to attain. 
A second rationale for embracing a maximalist application of the quality 
of democracy is that more pervasive democratic norms have the potential to 
increase the legitimacy of the regime.80 According to Morlino, "...there is 
legitimacy when there is a widespread belief among citizens that, in spite of 
their shortcomings and failures, existing political institutions are better than 
any others that might be established."81 On the flip side, established 
democracies can experience a decrease in legitimacy when citizens or political 
elites begin to feel that there are failures or weaknesses in democratic 
institutions.82  
The meaning and impact of democracy are important parts of the 
theoretical base of this study. Democracy, first at a process level and then in a 
more complete sense, is the central rationale for sacrificing demands for justice 
during a transition from an authoritarian regime.83 While the maximalist 
requirements of democracy may be beyond the reach of states in the early stages 
of transition, consolidation of a democratic system typically forces a more 
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complete assessment. As important as an understanding of democracy may be, 
it is also vital to explore transition theory. A brief explanation of this aspect of 
democratization is offered below.  
 
1.4.2.4 Disaggregating Governments 
While Morlino established elements for assessing a maximalist definition 
of a liberal democracy, there are a number of variables that can undermine the 
consolidation of the government. There are casual pathways between these 
variables, all emerging from the decisions made around amnesty, and issues that 
emerge in the development of each country’s democratic practices and norms. 
Each of these variables have been identified within the empirical research and 
then contrasted with the normative arguments around definitions of liberal 
democracies. Each variable contradicts or undermines characteristics 
considered essential for a good democracy. 
The variables considered within this research as contributing to the 
weakening of liberal democracies are as follows: 
1. Institutional impunity 
In each case study, cultures of impunity have continued to exist within 
key structures, including in political, police and judicial institutions. 
The culture of impunity that has developed within these key areas 
correlates to norms and expectations established by amnesty laws. 
Additionally there are instances where the boundaries of amnesty have 
been expanded to apply to actions outside of the agreed limits of 
amnesty or where the norms established by the amnesty have been 
used as justification for non-prosecution. This indicates the beginning 
of causal relationship between the use of amnesty and ongoing issues 
of impunity. Public perception of this impunity can undermine 
democratic legitimacy.  
2. Use of authoritarian practices within democratic context 
The use of particular authoritarian practices, and authoritarian era 
laws, during the democratic area directly challenges democratic 
norms. The continued use of these elements is connected to the 
absence of reckoning afforded by amnesty laws.  
3. Corruption 
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There are a number of causes of corruption and it would be impossible 
to establish a single casual pathway between corrupt practices and 
amnesty. However, as discussed above, it is reasonable to argue that a 
culture of impunity that develops through a lack of accountability will 
additionally contribute to impunity around corrupt practices.  
 
1.4.3 State Transitions  
The shift from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems is generally 
not a quick process. Moreover, a state transition involves many variables, some 
of which may not be entirely clear at the onset of the process. Existing power 
dynamics, national identity, the economy, the opposition and the long-term 
goals of each significant group all influence the democratic processes. The 
outcomes of such processes are by no means certain, with the potential for 
either a return to authoritarian rule or, often equally likely, to an alternative 
form of governance that may not necessarily be any better.84 
According to several authors, on the one side of the transition is the 
dismantling of the authoritarian regime or liberalization of the institutional 
structure,85 while on the other is the development of some form of democracy, 
a return to authoritarianism or the emergence of some sort of revolutionary 
alternative. This shift in regime type can be triggered either through defeat, a 
pacted negotiation or a mix of the two.86 While a number of theorists argue that 
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the liberalization that leads to a regime change is primarily triggered by schisms 
in the authoritarian coalition,87 Scott Mainwaring argues that this explanation 
provides only for a limited understanding of the process.88 According to 
Mainwaring, opposition actors and mass mobilization also play an important 
role. In some cases, there is, in fact, a combination of both elements intersecting 
to create the conditions suitable for a transition.      
The challenges facing the incoming democratic regime include a resistant 
authoritarian leadership concerned with maintaining their interests regardless 
of the transition's outcome, a weakened economy and a divided population.  
Institutional structures may have to be reworked, all the while maintaining 
enough stability to ensure the day-to-day functioning of governance. There is 
no clear map as to how to approach a transition, although some authors identify 
key steps. Dankwart Rustow's model, for example, begins with a fundamental 
background element: national unity.  "It simply means that the vast majority of 
citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to 
which political community they belong to."89 The first step in Rustow's model 
is the preparatory phase – a political struggle. This can be likened to O'Donnell 
et al.'s schism within the authoritarian regime,90 or Mainwaring's opposition 
and mass mobilization.91 Like Schmitter, Rustow points out that the preparatory 
stage is precarious, and not without the possibility of de-democratization. The 
fight may drag on until the opposing parties become weary and the issues fade 
away without the emergence of any democratic solution, or one group may find 
a way of crushing its opponents.92 According to Rustow, what concludes the 
preparatory phase is a deliberate decision on the part of the political elites to 
institutionalize some aspect of democratic procedure. The final stage of 
																																																						
threats to the governability of a transitioning state by guaranteeing the protection of vital interests 
of one or both sides. 
87 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead; Haggard and Kaufman; Przeworski. 
88 Scott Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and 
Comparative Issues (University of Notre Dame, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 
1989). 
89 Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative 
Politics, 2.3 (1970), 337–63. 
90 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead. 
91 Mainwaring. 
92 Rustow. 
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Rustow's model is habitation, also described as consolidation.93 This is an 
entrenchment of democratic ideals and institutions, to make any shift away 
from democracy a significant rupture.  
Transition theory is focused on achieving the minimal requirements of 
democracy, while the post-transition period looks towards the deepening of 
democratic institutions and the achievement of a more maximalist quality. The 
period of transition, while important, is of less importance for purposes of this 
study than the eventual post-transitional period that allows for reflection on the 
processes of democratization and establishment of justice. Once democratic 
culture has become firmly entrenched in a state, or at least is perceived as being 
more dominant than any other system, there is room to investigate the long-
term impact of amnesty legislation on the needs of justice and the perceptions 
of the democratic system.   
 
1.4.4 Theories of Justice 
 1.4.4.1 Understanding Justice 
Primarily found in the field of philosophy, discussions on the meaning of 
justice have produced a variety of answers; from Thrasymachus' argument that 
justice is the interest of the stronger to the Rawlsian argument that justice is 
fairness.94 While there is value of this debate, the popular perception of justice, 
as a concept and in practice, tends to fall outside of philosophical definitions. 
As discussed above, perception and the role it plays in legitimacy is given 
greater weight in this research, particularly as perceptions of justice can alter 
and determine perceptions of fact.95  
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1.4.4.2 Two streams of justice 
Definitions of justice develop along two distinct paths. Justice is either 
described as an innate quality of a situation, for example in John Rawls' 
argument of justice as fairness,96 or as an outcome.97 These two streams 
complicate the definition of justice, and are often used interchangeably rather 
than as distinct concepts. However, there are important differences between the 
two, particularly as to how one responds to the core question of whether 
fundamental principles of justice can be sacrificed for democracy. While justice 
as an innate quality is the focus of most of the academic debates around its 
definition, public perceptions of justice most often relate to outcomes such as 
the punishment of illegal or immoral acts.98 The fact that this stream of justice 
ties into public perceptions makes it relevant to explore the validity and impact 
of amnesty legislation central to state transition. As argued above, public 
perceptions are closely linked to legitimacy,99 and can have an important impact 
on the sustainability of a government, regardless of regime type.  
Viewing the concept of justice through the outcome paradigm also allows 
for a more tangible analysis of a given situation. This perspective allows 
researchers to ask questions that offer empirical responses. For example, was 
justice served by a particular measure? Rather than attempting to establish a 
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Wenzel and others, ‘Retributive and Restorative Justice’, Law and Human Behavior, 32.5 (2008), 
375–89. 
99 Headey. 
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philosophical framework to justify a given response, interviewees are able to 
examine their own experience and respond according to specific views. The 
outcome approach to understanding justice also allows for a concrete analysis 
of events. Did a person who committed a crime incur some form of punishment, 
either through retributive or restorative measures? If not, does this impunity 
amount to a lack of justice? To respond to this last question, it is important to 
establish what justice is from the perspective of the wider public. What do 
public groups and political elites mean when they demand justice after a crime 
has been committed?  
 
1.4.4.3 The “perception of justice” framework 
To understand justice from an outcome perspective it is necessary to 
establish a clear framework of justice. The question as to what is justice should 
be explored in relation to what the public perceives as justice. However, many 
contemporary debates on justice are distinctly philosophical and fail to take 
into account the power of perception in public understandings of the concept. 
As discussed above, positive perception can lend legitimacy to a political event 
or process. In analysing the threads of discourse that emerged from the primary 
and secondary data collection for this research, it became clear to the author 
that public perception plays an important role in how the concept of justice was 
used. In other words, it is helpful to assess what characteristics are required for 
a retributive or restorative act to be considered “justice”. After failing to find a 
suitable perception of justice framework in the existing literature, the author of 
this research developed a framework that was subsequently applied in each of 
the three case studies. A number of characteristics have been considered before 
settling on four distinct elements. The characteristics of justice are fairness, equality 
of application, law and legitimacy.  
Fairness - Rawls explored the concept of justice as fairness at great length in a 
number of his works.100 In outcomes, fairness encompasses a number of basic 
factors, in particular proportionality. The outcome or punishment should be 
proportional to the crime. A sentence of one or two years for crimes against 
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(1958), 164–94; John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 14.3 (1985), 223–51. 
	 25	
humanity101 has the potential to be viewed by the wider public, and by victims in 
particular, as disproportionate to acts committed, even in the context of a state 
transition. Granting amnesty contravenes a basic sense of fairness, offending public 
sensibilities that demand visible consequences that are beyond narrow legal 
norms.102 
Equality of Application - A clear argument can be made for universality of 
application in punishment.103 If person A is sentenced to 10 years for a crime, then 
the same sentence should be handed out to person B if they have committed a 
similar offense. While this may be obvious, the impunity or light sentences typically 
enjoyed by the political and military elites during and after a state transition are not 
shared by other groups in society accused of the same crimes. Amnesty legislation, 
used to facilitate the transition, tends to favour the elites of the outgoing regime. In 
some cases, as in Chile, the left was either so diminished that the universality of the 
amnesty legislation was a token gesture to legitimise self-granted immunity or, as 
in the case of South Africa, the law was seen as the only way to halt state sponsored 
violence, giving the opposition little room to dictate the terms.  
Law - The third indicator of justice the entrenchment in the legal system. 
Government and civil society actors should follow the same 'rule book', and the 
rules should be generally agreed upon in the form of a constitution or statute. If the 
outcome of an infraction is clearly established prior to the crime itself, then most 
can agree that justice is served when the punishment is enacted accordingly.  
Legitimacy - This fourth indicator of justice, legitimacy, dictates that a law must be 
proportional and follow established legislation. The question will remain, however, 
whether it is perceived as legitimate by the public. As discussed above, legitimacy 
has an impact on government. Legitimacy can also have an impact on the form and 
content of law. If a piece of legislation is considered as illegitimate, the public will 
resist it. Prohibition, Jim Crow Laws and Apartheid are all examples of legal norms 
																																																						
101 Crimes against humanity, as described in the introduction and discussed below, are defined as 
crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population". For further explanation see Article 7 of ‘Rome Statute of the International Court’, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1998 <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/585-
07?OpenDocument> [accessed 29 July 2014]. 
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that were widely contravened, to the detriment of the law and, in some cases, the 
regional or national governance. Fundamentally illegitimate laws tend to be viewed 
and challenged as unjust.  
 
The following table examines each of these factors and the research 
questions that relate to each one. 
 
Table 1.1: Perception of Justice Indicators 
Indicator Research Questions 
Fairness Was the sentence proportional to the crime? 
Equality of 
Application 
Did everyone who committed the crime receive the same 
outcome (whether amnesty or punishment)? 
Law Did the act contravene an existing law? 
Legitimacy 
 
Do the wider public perceive the law and outcome as 
legitimate? 
 
Each of these characteristics contributes to public perceptions of justice, 
while individual characteristics are, at times, identified in public discourse, the 
four taken together as the basis of a framework offer a more robust explanation 
of public perceptions of justice, giving depth to the term for purposes of this 
study. 
 
 
1.4.5 A word on equality  
As mentioned above, one of the key intersections of democracy and theories 
of justice is the concept of equality. Dahl outlined an argument on the central role 
of equality in democracy in his book Democracy and its critics. According to Dahl, 
"democracy might...be little more than a philosophical fantasy were it not for the 
persistent and widespread influence of the belief that human beings are intrinsically 
equal in a fundamental way...."104 While certainly one of the most direct 
explanations of the role that equality plays in democracy, Dahl is by no means the 
only theorist to claim this as an intrinsic characteristic, nor was he the first. John 
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Locke expanded on the idea of equality in his Second Treatise of Government,105 
and Bhikhu Parekh argued that political equality before the law and the state is a 
core characteristic present to some degree in all liberal democracies.106 In 
Understanding Liberal Democracy,107 Barry Holden contended that equality is one 
of the three key concepts of liberal democracy, along with liberty and democracy. 
Holden argued that democracy is seen to be bound in two ways to the principal of 
equality. First, most supporters of democracy support the idea that all men are equal. 
Second, this inherent quality of humanity is best served by democracy.108  
These fundamental beliefs in equality are also present in discussions of 
justice, although they are often tied to the language of fairness. The Rawlsian 
argument of justice as fairness109 places everyone in an equal position of ignorance 
before the collective decision of what is just can be decided. Christopher Ake claims 
that there is something more tangible in the relationship between justice and 
equality than simply that of a social virtue as described by Rawls. He argues that 
"justice in a society as a whole ought to be understood as a complete equality of 
level of the benefits and burdens of each member of that society."110 Justice requires 
equality to permeate through every facet of society, not only in the legal sense.  
The argument that the perception of equality is at the heart of both democracy 
and justice raises a key question in relation to the use of amnesty legislation. The 
denial of justice during a state transition creates an absence of equality before the 
law.111 Victims’ rights are placed below those of the rest of the state, highlighted in 
the “exceptional times” argument used in support of amnesty legislation.112 This 
vacuum of equality does not stand alone. According to the arguments presented by 
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111 This absence in equality before the law was highlighted in the case brought by victims’ groups 
against the South African government. Lawyers for the plaintiffs argued that amnesty legislation 
contravened guaranteed rights articulated in the new democratic constitution, in particular the right 
of all people to seek redress for crimes committed against them. For more see: ‘Azanian Peoples 
Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
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112 The exceptional times argument is presented clearly in the South African Constitutional Court’s 
findings in the above case, and is regularly sited as the reason for using amnesty legislation as a 
tool during state transitions.  
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Holden et al, equality is at the heart of democracy. The absence or denial of equality 
in justice fosters the perception that there is an absence of equality in the democracy. 
In turn, this can have a direct impact on the quality of democracy and the state's 
governability.  
 
1.4.6 Amnesty legislation 
1.4.6.1 A negotiated choice 
One of the core issues that arise during pacted negotiations is the 
agreement to and/or the continuance of amnesty legislation. This effort to 
expunge criminal or civil liability for crimes committed during an authoritarian 
regime is usually considered necessary to the transition process, with one side 
– the outgoing regime – requiring the acceptance to amnesty before 
democratization can begin. The threat of violence is often articulated by 
outgoing leaders or their supporters if amnesty, in some form or another, is not 
agreed to.113 Chile's outgoing dictator, Augusto Pinochet, reportedly warned 
"touch one hair on the head of my soldiers, and you lose your new 
democracy."114 If the request for a new amnesty law is made, or the request for 
the maintenance of an existing law is expressed, it is almost always accepted 
during the negotiation process. Too weak to force domestic trials, or facing a 
political environment with too many factions, the incoming government often 
sees little alternative to accepting amnesty legislation.115 But while seen as a 
tool during a fragile process, amnesty legislation can take on a more prominent 
role in the post-authoritarian political and institutional development, becoming 
entrenched in the state's democratic structure.116 Amnesty legislation, often 
cloaked in the claim of necessity, becomes the sticking point in the questions 
around what to do about the past. But to understand whether amnesty can be 
maintained in perpetuity, a clear understanding of amnesty, its application and 
its historical role in democratic transitions must be considered.  
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	 29	
Most amnesty laws are used to eliminate criminal or civil liability for 
violence including crimes against humanity (CAH). CAH are typically 
considered "international" in nature.117  This adds an important dimension to 
the understanding and debate around the use of amnesty legislation. The 
international nature of crimes against humanity means that they tend to generate 
international acknowledgement and response. William Schabas argues that the 
international nature of human rights obligations bypasses the traditional state 
sovereignty argument.118  
Where these obligations are breached, the individual may be punished for such 
international crimes as a matter of international law, even if his or her own State, 
or the State where the crime was committed, refuses to do so.119 
 
Amnesty has been used periodically throughout history, and was 
particularly evident during the wave of democratization that took place in the 
latter half of the  Twentieth Century.120 The use of amnesty legislation during a 
state transition typically reflects its pacted nature and the absence of a clear 
victor.121 It also indicates a fragmented community, with enough support for the 
outgoing regime to guarantee a continuing lack of accountability for the 
political violence perpetrated by its leaders and more often than not, the state's 
military and police forces.122 This was the experience of Chile and South Africa, 
where negotiators in Chile had to deal with an almost 50/50 split of support, 
and a very powerful defence force in South Africa. History has also shown, in 
parts of Latin America and Europe at least, that amnesty legislation does not 
last. This negotiated law, considered vitally necessary at the time, becomes 
problematic in the decades following the transition, creating a contested legacy 
of the state transition.  
 
 
																																																						
117 Ntoubandi; Chigara; Andreas O’Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
118 The state sovereignty argument rests heavily on the idea that law and order is a sovereign issue, 
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1.4.6.2 What is amnesty legislation? 
On a simple level, amnesty legislation can be defined as a form of 
impunity or amnesia regarding past criminal actions. The words "amnesty" and 
"amnesia" originate from the Greek term "amnestia", meaning 
“forgetfulness”.123 National amnesty legislation inevitably involves some form 
of public forgetfulness of past crimes. According to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, 
Impunity" means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators 
of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary 
proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being 
accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and 
to making reparations to their victims.124 
 
While impunity can take on a number of forms during a transition, from 
statutes of limitations to de facto immunity through an unwillingness to pursue 
criminal liability,125 the focus here is on the actual amnesty laws that are passed 
or maintained as part of the pacted transition. According to Ben Chigara, the 
goal of national amnesty laws is to expunge "criminal and/or civil liability of 
agents of a prior regime alleged to have violated basic human rights of 
individuals."126 These laws can be self-granted, written and passed by the 
authoritarian regime, usually after a particularly violent period. In Chile, Brazil 
and South Africa, the authoritarian regimes granted themselves, and their 
agents amnesty after periods of significant repression, and these grants occurred 
long before the eventual democratic transition.127 While self-granted, the 
outgoing regimes make it very clear that these laws would be non-negotiable 
during the democratisation process.128 Alternatively, national amnesty laws can 
be debated during the state transition and are considered a key part of 
negotiations for the transfer of power. South Africa's transition pivoted on 
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granting amnesty for the more brutal aspects of the country's authoritarian 
order. 
 
 1.4.6.3 Typology of Amnesty legislation 
As mentioned above, amnesty laws can be broken down into two types of 
legislation. They are either imposed on the people, or they can stem from the 
electoral process.129 Chigara explains that imposed amnesties are put into law 
by authoritarian regimes themselves either as laws or decrees that predate the 
transition process, or as fundamental requirements of eventual negotiation 
processes. While many would argue the latter is not an imposition per se, the 
lack of flexibility of the outgoing regime on this point and the perceived 
inability of the incoming government to institute some sort of punishment or 
criminal liability for past crimes, transforms such negotiated laws into 
impositions.130 The core difference in elective amnesty laws from those that are 
imposed is that the incoming governments decide that granting amnesty to 
members of the previous regimes is beneficial to the state. These are pragmatic 
and highly political decisions that are not necessarily required for transition to 
democratic rule.  
From within this broad typology of amnesty comes a defining 
subcategory. Amnesty legislation inevitably falls within two forms: blanket 
amnesty and particularized (also known as conditional) amnesty.131 Blanket 
amnesty is the blanket coverage of political crimes committed during a specific 
time period, without any requirement of information, remorse or acceptance of 
culpability.132 Particularized amnesty requires something from those who would 
seek coverage of the law. This type of amnesty process can require those 
seeking amnesty to give up their weapons, provide information, admit the truth 
about past violence and tell the incoming government where their victims may 
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be hidden or buried.133 Particularized amnesty is a response to some of the core 
criticisms of the former, though whether particularized amnesty is in fact able 
to make up for the shortcomings of blanket amnesty is up for debate, 
particularly in its application.134 
The best-known use of particularized amnesty was in South Africa, 
through its Truth and Reconciliation process (TRC). This will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Four. Briefly, the majority of the goals of the South African 
process lay in reconciliation, with a lesser form of accountability. Particularized 
amnesty was meant to provide healing through truth, while pursuing 
prosecutions against those who refused to take part, or who gave 
misinformation.135  
 
1.4.6.4 Arguments for and against amnesty legislation 
For every amnesty law that is passed, there are those who support the 
action out of necessity, or the desire to move beyond the atrocities of the past. 
There will also always be those who argue against the legislation, arguing that 
those who committed significant violence should be held accountable and thus 
punished. Those against amnesty are left with few options outside of the 
judicial arena to pursue traditional forms of justice.136 The following reasons 
for and against amnesty legislation are often cited in debates, court cases and 
academic literature.  
The pro-amnesty side of the debate can be distilled into five main 
arguments.137 These are politically pragmatic in nature, as opposed to the more 
idealistic goal of reconciliation that is also often cited. While other arguments 
in support of amnesty may also be put forward, the five listed here are those 
arguments that are most often used.138 First, without some form of amnesty, 
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there is a real possibility that the security forces of transitioning states and their 
supporters will resist any change to the power structure. Second, most incoming 
governments have few resources to pursue investigations and convictions of 
past human rights abuses. Third, even if investigations are feasible, the number 
of victims and the secretive nature of many authoritarian regimes mean that 
proving guilt beyond the shadow of doubt will be difficult. This is particularly 
the case where past regimes have conducted extensive campaigns to destroy 
evidence, as was the case in Brazil and South Africa.139 Fourth, in some cases 
criminal prosecutions may extend beyond the outgoing regime to include 
members of the opposition, and this has the potential to destabilise the 
transition. Fifth, pacted negotiations are not a matter of a victor and loser.140 
More often than not, neither side is able to win outright.141 The authoritarian 
regime recognises that its legitimacy has been reduced to the point that it can 
no longer rule without an escalation of violence. Nevertheless, it may still have 
enough support from the political elite to play the role of kingmaker or, at very 
least, of influence within the democratisation process and hence disrupt 
proceedings. 
A growing number of scholars have presented legal arguments against 
amnesty legislation, for example that agreement to existing or to new amnesty 
laws represents illegal acts on the part of the incoming democratic leaders. 
Chigara identifies four reasons that make amnesty laws untenable. First, if 
justice, and more broadly, "life, liberty and estate",142 are the rights of each 
individual, then amnesty laws are the trade-off of the rights of the victim by the 
state without the right of title. Second, state legitimacy is called into question 
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if the government is able to transfer victim's rights for the hope or promise that 
democracy will be realised at some undetermined time in the future. Third, 
amnesty legislation flies in the face of international law. In the case of crimes 
against humanity, in particular, international statutes such as the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984), take precedent over domestic sovereignty. Fourth, amnesty 
legislation asks for some form of a "blind, denied or forgotten history."143 But 
with no future guaranteed, can the trade-off of victim's rights be justified? The 
danger is that if democracy proves too difficult, victim's still have no redress 
for the past. Granting or maintaining amnesty “adjusts” the rights of the victim 
to zero on the basis of an unguaranteed greater good. In addition to these stated 
reasons against amnesty, the use of this type of legislation raises questions 
regarding the legitimacy of a state built on the denial of justice.  
 
1.4.7 Crimes against Humanity 
Arguments against the use of amnesty legislation tend to be built around 
the idea that the crimes that most often come under its aegis go beyond the 
jurisdiction of domestic law.144 The concept of crimes against humanity (CAH) 
was developed at the end of World War Two as one of the three classes of crimes 
articulated in the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
signed by the allied forces.145 The other two were crimes against peace, and war 
crimes. Since then, a number of international laws have given a special status 
to CAH, which are also described as international crimes. The Office of the 
High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) Updated Set of Principles for 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat 
Impunity specifically restricts the use of amnesty for international crimes (such 
as crimes against humanity). Principle 25 goes on to say that these restrictions 
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stand, even when the legislation is part of peace agreements or to promote 
national reconciliation.146 
International crimes are considered crimes against more than merely the 
individuals involved, but against humanity as a whole. These are acts that 
"trample underfoot the laws of God, and humanity, crimes jus cogens, and grave 
violations of human rights."147 Applying the parameters established by the 
International Military Tribunal in 1945, crimes against humanity were more 
clearly defined during the trial of Klaus Barbie in France in 1987.148 For the 
purposes of the Nuremburg Trials, crimes against humanity were defined as 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population before or during war; or persecution on 
political, racial, religious grounds in execution of or in connection within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the 
country where it was perpetrated.149 
 
The international community has since further entrenched the concept of 
crimes against humanity into international law with the Convention of the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations of War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity (1968), the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), which establishes apartheid as a 
crime against humanity, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), among others. More 
recently, during the case against former military leader, Lt.Col Desi Bouterse, 
international law expert John Dugard explained the six characteristics that now 
make up the legal understanding of CAH.150 According to Dugard, crimes 
against humanity must be committed against a civilian population, must be 
collective in nature, there must be accompanied by evidence that the acts were 
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State - or organised non-state - sanctioned, must be systematic, widespread or 
large-scale, do not need to be carried out in a discriminatory or persecutory 
manner, and the perpetrator must be proven to have the necessary mens rea to 
be held accountable.151 Despite international agreements that are generally 
punitive against CAH, the international community has generally been slow to 
take actual action against leaders of previous authoritarian regimes, particularly 
those that have been amnestied. In the 313 post-WWII conflicts identified by 
Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, only 1 per cent of perpetrators of CAH have been 
held accountable, with 40 per cent of perpetrators receiving some form of 
amnesty.152   
Granting amnesty for crimes against humanity is problematic, raising 
significant questions around which offenses can be granted immunity from 
prosecution. The arguments for amnesty reflect the pressing needs of 
exceptional and difficult times, while the arguments against it reflect growing 
legal concerns. In the end, there is a fundamental standard of human rights that 
typically insists on those rights’ precedence over convenience.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
 1.5.1 Two Methodological Approaches 
 Two distinct methodological approaches have been employed in this research. 
The normative approach pivots on the fundamental question of whether amnesty 
can be used in a liberal democracy without undermining the political structure. As 
a normative argument, this focuses on the norms and expectations of liberal 
democracy in contrast with the requirements of amnesty. The normative approach 
attempts to establish whether there are areas of incompatibility between the 
expectations of a liberal democracy and amnesty legislation.  
 The second methodological approach is empirical, pivoting on the evidence 
gleaned through primary and secondary research to explore whether amnesty can 
have an impact on the development of a stable liberal democracy. While there is a 
myriad of variables that have an impact on democratic consolidation in the decades 
that follow a transition, the empirical section of this research points to correlation 
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between amnesty and some of the key areas of weakness in the subsequent 
democracy. These areas include culture of impunity in political, judicial and police 
services, corruption and the use of authoritarian political tools within the 
democratic context. 
 The correlation between amnesty, these areas of weakness and the stability of 
liberal democracies is an area that is explored in this research, with the 
understanding that there is significant space for further investigation. 
 
1.5.2 Comparative Analysis 
The long-term efficacy of amnesty legislation can be examined either through 
quantitative or qualitative methods and both of these very general approaches were 
considered for this research. The choice to examine this issue using qualitative 
measures and a case study research design stems from the depth of understanding 
and detail that it offers. Case study analysis allows researchers the opportunity to 
examine a causal relationship from a number of angles and to explore what makes 
that case unique, interesting and informative.  Within the small set of case studies 
in this work, there is an implicit micro-macro link, that is, the ability to draw limited 
generalisations regarding social and political behaviour from a smaller to broader 
scale.153 This is significant with what are called instrumental case studies, which 
aim to "provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalisation."154 
Bill Graham describes case studies as "a unit of human activity embedded in 
the real world...which can only be studied or understood in context." 155  This 
straightforward explanation of case studies is disputed, in that others argue that 
there is more ambiguity in the construction of a case study then simply a unit of 
human activity. Such ambiguity breeds confusion. Gerring describes this situation 
as a "definitional morass"156 made more difficult by a number of near-synonyms of 
the term case study such as single unit, single subject and single case. Rob 
VanWhynsberghe and Samia Kahn157 claim that the term case study has become a 
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catch-all for a variety of research methods, methodologies and designs, and as a 
consequence has come to mean very little. In an attempt to clear away the confusion 
and introduce a solid definition, Gerring argues that at its heart, a case study is made 
up of three elements -- time, space, and a phenomenon. These boundaries can be 
small, such as in a case study of a single person, or they can expand to the study of 
a nation-state. Gerring's definition of a case study tends towards presenting the idea 
as a research design. Harry Eckstein158 identifies four types of case studies, based 
on the underlying goals of case studies in relation to theory formation. His typology 
is made up of the configurative-idiographic study, disciplined-configurative study, 
heuristic case studies and plausibility probes. While it is debatable whether 
development of theory is possible from case studies, Eckstein argues that this is one 
of the key roles of case study analysis, with each type of case study offering a 
different path to theory development. VanWhynsberghe and Kahn disagree with this 
approach, however, and argue that defining case studies as a research design is 
restrictive. They argue that case studies represent a “transparadigmatic” and 
“transdisciplinary” heuristic "that allows for the circumscription of the unit of 
analysis."159 The authors present their inclusive definition in an effort to 
accommodate variables that sit outside tighter definitions.  
Criticisms of the case study approach are most often based on the argument 
that an in-depth study cannot provide the basis for generalizability—one of the 
goals of social science.160 At issue, according to Bent Flyvberg, are 
misunderstandings regarding the case study's ability to provide a measure of 
"theory, reliability and validity".161 However advocates of this approach including 
Flyvbjerg, Eckstein and others, reject this view. Eckstein's work relates "n = 1 to all 
phases of theory building and particularly to stress the utility of cases study where 
rigour is most required and case studies have been considered least useful."162 
Flyvbjerg ties the value of case studies to basic human experience with learning. 
																																																						
158 Harry Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’, in Strategies of Inquiry, ed. by 
Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 1St Edition edition (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc, 1975). 
159 VanWynsberghe and Khan, p. 90. 
160 Eckstein; Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Case Study’, in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. 
by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Fourth Edition edition (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, Inc, 2011); Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 
Qualitative Inquiry, 12.2 (2006), 219–45. 
161 Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, p. 221. 
162 Eckstein, p. 132. 
	 39	
First, he argues, the context-dependent knowledge born out of case studies is what 
allows a person to move from "rule-based beginners to virtuoso experts. Second, in 
the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent 
knowledge, which, thus, presently rules out the possibility of epistemic theoretical 
construction."163 According to Gerring, case studies are  
generally more useful when (1) when inferences are descriptive rather than causal, 
(2) when propositional depth is prized over breadth and boundedness, (3) when 
(internal) case comparability is given precedence over (external) case 
representativeness, (4) when insight into causal mechanisms is more important 
than insight into causal effects, (5) when the causal proposition at issue is invariant 
rather than probabilistic, (6) when the strategy of research is exploratory, rather 
than confirmatory, and (7) when useful variance is available for only a single unit 
or a small number of units.164  
 
The method of research that underpins case study analysis can be as 
ambiguous as the definition of case study itself. While phrases such as qualitative 
research or ethnographic studies are used as a short hand for case study research, 
this is misleading, or rather, incomplete.165 As Eckstein indicates in his work briefly 
mentioned above, there are a number of types of case study analysis, each with its 
own approach to gathering data. Ultimately, the "intensive study of a single unit 
with the aim to generalize across a larger set of units"166 can be constructed in a 
number of ways. Eckstein illustrates the case study methodology by contrasting 
experimental medical studies using large sample numbers and clinical studies that 
focus on individuals. The experimental study is run by a strictly defined and 
constrained research design, while "the typical clinical study is much more open-
ended and flexible at all stages."167 Typical case study research includes interviews, 
archival documents and other related research with the goal of deep understanding 
of the topic. Robert Stake argues that case study analyses draw from six areas: "the 
nature of the case; the case's historical background; the physical setting; other 
contexts (e.g., economic, political, legal and aesthetic); other cases through which 
this case can be recognised; the informants through whom the case can be 
known."168 
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In examining whether amnesty legislation and a robust liberal democracy can 
co-exist, a number of research-related choices became necessary. Put simply, the 
methodological approach used for this research is a collective (multi) case study 
analysis examining the experiences of Brazil, Chile and South Africa. The study is 
instrumental rather than intrinsic in language employed by Stake;169 these selected 
case studies should tell us something about the long-term impact of amnesty 
legislation in a democracy. The information gathered through interviews, archives 
and broader research promise to illustrate the experience of each of the case studies, 
offering both points of similarity and contrast.  
This research was designed as collective case studies to provide depth of 
understanding of the experiences of each state, as well to identify points of 
comparison. As a heuristic case study, this work "tie[s] directly into theory building, 
and therefore is less concerned with overall concrete configurations than with 
potentially generalizable relations between aspects of them..."170 Gerhard Kleining 
and Harald Witt argue that heuristic case studies are defined by their flexibility, 
allowing new evidence to shape the direction of the research. 171 
Chile, Brazil and South Africa are not the most common grouping of states in 
the literature dealing with transitional justice. The differences between these three 
states include region, authoritarian regime types, levels and types of violence, 
transition processes and outcomes of transitional justice efforts. Their single 
commonality is their use of amnesty legislation as part of their respective bargain 
for democracy. South Africa, Brazil and Chile all introduced or maintained amnesty 
legislation during their democratisation processes. However, even here there were 
differences -- each of these three countries used amnesty legislation differently, and 
with varying degrees of success. The choice of these three countries came down to 
a single concern: each individual country was instructive as a single case study 
about the transitional justice process. Together, this group of states appeared to be 
instrumental in understanding a key problem: the capacity of democracy and 
amnesty to co-exist.  
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Since the end of World War II, a number of states have used some form of 
amnesty legislation to help convince authoritarian leaders to step aside and allow 
for democratisation.172 In an attempt to identify suitable cases for this research, 
selection parameters were created. The basic parameters set for this research were:  
1. Time frame -- the authoritarian regime had to have risen to power 
in the mid-to second half of the Twentieth Century and the transition needed 
to have taken place in the 1980s/early 1990s, giving sufficient time to reflect 
on the longevity of amnesty legislation in a liberal democracy. 
2. Pacted negotiation -- The existence or maintenance of the 
amnesty legislation had to be agreed upon rather than serving as the 
preference of the conquered over the vanquished.  
3. The presence of violence -- the amnesty legislation had to cover 
state-sponsored acts of violence 
4. Democratic development -- the state had to have developed, or 
attempted to develop, some form of liberal democracy.  
 
Beyond these basic points, this research also sought to highlight the outcomes 
of the different types of amnesty legislation, attempting to identify whether or not 
there was greater utility in particularised amnesty in its coexistence with a liberal 
democracy over the outcomes generated by blanket amnesty laws. 
Out of a potential pool of case studies, South Africa, Brazil and Chile were 
chosen for their compatibility with the above parameters as well as what could be 
learnt from their differences. In terms of points of commonality, these three states 
all experienced forms of authoritarian regimes after World War II. South Africa's 
apartheid regime stands slightly separate from the other two countries in its form of 
authoritarian regime; however, it is still in the same wheelhouse in its opposition to 
the ideal of the liberal democratic state and use of the security apparatus as a core 
tool of control. Brazil, Chile and South Africa all transitioned towards democracy 
in the 1980s or very early 1990s, giving ample time for the democratic structure 
and norms to take hold and, potentially, to challenge the legitimacy of the agreed 
upon amnesty legislation. Pacted negotiations marked the transition towards 
democracy for Chile and South Africa, although less so for Brazil. In Brazil, the 
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negotiation process was within the authoritarian regime itself as opposed to within 
any significant opposition. The levels of violence in each of the three states varied. 
Regardless, opposition members in all three states experienced violence, repression 
and general persecution at the hands of the non-democratic regimes. Finally, each 
one of these countries entered a period of liberal democracy at the end of the 
transition process. 
The points of differences in the case studies are as valuable as the points of 
similarity. Brazil, Chile and South Africa have each begun with an amnesty law, 
however these laws have developed in different ways over time. Have the 
differences at the laws' inception changed the outcomes? The answers to these 
questions can be found in the outcomes of the individual case studies. 
I also have a personal connection with each of the cases studies.  I am South 
African by birth. My family left apartheid-controlled South Africa when I was five. 
I am connected to Chile through my sister-in-law, and travelled there a number of 
times prior to conducting research. My first degree was in Spanish. Finally, my 
chief supervisor has focused on Brazil throughout his academic career and was able 
to provide a depth of understanding and insight valuable to this work. My field 
research in Brazil, and my interviews there, opened my eyes to a world of 
comparisons and contrasts in that rich land. 
In the tradition of case study analysis, the purpose of this research is to 
explore an idea (amnesty legislation; democracy), to be flexible about the research 
direction, and to discover the similarities and significant contrasts between these 
case studies. This is achieved through a number of different methods of inquiry. 
Primary and secondary sources in various forms were utilised to develop a clearer 
picture of the often-surprising uses of amnesty, as well as its unexpected longevity 
in South Africa, Brazil and Chile. 
In 2011, I spent five weeks in each country conducting interviews and 
accessing archival documents. Subsequent interviews were conducted via Skype. 
These interviews were conducted in English. These data sets were supplemented by 
an extensive analysis of academic literature examining the authoritarian and 
democratic experiences of each state. 
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1.5.2.1 Primary Sources  
The primary sources used in this research include interviews, source 
documents and other forms of data from a number of in-country archives. As 
explored in Ranjit Kumar's Research Methodology,173 interviewing best 
accommodates complex situations and is useful for collecting in-depth data. 
Information can be supplemented by non-verbal cues and questions and answers 
can be teased out and explained. Interviews can also be adapted and used across the 
population. However, interviewing, particularly as part of international research, is 
expensive, time consuming and language dependent. Interviews are dependent on 
the "quality of interaction" between the participants and the interviewer, and depend 
on the skill and experience of the interviewer. The information gathered during an 
interview has the potential to vary due to outside factors (such as relationship 
between participants and interviewers, the number of times a person is interviewed, 
etc), and there is the possibility that the interviewer may introduce his/her own bias 
into the data collection and analysis.174  
Archival documents, such as minutes of negotiations, can offer the official 
narrative of an event or period. The strength of these documents is that they rely 
less on recollection than do other sources. However, as documents of record, they 
have already been subject to levels of interpretation, including the very simple 
decision to keep one document over another.  
Interviews   
During research conducted in 2011 in Brazil, Chile and South Africa, 11 in-
depth interviews were held with members of the political elite, human rights 
activists and lawyers who were part of the transition process. Three further 
interviews were conducted via Skype and in-person from New Zealand following 
the same methodological approach as the interviews conducted in-person. A further 
seven interviews were conducted with observers such as journalists and academics. 
All questions were submitted in advance to, and approved by, the Faculty of Arts 
and Social Sciences of the University of Waikato Research Ethics Committee, as 
per standard human research ethics protocol. These interviewees all contributed to 
a deeper understanding of decision-making process involved during the pacted 
																																																						
173 Ranjit Kumar, Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners (Sydney, Australia: 
Addison Wesley Longman Pty Limited, 1996). 
174 Kumar. 
	44	
negotiations, particularly in relation to the amnesty legislation. They were also 
asked to explore the ongoing roll of the amnesty and justice in their respective 
countries and how these two concepts interacted as part of the state's democracy. 
The process was semi-structured, with a set of predetermined questions 
complimented by the direction offered by the participants themselves. The focus of 
each interview—the use of amnesty and its long-term consequences—were 
predetermined and made clear amongst the various participants. The interviews 
tended to range across a variety of subjects; including the concept of justice, how it 
is popularly perceived and the connection impunity has in popular perceptions with 
current human rights issues. Each interviewee was selected on the basis of the role 
also played in the transition process. Availability and willingness to speak on these 
issues played a key role in the number and selection of participants. In South Africa 
and Chile interviewees were more available and willing to be interviewed than they 
were in Brazil. There are a number of possible reasons as to why this may have 
been the case, although it is likely that timing contributed to the unwillingness of 
some members of the political elite to participate in this research—interviews were 
conducted at the same time as the negotiations that took place in the formation of 
Brazil's first truth commission.  In the end, 37 potential participants who belonged 
to this group were contacted, of which 20 were willing to be interviewed.  
The interview responses were then thematically organized in a discourse-
analysis matrix. The analysis themes included justice, amnesty, transitional justice, 
post-transitional justice, democracy, international involvement, the authoritarian 
regime and legal. This process allowed the researcher to identify and highlight the 
fundamental threads of the discourse, and points that were commonly shared across 
interview participants.  
Archival documents. 
 Archived documents were accessed in each country. These archived materials 
included minutes from negotiations, transcripts and reports of the truth commission 
proceedings, and copies of the constitution and other related laws. These documents 
added significantly to the case study analyses, giving first-hand information 
regarding the transitional justice processes, as well as clarifying the laws used to 
establish the subsequent liberal democracies. The key themes of discourse, amnesty, 
justice and democracy were used as general search terms, though research was not 
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limited to these. Articles from contemporaneous media coverage on these topics 
have also been used to inform the research. 
 
1.5.2.2 Secondary Sources  
Media Reports. Efforts at transitional justice, amnesty legislation and their 
impact on democracy, have featured in local media. Accessed via archives in both 
digital and hard copy, these reports contributed to the texture and depth of 
information for each case study, with the information illustrating how the key issues 
are perceived in the media. These reports also provided useful information and 
quotes from members of the political elite that were unavailable for interviews, and 
further information from those that were interviewed. Media reports can be 
classified as either primary or secondary sources, depending on the focus of 
analysis. When part of a discourse analysis, media reports are primary sources. 
When used to give context to past events, they were secondary sources.  
Relevant literature. There are a number of works broadly examining the 
transitional justice experiences of Chile, South Africa and Brazil. These texts have 
been used, where appropriate, to contribute towards the analysis of the longevity of 
amnesty legislation in liberal democracies.  
As touched on above, there were a number of challenges that shaped the 
methodology of this research. One issue was participation. Prospective participants 
were approached to be a part of this research via email and telephone. Of those 
contacted, 22 declined to be interviewed or did not respond, while 8 were unable to 
meet due to location or time schedule conflicts.  Those who were willing to be 
interviewed did so in a common language shared by the interviewer and 
interviewee, either English or Spanish. Archives were also problematic. At the time 
that this research was conducted, documents pertaining to South Africa's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission were still held by the South African Department of 
Justice and were unavailable to researchers.  
This research was conducted in a manner that reflected these challenges.  
While more time in-country and greater access to a larger number of sources would 
have been ideal, this was not possible. Despite these limitations, the use of both 
primary and secondary sources has allowed for the necessary depth of 
understanding to examine the core question of whether or not amnesty legislation 
can be maintained in a liberal democracy.  
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1.6 Chapter Summery 
The following substantive chapters of this thesis are broken down by case 
study. Chapter Two covers Chile, Chapter Three covers Brazil, and Chapter 
Four covers South Africa. Each chapter explores the socio-political experiences 
of the state in question, beginning with a brief sketch of the pre-authoritarian 
period. The goal is to outline the norms established in each state just prior to 
the political rupture that led to the authoritarian regime. In the case of Brazil 
and Chile, political and institutional patterns established in the early 20th 
Century have re-emerged with democracy, with populist rhetoric (Brazil) and a 
deeply legalist approach (Chile) once again the norm. In South Africa, the 
historical context explains both the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the deep 
divisions that remain amongst the different political groups.  
After examining the historical context of each case study, the chapters 
then move to an examination of the authoritarian regime, including an 
accounting of the violence perpetrated by the state. These sections are informed 
by first-hand accounts given to each country’s truth commission, as well as 
published narratives and archived data. By establishing a legacy of violence, 
the sections on the authoritarian regimes then draw a line between the events 
of the non-democratic period and the demands for justice after the transition.  
In outlining the socio-political history of the transition period in each 
state, the goal is to examine the negotiations for democracy, and in particular, 
the decisions around amnesty laws and transitional justice. It is in this section 
in each chapter that H1 is explored, to examine whether amnesty was, indeed, 
agreed to in good faith. The arguments addressing H0 and H1 are then presented 
in the subsequent two sections. The health of each case study’s current 
democracy is assessed and examined in the context of H0. This section includes 
an assessment of the quality of democracy in each state, and an examination of 
whether or not particular issues such as corruption, impunity, and falling 
legitimacy can be identified and linked to decisions made during the negotiation 
period. The chapters then move to examine whether time has made a difference 
in demands for justice, as the percentage of the population born after the 
transition increases. The quality of democracy indicators are used here to assess 
the state of democracy in each case. Finally, each chapter outlines the different 
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threads of discourse expressed by the different elite groups that participated in 
the pacted negotiations and democratization process. The interview participants 
gave insight into the decisions made during the transition, and how they are 
viewed decades on. The participants also reflected on the concept of justice 
during exceptional times, and the impact the absence of justice has had on the 
current democratic development.  
The conclusion of each chapter pulls together the socio-political 
experience of the case studies, the themes outlined in the discourse analysis of 
the interviews and results of the tested hypotheses. The concluding analyses in 
each chapter use the different streams of data to respond to the key question – 
can justice be sacrificed for democracy? While the experiences of Brazil, Chile 
and South Africa are unique, the data presented in each chapter finds that 
amnesty and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. A liberal democracy 
requires equality and justice that are in direct conflict with the requirements of 
amnesty. 
 
Chapter Two – Chile 
Chile is a case of a country that attempts blanket amnesty with a truth 
commission. At the point of transition, Chile was still split between those who 
supported Pinochet and those who sought his demise. The democratic 
leadership had sufficient political legitimacy to mandate a truth commission 
through an executive order. However, it was unable to convince congress to 
pass legislation that would have given the commission judicial weight. On the 
completion of the commission’s report, the government actively attempted to 
move on from the transition, arguing that it had fulfilled its responsibility 
towards justice. Victims were not so easily persuaded. Despite threats from 
Pinochet to challenge the democratic order, victims continued to pursue justice, 
culminating in both domestic and international court cases against Pinochet in 
1998. Since then, efforts for justice have moved forward slowly despite general 
resistance from the legislative branch. Democracy has been generally well 
established; however, victims are still able to upset governability during periods 
of mass mobilization. The demands for the repeal of the 1979 amnesty law 
remain, as do demands for further measures of justice in the courts and the 
congress.  
	48	
 
Chapter Three – Brazil 
 From the early days of the transition, the political elites in Brazil 
remained committed to a pact of forgetting; blanket amnesty in its purest form. 
This was, in part, due to the nature of the decade-long military-controlled 
democratization process, as well as the nature of the amnesty law and the 
limited impact of the authoritarian regime’s CAH on the wider population. This 
commitment to silence remained for over two decades until a former victim of 
the regime, Dilma Rousseff, became president. Despite congressional 
resistance, Rousseff managed to establish a Truth Commission, with the report 
delivered in 2014. However, Rousseff declined to pursue potential prosecutions 
and the issue became subsumed in the broader constitutional crises and 
corruption charges. The amnesty law remains part of Brazil’s legislative 
structure, however democracy is in decline. Issues that correlate somewhat with 
the use of amnesty such as impunity, corruption and violence, remain as 
significant issues in Brazil. Demands for justice, however, are persistent albeit 
muted. Chapter Three is illustrative of what can happen when justice and 
equality are ignored, undermining democracy in the process.  
 
Chapter Four – South Africa 
The South African transition was intended to be a new example for how 
difficult negotiations could be shaped to include both elements of justice and 
amnesty. It was lauded as the way forward, however as the evidence presented 
in Chapter Four shows, the expectations of this model remain unfulfilled.  
Particularized amnesty required truth telling at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission before amnesty could be granted. It was individualized and 
limited. However, the process of particularized amnesty has become an ad hoc 
blanket amnesty. The government has failed to pursue prosecutions, despite 
recommendations by the commission to do so, and other measures of justice 
have likewise been ignored. At the same time, the quality of South Africa’s 
democracy has been severely limited. Similar to Brazil, South Africa has been 
beset by corruption, impunity for state violence, and accusations of state 
capture. The narratives around justice, democracy and amnesty remain strained, 
with serious concerns that democracy in South Africa is in crisis. The 
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generation of South Africans born after the end of Apartheid still demand 
justice, however it is less tangible than the demands expressed by direct 
victims. Rather, it is a more nebulous and volatile demand for justice in a 
country beset by widespread violence, unemployment and economic inequality.  
 
Chapter Five – Conclusion 
The final chapter in this work brings together the two key elements of this 
thesis – the theory and the cumulative evidence gathered in the case studies – 
to answer the research’s guiding question: can justice be traded for democracy? 
The answer, simply, is no. The requirements of democracy exclude the 
possibility of key legislation that prohibits some measure of justice for crimes 
committed by the state. The case studies, each representing a different approach 
to amnesty, have all landed within the same ballpark in terms of outcomes. In 
Chile, amnesty has been successfully undermined by persistent demands for 
justice while in South Africa and Brazil, amnesty laws remain, however the 
respective democracies are fundamentally unstable with issues around 
corruption, continuing impunity and widespread violence. The concluding 
chapter outlines a correlative argument that a requirement of a healthy and 
entrenched democracy is the appropriate handling of past crimes against 
humanity. To ignore demands for justice, the evidence indicates, is to risk issues 
in governability and perceived legitimacy.  
 
1.7 Conclusion: Intersecting theories 
 A large number of rights are taken for granted in established democracies. 
The right to vote is well entrenched, as are the rights to justice, to security, to 
equality and to a responsive government, among others. While academics may 
debate the nature of democracy, the characteristics identified by Morlino 
provide a good indicator of what is widely perceived by the public as a good 
democracy,175 and this public perception matters. Collective memory plays a 
powerful role in the interactions between the public and state, with demands for 
justice persisting well beyond the time limits of the transitional period. The 
quality of democracies rise and fall on their ability to respond to the needs and, 
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more importantly, the expectations of the public. In democratizing states, the 
constitutions are written to replicate the norms and expectations of existing 
democracies. In the case of South Africa, the constitution of 1996 was one of 
the most socially advanced of its time.176 However, while the legal structure 
looks to the future, the presence of amnesty creates a significant issue. How can 
a country that holds the rights of citizens above all else then ask a section of 
those citizens to forgo their rights in relation to justice? Amnesty in any form 
directly challenges the expectation of equality that is inherent in a democratic 
structure.  
 From a theoretical perspective, amnesty laws are a significant issue; an 
irregularity that may cause problems once the exceptional nature of the 
democratization process is over. From a practical perspective, the evidence 
gathered from the experiences of Chile, Brazil and South Africa have shown 
that attempts to maintain amnesty in democratizing states can correlate to either 
the diminished quality of the democracy in the long run, or the dismantling of 
the amnesty law altogether. The latter option raises a series of questions that 
fall within the scope of post-transitional justice theory.  
 Returning to the question at the heart of this research, the answer appears 
to be less positive than proponents of amnesty would like. Can justice be traded 
for democracy? No, the need for justice, or at least perceived justice, seems to 
be fundamental to democracy, and democracy, after all, is universally accepted 
as a political system that is built on equality above all else. By removing this 
aspect of democracy for those who have been persecuted at the hands of the 
authoritarian regime, the negotiators of the transition in effect inflict a deficit 
within the institutional structure that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to overcome, impacting the socio-political development for generations.  
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Chapter Two 
Chile 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Pinochet regime (1973-1989) cast a significant shadow over Chilean 
politics for more than two decades, with questions around human rights and 
justice playing a role in each presidential administration after the transition. 
Chile’s experience with authoritarianism and democratization provides an 
informative case study for addressing the key question of this research.  Can 
justice be traded for democracy? More specifically, can amnesty legislation, in 
the form of blanket amnesty as in Chile as opposed to the particularized 
amnesty of South Africa, be effectively used during a transition without either 
suffering a reversal, or having a significantly adverse impact on the quality of 
democracy that emerges afterwards?  
According to Patrico Aylwin, the first democratic president of Chile after 
the Pinochet regime, the answer is simple. The sacrifice of justice was said to 
be the price Chileans would have to pay for a democratic future.177 During a 
personal interview conducted with the author of this thesis before his death, 
Aylwin argued that by agreeing to maintain the amnesty decree the opposition 
did what was necessary to ensure a peaceful transition. Though resolute in his 
belief that maintaining amnesty was the best option, Aylwin also insisted that 
there were few alternatives available to him as leader of a still-divided Chile. 
He rejected subsequent demands for justice, saying that the government did 
what it could.178 This view has proved to be somewhat hollow in the face of the 
continued discourse over amnesty, impunity and justice. Protestors continue to 
march en mass, demanding measures of accountability, and the democratic 
system in Chile is still periodically disturbed today by revelations of past crimes 
and by questions over the impact impunity has had on the country’s 
development. The amnesty decree itself has been directly challenged in national 
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and international courts, with the possibility that the decree will be revoked 
under the current administration of President Michelle Bachelet.179 
Initially the result of an uneasy pact agreed during a tense transition, 
democracy in Chile  no longer has the will to allow for full impunity as demands 
for justice persist longer than the expected by the political elites. Public 
legitimisation of the transition, or the lack thereof, has played an important role 
in the path of democratization. How the Chilean public accepted the process is 
important in understanding the effectiveness of efforts at justice and 
democracy.  
Volatility in the political system marked much of the decade leading up to 
the 1973 coup, with the election by a minority of Chile’s first Socialist 
president, Dr Salvador Allende, in 1970 marking a tipping point for 
conservative interests. After three years on Chile’s ‘democratic road to 
socialism’, the military took power by non-democratic means. A violent coup, 
the events of September 11, 1973, marked the beginning of 17 years of 
authoritarian leadership by Augusto Pinochet. The military regime acted 
criminally in its indiscriminate torture, murder and kidnapping of members of 
the opposition.  
Just prior to the formulation of a new constitution in 1980, the military 
junta, by then led by Pinochet, issued an amnesty decree (1978) that ensured 
impunity for the violence during the first period of the authoritarian regime. 
Decree 2.191 was a blanket amnesty for criminal offenses committed between 
1973 and 1978. Described by torture victim and advocate Hector Cataldo as 
something that “came back to haunt us,”180 this decree, still in effect as of 
December 2015,181 had become a focal point for efforts by victims to achieve 
some form of justice. Significant debate had emerged over the legality of the 
decree in the post authoritarian period. The transition and eventual post-
transition era, as outlined below, had been characterised by the re-establishment 
																																																						
179Brianna Lee, ‘Chile Moves to Overturn Pinochet-Era Amnesty Law’, International Business 
Times, 2014 <http://www.ibtimes.com/chile-moves-overturn-pinochet-era-amnesty-law-1687092> 
[accessed 26 November 2014]. 
180Hector Cataldo, Personal Interview, Via Alemana, Chile, 5 May 2011. 
181In 2014 Bachelet presented legislation that would revoke the 1978 amnesty law. However, this 
has since been stuck in Congress. Tihomir Gligorevic, ‘Chile: Effort to Repeal Pinochet Amnesty 
Law Languishing in Congress | InSerbia News’ <https://inserbia.info/today/2015/09/chile-effort-
to-repeal-pinochet-amnesty-law-languishing-in-congress/> [accessed 17 February 2017]. 
	54	
of democratic principles, albeit based on the authoritarian-formulated 1980 
Constitution, which remain the law today. Civil society has played a significant 
role in pushing accountability at both domestic and international levels for the 
human rights abuses of the authoritarian regime. But the question arises as to 
whether these popular calls for justice have impacted the institutional structure 
and stability of the subsequent Chilean state.  
 
    2.2 Historical Background 
2.2.1 Before the coup 
Electoral participation in Chile during the middle of the 20th Century was 
about 80 per cent, and registration grew rapidly by the 1960s. As the country’s 
experience with democracy increased, so did the strength of the country’s 
political organisations and party affiliation.182 The competitive nature of the 
regional and national elections meant that it was rare for one party to gain a 
clear majority over the others.183 Coalitions were the norm. Coalition-building 
became particularly important during the later stage of the democratic period 
that pre-dated the coup, with the fragmentation of parties leading to smaller 
percentages for the different political organisations. 
Authors have questioned whether the intense activity of the electoral 
process truly reflected a stable democratic system. As pointed out by Whitting: 
“high levels of group activity aimed at economic goals may be incompatible 
with political procedures designed to moderate and mediate conflicting 
interests.”184 Labour activities, in the form of both legal and illegal strikes, 
marked much of the democratic period, and were particularly prevalent during 
the Allende administration.185 During the 1950s and 1960s a number of 
demands were made by the unions, pushing successive governments to focus 
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on public expenditure as a response to the so called ‘social question’ (public 
health, social assistance, labour, social security, housing and education).186 The 
effectiveness of these policies over the four decades of democracy, particularly 
with regard to wage increases in the industrial sector, depended heavily on the 
price of copper, which fluctuated wildly during this period.187 Inflation was a 
significant issue, particularly in the late 1950s, reducing the standard of living 
for most Chileans, despite increased social spending.188 The 1960s saw 
continued volatility as the ruling Christian Democrats utilised foreign aid, in 
the form of the US sponsored Alliance for Progress.189 The commitment to 
agrarian reform required by the Alliance for Progress programme eventually 
led to a significant dismantling of the existing hacienda system by the Christian 
Democratic administration, intensifying the already existing polarization of the 
Chilean political electorate and effectively weakening the decades-long 
political stability in Chile.190 
 Equality in Chile during this period was of concern for both the 
government and labour unions. While social spending significantly increased 
during the mid-20th century,191 traditional class structures remained.192 Secret 
ballots were introduced in 1958, allowing tenant farmers some independence 
from the hacienda owners, who had previously held sway on the voting choices 
of the poorer farmers. Vote buying was also reduced by the secret ballot 
measure. As discussed above, in the late 1960s the requirements of foreign 
borrowing and in particular the US sponsored Alliance for Progress, led to 
changes in the hacienda system, further weakening the dominance of the land-
owning elites over voting preferences. The social spending in Chile during this 
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period was remarkable for its sheer amount in comparison to the growth of the 
gross domestic product, placing Chile first in Latin America in social spending 
and in line with the average spending of OECD nations.193 On the other hand, 
Kantor argued that despite government investment in social spending, poverty 
remained high, with up to 75 per cent of the Chilean people excluded from 
mainstream society based on financial standing, class structures and location.194 
Faundez points out that “income gains by the poorest sections of the population, 
though not negligible, were far from satisfactory.”195 As regards to broader 
equality measures, women were eventually allowed to participate in the 
political system, and granted the vote in national elections in 1949. Illiterates, 
who represented between 27 per cent (1940) and 11 per cent (1970) of the 
population, were granted voting rights in 1970.196 
 Though Chilean culture was considered broadly legalistic, particularly 
during this democratic period, presidential power increased beyond the scope 
of the 1925 Constitution. “During this period the executive regularly expanded 
and often abused its regulatory powers, especially in the areas of economic 
regulation and state security”.197 The institutional body expected to oversee and 
review the application of the constitution, the Supreme Court, tended not to use 
this power, opting to “avoid confrontations with the political organs of the 
state.”198 
 While there are some areas of concern regarding Chile’s democratic 
period, particularly concerning equality and the expansion of executive power, 
many of the qualities of a ‘good’ democracy were met. The core characteristics 
of democracy most notably absent were perceived equality and equal treatment, 
though the evidence shows a concerted effort by succeeding governments to 
invest in social expenditure and to increase economic equality to some 
extent.199 The failure to achieve this goal fully could be put down to the 
prevailing class system that continued to give significant power to both the 
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urban and rural elites as well as the volatility in the political system that 
decreased political continuity and ensured the constant building and rebuilding 
of political coalitions. 
 
2.2.2 A Tradition of Justice in Chile 
 Early approaches to justice at a state level did not bode well for the 
democratic period after the implementation of the 1925 Constitution. The first 
real test of justice in Chile after the political upheaval of the 1920s was the 
Comisiòn Investigadora de los Actos de la Dictadura (Commission to 
Investigate the Acts of the Dictatorship),200 established in 1931 to investigate 
acts of censorship, illegal detention, arrest, torture, exile, assassinations, 
disappearances and murder. Despite the initial political will to limit impunity, 
the commission soon became an inconvenient distraction for the ruling elites in 
Congress, who were attempting to return governability to Chile by granting a 
number of amnesties. After a series of upheavals, the commission’s members 
resigned and the commission was dissolved. As outlined by Loveman and 
Lira,201 the use of amnesty to ensure stability and prevent political rupture 
became the norm.  
To avoid political breakdown and restore governability in moments of crisis, pardons, 
amnesties, and other methods of political pacification conceded juridical impunity to 
government officials, military and police personnel, party and labour leaders, and 
miscreants of all sorts. Amnesties and self-amnesties became routine – ever more 
frequent, ever more institutionalised – for political matters, failed coups, bureaucratic 
malfeasance, violations of the electoral law, the failure to comply with the obligatory 
military service law, and for common crimes.202 
 
 There has been widespread debate over the nature of justice but of greater 
relevance are the perceptions of justice. In the preceding chapter, a number of 
dimensions of the perceptions of justice were outlined. Briefly, these are 
fairness, equality in application, legitimacy of both the claims of justice and its 
application, and that justice is legally enshrined in legislation. These 
dimensions contribute to the perceptions, or lack thereof, of justice. In theory, 
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at least, Chile’s 1925 Constitution guaranteed Chileans “all the traditional 
liberties, including equity before the law, freedom of conscience, of speech, 
and of the press, and the right to assemble, to create organisations, to teach, to 
own property, and to have a fair trial.”203 For much of the Twentieth Century, 
this liberal legal foundation was complemented by the perception of a strongly 
legalistic culture, with respect for the law reaching ‘cult’ status.204 In the 1925 
Constitution, the Supreme Court was given equal status with the legislative 
branch, with the intention that it would oversee the behaviour of Congress and 
the executive. The willingness of the court to carry out these duties, both 
preceding and during the 1973 coup, was limited, however. Despite this 
inactivity, the perception of legalism came to represent an important cultural 
characteristic.205 However, legalism, and its contribution as a dimension of 
good democracy, did not necessarily translate into a dynamic system of justice. 
For the urban and rural elites and the middle class, liberty and access to justice 
were a reality. But the entrenched class system ensured that for the rest, access 
to justice was limited,206 particularly in the context of fairness and equality of 
application.  
 Faith in the system, regardless of actual outcomes, can provide a level of 
legitimisation. This was the case in Chile during the 1932-1973 democratic 
period. The widespread protests that marked this period had to do with labour 
and poverty as opposed to questions of justice.207 That is not to say that this 
period was without violence. However, political leaders quickly justified acts 
of violence, and followed these rationalisations with general amnesties.208 The 
frequent use of amnesties to maintain order was debated by the Congress, 
particularly during the 1960s, but they were still considered a matter of course 
for what is sometimes described as the Via Chileña.209 
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 Research examining the justice tradition and practices prior to the 1973 
coup indicates a perception of justice that was not always reflected in the actual 
practice of justice, particularly across social classes.210 This perception 
legitimised the actions of the political elites after occasionally violent 
disturbances focused attention on labour policy and reform.  
 Some commentators have argued that Chileans who voted for Allende in 
1970 may have been depending on Chile’s strong democratic tradition to 
address the social and legal injustices that had marked much of the democratic 
period.211 This was, in many ways, the underlying promise of the UP electoral 
platform: a democratic road to socialism. The volatility that quickly ensued 
after Allende’s election pointed to the significant political rupture that was to 
come.  
 
2.3 The Breakdown of Democracy? Allende, Pinochet and the human     
rights abuses 
 2.3.1 An end to Chile’s ‘road to socialism’ 
On the morning of September 11, 1973, the people of Chile faced the 
consequences of the preceding decades of political volatility. The armed forces 
took power by force, removing Allende, Chile’s democratically elected 
socialist president. While the political rupture was decried by some observers 
as sudden and unexpected,212 an examination of the preceding three years 
reveals a number of signs of the government’s instability. Allende was elected 
in 1970 with only 36.3 per cent of the vote, placing his left-wing coalition on 
precarious ground as a minority-led government. His first year was marked by 
a number of successful policies, but these were quickly reversed by rising 
inflation, leading to an increase in the cost of living, a drop in foreign and 
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domestic investment, a drop in copper prices, and an almost complete reduction 
in the foreign capital reserves that had allowed a number of the initial policies 
to be possible.213 
Prior to the popular election of Allende in 1970, the Chilean political 
institutional structure was known for its stability and its ability to adapt external 
economic changes, power transfers and mass mobilization.214 Its institutional 
tradition included negotiation between the political elites and a commitment to 
the requirements of the 1925 Constitution. However, by 1971 “the political 
institutions were increasingly divided and rigid in their inability to reach any 
accord in the exercise of their shared power”.215 
Moreover, opposition to Allende by 1971 emerged from both ends of the 
political spectrum.216 That the parties on the right, that is the Liberals and the 
Conservatives, opposed Allende’s democratic road to socialism is of little 
surprise. However, Allende himself may not have expected the level of political 
resistance he faced from leftist parties, and even from within his own Unidad 
Popular (Popular Unity, or UP).217The centrist party, the Partido Democratica 
Christiana (the Christian Democratic Party, or PDC), while sharing many broad 
social goals with UP, was reluctant to support Allende for fear that he would 
transform Chile into a second Cuba.218The PDC’s opposition to Allende, and 
the party’s eventual support of military intervention, played a key role in the 
democratic breakdown to come. However, the instability from within the UP 
itself was of significant concern to Allende. The UP was a coalition of left 
parties, including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Radical Party, 
the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Popular Action, as well as other 
smaller groups. Allende, rising to leadership out of the Socialist Party, 
struggled to maintain control of the coalition. He faced public criticism from 
members of the individual parties within the UP. They either claimed that he 
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was going too far, too fast in his attempts to move Chile towards democratic 
socialism, or alternatively, that he was not going fast enough.219 
The growing tensions that developed between the government and the 
opposition parties in 1971 continued throughout 1972. The hyper-mobilization 
on the streets, initially welcomed by Allende as a potential form of support, 
soon undermined Chile’s social stability.220While “controlled mobilization was 
precisely what a minority government needed as it sought to embark on an 
immensely ambitious schemes of social and political change,”221 the scale 
tipped towards chaos. Groups that were seemingly natural allies of the socialist 
cause, such as unions and other labour organisations,222 sought ever higher pay 
increases, displaying what some academics have described as rampant 
“economism”.223 Strikes and factory takeovers were more frequent and 
widespread than ever before, heightening the sense of crisis across the 
country.224 As succinctly pointed out by Peter Goldberg,  
Besides the opposition parties, the actions of the United States, the army, business and 
professional elites, small businessmen (notably the independent truckers), and even some 
factory workers, peasants, and Popular Unity functionaries constituted sources of 
resistance whose collective effect was to plunge the society into near civil war.225 
 
By 1973 Chile was crippled by labour strikes, food shortages and 
hoarding, a gridlocked Congress and a crumbling economic outlook. Many in 
the Congress felt that “the president had violated his constitutional authority, 
and Congress sought to uphold its constitutional mandate, to assure or ensure 
respect for the constitution, and to prevent executive tyranny.”226 In the middle 
of August, 1973, Congress appealed to the military to restore order and save 
Chile’s democratic tradition. Less than a month later, the military took over.  
 Of the dimensions outlined by Morlino as indicators of a good democracy, 
very few appeared in the regime that emerged after the 1973 coup, supporting 
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arguments that a profound democratic rupture had occurred.227 Despite 
claiming constitutional support for the coup, General Augusto Pinochet and his 
junta seized power, violating the 1925 Constitution.228 The cornerstone of 
Chile’s legal system, the Constitution, was not completely removed but rather 
was subjugated to subsequent military decrees. Pinochet effectively built a 
façade of legality around the actions of his regime,229 but his actions were 
against the wording and spirit of the Constitution. The rule of law, in the strict 
sense, was absent from the new regime, particularly in the first stages of 
repression (between 1973 and 1978), and the other dimensions of democracy 
were largely or completely absent. Over time, there was some (albeit 
questionable) popular participation in the form of a plebiscite for the 1980 
Constitution.230 Accountability for the violence committed by the regime was 
non-existent, while all political parties were eventually outlawed, eliminating 
any potential competition. A ‘state of siege in time of war’231 was declared, 
curtailing most of the freedoms expected in a democracy. It would be difficult 
to argue that this new military junta was responsive to the needs of the people, 
particularly in light of the state-sponsored violence that emerged. Equality was 
equally difficult to identify in post-coup Chile, in the midst of repression after 
the takeover. With a focus on the left, and particularly on Marxism, the 
repression took on a class focus, with the poor and lower middle classes bearing 
the brunt of the repression.232 
 The military-led violence that began as the first tanks rolled into Chile’s 
major cities included human rights abuses (subsequently defined as 
international crimes, as discussed in the “Introduction”). These abuses 
included beatings, torture, disappearances, murder and assassinations on 
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foreign territory. The Report of the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation (commonly known as the Rettig Report) documented the 
violence committed after the democratic rupture.233 While torture was not the 
focus of the report, the commissioners did outline details relating to the use of 
torture in Chile. As discussed in the Rettig Report, a common practice of the 
interrogation teams was the staging of mock executions, holding the victim’s 
head under water or excrement almost to the point of suffocation, beating the 
victim until they bled and bones were broken, or hanging the victim upside 
down with a pole placed behind the knees and biceps.234 The Rettig Report 
describes the torture techniques of the military regime as “extremely varied,”235 
and used to gain evidence, or to punish. Many who were killed by the regime, 
particularly in the initial months of the dictatorship, were often shot or died 
after extensive torture.  
One of the most high profile killings in Chile by the Pinochet regime was 
that of folk singer Victor Jara, who was killed at the National Stadium. Jara’s 
face and hands were severely disfigured from torture before he was reportedly 
shot 44 times.236In another infamous case, the “Caravan of Death”,237 Pinochet 
sent a delegation of officers by helicopter to the provinces to ensure the heads 
of these outposts were not being “soft” on their detainees. Almost 100 detainees 
in 16 towns were killed between 30 September 1973 and 22 October 1973.238 
Violence was characteristic of the state repression experienced in Chile 
throughout the 17 years of the dictatorship. However, the violence was 
particularly prevalent during the first four years of the regime.239 
Targeted victims were predominantly left wing activists from the 
Movimeinto de Izquirda Revolutionario (the Left Revolutionary Movement), 
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politicians from the Communist and Socialist Parties (among others), and 
students and labour union representatives.240 For the new regime, those with 
“left-leaning ideologies were not only implacably totalitarian and anti-
Christian, they were also agents of a foreign power.”241Some authors have 
claimed that the military’s goal was to round up 20,000 of these ‘enemies of 
the state’, with 6000 to be captured in the first day.242 While it is uncertain how 
many were initially trapped in the military’s net, it is known that most of the 
violence committed by the military regime took place in the first four years, 
though even this violence became much more systematic with the creation of 
the Dirección de Intelegencia Nacional (Directorate of National Intelligence, or 
DINA) after November 1973. Over 200,000 Chileans fled the country or were 
exiled during the dictatorship. The Chilean National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation (1990) later focused solely on those who had been killed or 
disappeared and identified 3400 victims of the Pinochet regime.243The National 
Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, also known as the 
Valech Commission, identified those who were tortured by the regime and 
documented the torture of 27,255 victims 12 years after the Rettig 
Commission.244 At the end of her first term in office Bachelet reopened the two 
commissions with further investigations, increasing the number of victims of 
Pinochet’s regime to over 40,000.245 
 
2.3.2 Left and Right perceptions of the military regime  
Both during the regime and after the transition there have been competing 
narratives regarding the level of violence, culpability and motives.246 The 
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discourse from the right has focused on the claim that intervention was 
necessary, and was ultimately caused by the actions of the left.247The right have 
also argued that any violence that may have occurred was committed by rogue 
officers acting outside the official mandate. The left have argued that the sheer 
level of violence as well as its widespread use indicates that it was official 
policy directed from the highest echelons of the regime.248 Differing 
perspectives on the level of violence committed during the Pinochet regime, 
and contrary arguments regarding culpability, have played an important role in 
how the eventual efforts at securing justice have been viewed. Those supporting 
Pinochet have claimed that the left committed acts of violence, and see this as 
weakening charges of government repression, or at the very least, providing 
excuses or even justifications for the junta’s behaviour.249 The most reliable 
figures show that while some violence was committed by left wing groups,250 
this was significantly overshadowed by the sheer scale of government actions.  
These actions, as recorded by a number of sources, were asymmetrically greater 
in number and intensity, and belie attempts by the regime and its supporters 
(mostly in the middle and upper classes) to argue otherwise.251 
 It is clear from the level of violence, outlined by Chile’s three subsequent 
truth commissions as well as the testimony of victims and witnesses, that the 
human rights of a significant number of Chileans and foreigners were violated. 
The coup, and the subsequent actions of the military junta, violated the 1925 
Constitution, as well as the fundamental requirements of democracy discussed 
in the preceding chapter. The subsequent impunity awarded in the self-granted 
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amnesty, however, effectively limited the options for justice for the survivors 
of the government repression and for their families. 
 The tension between supporters of the amnesty legislation, and those who 
have attempted to repeal it is clearly illustrated in the interview responses from 
former President Patricio Aylwin and lawyer Jose Zalaquette, as well as 
statements released by the military and judiciary on the one hand, and interview 
responses from justice advocates such as Roberto Garretón and Hector Cataldo 
on the other.252 The narrative that emerged from the collective interviews as 
well as extensive data analysis of statements and media coverage of relevant 
groups shows a divided nation, with the amnesty legislation as a key sticking 
point.  
  
    2.4 Amnesty Decree in Chile 
 The use of amnesty legislation in Chile was not unusual after periods of 
unrest, and generally reflected an effort to maintain stability, the via 
Chileña.253What was unusual was the self-declaration of amnesty legislation 
by Pinochet in 1978.254 Decree 2.191 stated:  
an amnesty shall be extended to all persons who, as principals or accessories, have 
committed criminal offenses during the period of state of siege, between 11 
September 1973 and 10 March 1978, unless they are currently on trial or have already 
been convicted.255 
 
Of the differing types of amnesty legislation discussed in “Chapter One”, 
this decree falls under the category of a self-granted blanket amnesty. While 
the decree did not prevent the investigation of crimes once applicability of the 
amnesty was identified, the decree allowed the courts to shut down any further 
investigative activity. The stated goal of the decree, according to its preamble, 
was “to strengthen the ties that bind Chile as a nation, leaving behind hatred 
that has no meaning today, and fostering all measures that consolidate the re-
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unification of all Chileans.”256 But critics have argued that the decree, instead 
of uniting Chile and fostering reunification, ended up becoming an 
insurmountable obstacle to reunification.257 As pointed out by Cataldo, “To 
make amnesty palatable, Pinochet offered the same [law] to the left. Why did 
the left use violence? To defend itself against the state, and this is not the same. 
But the right uses this reasoning to manipulate the situation.”258 
 Considering the political and social environment in Chile at the time of 
the decree, the question arises as to whether the amnesty was viewed either as 
fundamentally unjust or necessary and legitimate. The nature of the 
government repression at the time meant that there was no widespread debate 
on its merits, nor an examination of its immediate effectiveness. What is clear 
is that the benefits of the decree were felt to a much greater degree on the side 
of the armed forces than by those who were fighting against them.259 Only 69 
political prisoners were released after the decree.260 By the time the amnesty 
decree was written, many in the opposition had been murdered, disappeared or 
exiled.261 It was not until much later, in 1988, that those forced out of the 
country were allowed to return, suggesting that the protection of the amnesty 
decree was felt to a much greater degree by military and pro-government forces 
than by the opposition. While perspectives on the amnesty decree after the 
transition will be explored below, popular views tended to call for the repeal of 
the decree in the lead-up to the 1988 plebiscite.262 The repeal of Decree 2.191, 
in fact, became a policy platform for the Concertación alliance that took power 
in 1990, though this policy was later dropped due to the political realities of the 
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transition and negotiations with the outgoing regime.263 In a personal interview, 
Aylwin outlined the challenges he face in navigating the transition period.  
You have to understand that the process to incorporate democracy had to happen without 
taking away all the power of Pinochet and his collaborators. I was President but I didn’t 
have the power to charge General Pinochet. The military followed Pinochet, as did his 
supporters. With them, we had to negotiate. One side of the right stuck behind Pinochet, 
the other opened the door, working with the government to reintroduce the country’s 
democracy.264 
 
 During the initial transition period, amnesty was prioritized over other 
legislation, with the Supreme Court citing Article 44 of the 1925 Constitution 
(in place at the time of the Amnesty Decree), and Article 60(16) of the 1980 
Constitution in the case of Insunza Bascuñán,265 both of which appeared to give 
the government the power to decree amnesty.266 Zalaquette argues that “under 
Aylwin, removing the amnesty decree would have been wasted political 
power.”267 This attitude persisted within subsequent left and right-wing 
administrations, until Bachelet. Cath Collins, the founder and director of the 
Transitional Justice Observatory at Diego Portales University in Chile and a 
specialist on transitional and post-transitional justice, claims that  
leaving the decision to the courts would be the best thing politically. The Concertacion 
coalition’s policy was to leave it to the courts until the late 1990s. Then they started to 
meddle and they have found that they are getting into trouble that way.268 
 
While the complainants attempted to use international law in support of their 
argument, including the Geneva Convention, the Supreme Court rejected these 
claims, arguing that the period after the coup was not one of armed conflict, 
invalidating the applicability of the Convention.269 
The on-going realities that faced those attempting to remove impunity by 
political means became very clear in 1998, when legislators presented an 
acusación constitucional (constitutional accusation) against Pinochet, who had 
just been made a senator for life. If this legislative effort had been successful, 
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Pinochet would have lost his position in the senate and been open to civil and 
criminal prosecution. This effort was rejected, however, and it was later 
revealed that Aylwin and then-President Eduardo Frei, had actively petitioned 
members of the Christian Democratic Party to reject the acusasción.270 The fear 
was that if it were successful it would cause significant instability and raise the 
possibility of military action. According to Zalaquette, the mode of the 
transition, with an emphasis on the truth commission rather than prosecution, 
was one of political realities. “The Pinochet government was defeated through 
the ballot box, not on the battlefield. You can’t kick over the game board.”271 
Chileans were clearly presented with the options before their political leaders, 
according to academic Cath Collins. “What Chileans were told during the 
transition was that it was democracy or justice. You can’t have both.”272 
 Chile’s amnesty decree has been maintained since the transition, despite a 
number of challenges to its validity. Domestically, while still part of the legal 
system, the use of amnesty has declined,273 reflecting a weakening in the 
arguments in support of impunity as well as concerted efforts by groups in civil 
society groups to seek court action against the law. Instead, judges are handing 
out significantly reduced sentences.274 What has also developed in Chile is a 
greater certainty around the stability of the democratic regime, at least at an 
institutional level. Internationally, the continued use of amnesty in Chile, 
although less than in the initial transition period, has been sharply criticised. 
Zalaquette pointed out that “the international community and international law 
has said some crimes must be prosecuted.”275 However, this has been poorly 
received by the judiciary both during and after the transition. Roberto Garretón 
encountered this judicial resistance to international judgement as part of his 
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legal advocacy for victims. “During the dictatorship, we started using 
international law. But the judges hate this, it makes them indignant. So we 
mentioned it occasionally, but it was rare.”276 In 2006 the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights decided against the Chilean government in the Almonacid v. 
Chile case over the continued use of the amnesty law, deciding that amnesty 
legislation goes against a number of international treaties and should be 
revoked.277 This decision prompted little action in Chile beyond some political 
debate, with the president of the Supreme Court declaring that the Almonacid v. 
Chile case “was not binding, but merely a guide.”278 
 Amnesty in Chile has an established history dating back to the 1920s, as 
does the debate regarding impunity vs. justice following military interventions. 
Regularly used during the democratic period without any particular legislation 
to establish its validity, and ostensibly allowed in the 1925 Constitution, the 
employment of an amnesty decree by the Pinochet regime was not a significant 
deviation from established practice. H1) hypothesises that amnesty is agreed to 
in good faith, and this is born out in the Chilean case. The evidence is clear that 
while the amnesty decree itself was passed by Pinochet, the opposition leaders 
agreed to maintain the amnesty decree and at times actively advocated for the 
maintenance of the status quo in terms of the existing impunity.  There is no 
evidence that either side expected significant challenges to the amnesty decree, 
however the continued existence of the decree following the transition raises 
important questions regarding legislated impunity, and whether it can coexist 
with a modern democratic institutional structure.   
 
2.5 The Transition Period and Transitional Justice 
 2.5.1 Justice in-so-far as possible  
 By the time Pinochet officially relinquished power to the new 
democratically elected government, Chileans had experienced 17 years of 
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repression.  The final ten, from 1980 – 1990 had come to be seen as an odd 
blend of “authoritarian democracy”,279 a repressive regime that allowed for 
some public participation as long as it was limited to officially mandated 
events, such as plebiscites. In 1980, the people were asked to ratify a newly 
drafted constitution that both justified the continued military regime as well as 
marking out a path for an eventual transition.280According to Aylwin,  
Under Pinochet this [democratic] characteristic of Chile was limited. But the period 
wasn’t a full tyranny. Chilean’s were eventually allowed some expression and to vote [in 
the plebiscite]. That said, Pinochet’s people were very much in power…Pinochet didn’t 
open many doors for the opposition to move forward, but this didn’t impede progress. 
He couldn’t go back on the plebiscite…If you look at the late period of Pinochet in 
hindsight, you could say it was a democracy. This was good for the country and the 
opposition. The power of the military reduced, along with the military environment.281 
 
The new constitution named Pinochet as president until 1989, when a 
national plebiscite would be held to decide whether to continue with the 
existing order or hold democratic elections. The new constitution significantly 
expanded the powers of the president and limited the role of Congress. It also 
allowed for the suspension of civil liberties and individual rights and 
institutionalized the political dominance of the armed forces while providing 
for the permanent militarization of politics. All movements, groups, 
organizations and parties that were thought to promote violence or class conflict 
were banned.282 Despite the obvious authoritarian nature of the constitution, 
Chileans were described as “born free and equal in dignity and rights.”283 Chile 
was also described as a democratic republic (Article 4).284 
The 1980s saw significant movement within the left, with overt action 
against the government in 1983, leading to the declaration of another state of 
siege.285 By 1988, and the time of the plebiscite, the opposition, including some 
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conservatives, rallied around a new leader, Patricio Aylwin. The pro-
democracy movement won the plebiscite with 54.7 per cent of voters opting for 
‘No’ when asked to continue Pinochet’s rule. While Pinochet was reluctant to 
let go of power, it was clear that many in the military would not support his 
going against both the 1980 Constitution and the will of the people.286 His 
regime had come to an end.  
 The results of the plebiscite ushered in a new era in Chilean politics. The 
year following the vote involved negotiations between opposition leaders, led 
by military regime, and members of parties from across the political 
spectrum.287The focus of these negotiations was to shape the 1980 Constitution 
into a document suited to the impending democratic institutional transition. 
Military leaders were able to push for concessions from opposition leaders, 
however the junta needed the opposition groups to agree to these changes to 
lend them legitimacy.288 The 1989 constitutional changes ultimately created a 
more democratic document, albeit one that still granted significant oversight to 
the military. “Restrictions on individual liberties and national security 
provisions that informed decisions on education, political party formation and 
activities, and even some forms of press censorship remained despite the 
democratic government’s efforts to change them.”289 
While the result of the plebiscite was sufficient to end the dictators rule, 
Pinochet still held enough support, over 40 per cent, to ensure that the 
authoritarian institutional structure, and importantly, the 1978 amnesty decree, 
would remain.290 In 1990, Aylwin took office and ushered in a new democratic 
era, albeit limited by the letter and spirit of the 1980 Constitution, as well as 
the continued presence of Pinochet as commander-in-chief of the army. 
H0 hypothesises that the experiences of transitioning states show that 
amnesty legislation is compatible with expectations and norms of an entrenched 
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liberal democracy. The recent history of Chile, from transition to the present, 
affords an opportunity to test H0 and to identify when, if ever, the amnesty law 
and the democratic institutional structure have become incompatible. The 
evidence, as discussed below, shows a growing tension between the amnesty 
law and Chile’s democracy, in direct opposition to the expectation of H0. 
 Chile’s transition reflected a number of trends that were taking place 
across the globe. For example, the use of the pacted negotiations,291 allowing 
for the continued participation of members of the previous regime, the use of 
amnesty as a bargaining tool within the negotiations and the establishment of a 
truth and reconciliation commission as part of the transition.292 The pacted 
negotiation in Chile that allowed for continued impunity via the maintenance 
of the amnesty decree, introduces the question of whether modern conceptions 
of democracy allow for the denial of justice for past state sponsored crimes.   
 President Aylwin took power on March 11, 1990, confirming the 
democratisation process that had begun the preceding year with Chile’s first 
competitive elections since the coup. The seasoned politician, a Christian 
Democrat, was the head of a 17 party coalition, the Concertación, which 
represented political parties from across the centrist-left spectrum. Arguably 
hamstrung by the realities of Chile’s transition, Aylwin was unable to fulfil all 
the hopes of the electorate, particularly in relation to justice for the human 
rights abuses of the Pinochet regime. Aylwin’s leadership became known for 
the governing principle of “justicia en la medida de lo possible” (“justice – 
insofar as is possible”).293During a personal interview in 2011, Aylwin claimed 
that 
[he] didn’t feel limited by the military or by Pinochet, though there were some 
exceptions. Decisions were sometimes limited. We didn’t have the legal means to convict 
Pinochet, but we were able to end his presidency.294 
 
																																																						
291 The concept of pacted negotiations is discussed by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead. The 
authors described pacts as an explicit, though not always publically transparent, process that 
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potential threats to the governability of a transitioning state by guaranteeing the protection of vital 
interests of one or both sides.  
292 The same pattern can be seen in South Africa’s transition process, at about the same time 
(1988-1990) while the other case study in this research, Brazil, approached the transition process 
in a significantly different way. 
293Bitar and Lowenthal. 
294 According to Aylwin, the government’s involvement in the transitional justice process began 
and ended with the truth commission. Anything more, he argued, belonged in the judicial realm. 
See Aylwin, Personal Interview. 
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Government-led transitional justice efforts focused on the National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and the Rettig Report it generated. 
During a personal interview Aylwin argued that “the Rettig Report clarified the 
magnitude of the topic but it also limited it, drew a ring around it. It permitted 
that the most grave cases were charged but also allowed society to move 
forward and for the fighting sides to live with each other.”295Aylwin stood by 
the Rettig Report, which was the result of a significant amount of personal 
effort, viewing it as the end of the government’s involvement in the transitional 
justice process. 
For me, the Rettig Report finished the need for justice. We sought the truth in the fairest 
way possible. The Rettig Report opened the door for judicial work. Undoubtedly, we 
could have had a collective vendetta against the tormenters but we chose the path of the 
judiciary not a vendetta. The Rettig Report was about truth and establishing that these 
were crimes that could be followed up in the judiciary. This was our chosen path. A path 
that I believe was right, it permitted social healing.296 
 
Limited by the fact that it was created by executive order rather than 
legislation, the commission was a fact gathering effort rather than a judicial one 
seen in a handful of other TRC processes.297The eight commissioners were 
assigned four main tasks: to establish as complete a picture as possible of the 
most serious human rights violations committed during the Pinochet regime; to 
identify victims by name and establish their fate and whereabouts; to establish 
a recommendation for reparations for the families of the victims; and to outline 
measures designed to ensure that such violations would never happen again.298 
While marking out a clear path for Chile’s transitional efforts at providing 
justice, the limitations of the mandate triggered a number of criticisms, 
including, for example, failure to name perpetrators or establish that violence 
was authorised by the state.299 A number of commentators have pointed out that 
these were among the only measures of justice possible, considering the 
continued existence of Decree 2.191, and the fact the power was still held by 
Pinochet through his supporters, particularly in the business community,300 and 
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that there was a lack of full congressional support for anything more than this 
toward complete justice. 
Roberto Garretón, a lawyer for the Vicaria de Solidaridad,301 has 
pointed out that this report was a product of its time and circumstance.302 Jose 
Zalaquette, one of the eight commissioners who wrote the Rettig Report agreed 
with his colleague in a personal interview, arguing that it would have been a 
waste of political power to attempt anything more than what was achieved. In 
reflecting on the early transitional justice efforts of the government, Aylwin 
reiterated that the report established facts that could be followed up by the 
judiciary, if appropriate. But his focus as president was on uniting above all 
else, to reduce efforts at vengeance and to establish a stable democracy. He 
argued that 
My conscience is clear. We did what we had to and what we could. It wouldn’t have 
been possible to chase Pinochet. I would have been out as President and we probably 
would have returned to a dictatorship. We did what was possible and what was 
desirable. I believe we did well…We tried to be uniting, and we succeeded with the 
politics that we followed.303 
 
 To varying degrees, Chile has enacted the basic transitional justice processes, as 
outlined by Arthur.304 These processes: justice, reparations, truth and institutional 
reform, have been progressively implemented by Chilean governments. The table 
below is a brief overview of the different transitional justice processes in relation to 
Chile. 
 
Table 2.1 Transitional justice processes in Chile  
Justice Limited, dependent on individual members of the 
judiciary.  
																																																						
301 The Vicaria was the main source of opposition during the Pinochet regime, organising habeas 
corpus writs in a continued effort to locate and protect victims of the regime. While mostly 
unsuccessful, the archive of documents that was built from these efforts created one of the most 
complete records of the violence committed by the regime. 
302Garreton. 
303Aylwin. 
304These processes, discussed in the introduction, are considered the basic norms of transitional 
justice. For more, see: Arthur. 
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Reparation Uneven, though increasingly widespread. Certain 
groups initially left out of reparation process, including 
torture victims, who were only considered for 
reparations in 2003. Reparations took several forms 
including programs based on pensions, social services, 
educational benefits, public recognition of the 
violations of the victims' rights, monuments, sites of 
memory, and health assistance, mainly in the form of 
mental health services. Recent legislation has included 
health service mandated for victims of CAH, including 
third generation relatives. 
Truth Multiple truth initiatives, including the National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (1990), 
National Commission on Political Imprisonment and 
Torture (2003) and the round table discussions of the 
Mesa de Diálogo 
 
Institutional Reform Some institutional reform including changes to 
judiciary, military reform and rule of law. However, 
amnesty decree is still in force, as is the Pinochet-era 
constitution.  
 
 
 
2.5.2 Opposing views of the transitional processes of justice  
While the president and his advisors were satisfied with the transitional 
justice processes, with Aylwin going so far to say that he felt that the Rettig 
Report ended government involvement in and responsibility for bringing about 
justice efforts,305 victims of the past repression were less satisfied.306 Many felt 
that the administrations that followed Aylwin’s tenure have failed to address 
the perceived basic requirements of justice in addressing the violence 
committed by the Pinochet regime, with some arguing that this failure has 
fundamentally impacted Chile’s development as a democracy.307 
Civil society groups, focused on different categorisations of victims, have 
developed around the need for judicial activity. In a personal interview, Hector 
Cataldo, member of the Agrupación de Ex-Presos Politicos (Association of 
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306 Subsequent administrations have attempted to increase public satisfaction with perceived 
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impunity. After the Mesa, the names of identified perpetrators were put under embargo for 50 
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[accessed 17 April 2014]. 
	 77	
Former Political Prisoners), outlined a number of concerns that have remained 
since the transition. He argued that justice is necessary for survivors, their 
families, and for the social organisations that work with them. He also 
maintained that there is no democracy without justice.308“We don’t accept 
immunity… Common crimes can be amnestied but crimes against humanity, 
as in the crimes committed by the state, can’t be amnestied. The state violated 
human rights…justice has to be equilibrated.”309 
This criticism of the amnesty decree and transitional justice is confirmed in 
the volume of cases that have come before the courts over crimes committed 
during the Pinochet era,310 including the attempted extradition of Pinochet by a 
Spanish Court,311 as well as the continued protests of organisations of 
survivors312 and the presence of groups such as the FUNA, whose members 
still picket both the homes and work places of former military personnel known 
to have been involved in the authoritarian regime.313  This group has become a 
mouthpiece for the post-authoritarian generation seeking to express frustrations 
over how questions of justice have been handled.314 
While the continued efforts of civil society may not have challenged the 
stability of the government, however, governability has occasionally been 
called in to question with the protests and public shaming of Pinochet era 
politicians who are still active in the Chilean political sphere.315 Amnesty 
																																																						
308Cataldo, Personal Interview. 
309Cataldo, Personal Interview. 
310 As of 2010, 782 agents of the Pinochet regime had been indicted or convicted, with much of 
this justice activity occurring between 1998 and 2010. For more see: Collins, Post-Transitional 
Justice, pp. 138–40. 
311 In 1998, a Spanish judge attempted to extradite Pinochet while he was in Great Britain, to be 
held on charges of the murder of a number of Spanish citizens. This caused an international outcry 
and raised the question of sovereignty and justice. 
312 The 40th anniversary of the coup saw 60,000 Chileans take to the streets of Santiago in protest 
at the government’s lack of justice measures. See: AFP, “Thousands March for Human Rights in 
Chile on 40th Anniversary of Augusto Pinochet Coup,” Telegraph.co.uk, 01:38, sec. world news, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/chile/10295315/Thousands-march-for-
human-rights-in-Chile-on-40th-anniversary-of-Augusto-Pinochet-coup.html. 
313Ana Ros, The Post-Dictatorship Generation in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay: Collective 
Memory and Cultural Production (Springer, 2012). 
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legislation has, thus far, co-existed with the democratic process, though 
uneasily and constantly challenged. Regardless of efforts by successive 
administrations to move beyond the past, the demands for justice remain, with 
a new generation continuing the debate around impunity. 
 
2.6 Justice and Democracy in the long run: Can amnesty and democracy 
coexist? 
2.6.1 The current state of democracy 
Over 25 years have passed since Chile’s democratic transition. The last 17 
years, in particular, have seen significant shifts in public perceptions of justice 
and amnesty, as well as the successes of a number of court cases challenging 
the Pinochet-era amnesty decree. The government has been pushed into playing 
a more active role, “at a time when amnesty is not a particularly rewarding issue 
in Chile”,316especially during the crises surrounding the attempts to extradite 
Pinochet. There have been two additional truth commissions, as well as calls 
for further evidence from victims during the final months of Michele Bachelet’s 
first term as president (2006-2010). The justice issue has not gone away. 
However, despite concerns around the continued use of the amnesty decree, as 
well as the persistent demands for justice, a number of the qualities considered 
to be part of a good democracy as outlined by Morlino317 are identifiable in 
Chile’s most recent democratic period. 
The country has continued to use the 1980 Constitution as the cornerstone 
of its legal institutions. While this Constitution has been criticised as being a 
legacy of authoritarianism, changes to the document have ensured that 
oversight has shifted into the hands of the civilian government, including a 
reduction in the role of the military in the political sphere and changes in the 
rules of the Central Bank, among others.318 Bachelet, in her second term as 
President, indicated the desire to introduce a new constitution, one “born out of 
democracy”,319 although there are doubts as to whether this is achievable 
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despite majority support in the Congress. Greater accountability is seen in the 
increase of dictatorship-era cases before the courts, as well as a number of 
members of the Pinochet regime that have either been convicted, or at least 
indicted, for their crimes.320 These measures of accountability suggest a decline 
in the use of amnesty legislation. 
Considering that perceived equality and equal treatment are core 
characteristics of democracy, it is important to note that inequality is still one 
of the most significant issues to face the Chilean government.321 The World 
Bank data shows that 14.4 per cent of Chileans live below the country’s poverty 
line, with an overall Gini index rating of 52.1, giving Chile the largest gap 
between the rich and poor in the OECD.322 Freedom of the press is another 
concern, with Chile listed as only ‘partly free’.323Many Chilean people have 
apparently checked out of the political system, with participation in the last 
election at 42 per cent.324 Whatever its causes, this abdication of civic 
responsibility may be the greatest challenge to the democratic system, 
especially when combined with the disparity between the rich and the poor. 
Volatile protests have continued to be a feature of the discourse between the 
public and the government, with tens of thousands of Chileans protesting less 
than two weeks after the inauguration of Bachelet in her second term of 
government. Protestors claimed they were marching to keep the pressure on the 
government to pursue the leftist agenda and the revision of the Constitution.325 
Table 2.2 below analyses Chile’s current situation in the context of 
Morlino’s quality of democracy indicators. 
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Table 2.2: Quality of Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Chile: An Analysis 
Dimension Chile Commentary 
Law Broadly legalistic, though 
with the continued existence 
and some use of 1978 
Amnesty decree.  
Rule of law based on 1980 
Constitution. While authoritarian 
in origin, adjustments have 
ensured wider freedoms. Supreme 
Court has been reorganised to 
ensure greater transparency and 
government input, Pinochet era 
judges have slowly been replaced.  
Still open to applying amnesty 
decree, or light sentences to 
human rights abuses cases. Legal 
environment rated well by 
Freedom House. 
Accountability Traditional democratic 
accountability via electoral 
process and active 
Congress. 
Regular elections, stable 
administrations. Continued 
movement in accountability for 
past actions, weakening amnesty 
legislation. 
Participation Broad enfranchisement. 
New voting system and 
voting apathy has seen a 
significant drop in voter 
participation. 2014 was the 
first time voting in a 
presidential election was not 
mandatory. 
Presidential elections in Chile in 
2013 saw voter participation of 
49% in the first round and 42% in 
the final run-off.  
Competition Widespread competition. Parties on both the left and right 
politically active, with a right-
wing president elected for the 
2012-2014 term for the first time 
since the dictatorship. 
Freedoms Constitutionally established 
rights widespread 
Personal freedom relatively 
widespread, including religious 
freedom (though preferential 
treatment is given to the Catholic 
Church) and economic freedom. 
Press freedom listed by Freedom 
House as ‘partly free’.  
Equality Procedural equality in terms 
of democracy. Gender 
equality in terms of 
education and employment. 
Current president is female. 
Still significantly unequal in 
regard to the rich and poor, 
and in regard to the 
indigenous population 
Gini Index of 52.1 (2009), 
indicating a relatively unequal 
society (0 is perfectly equal, 100 
is perfectly unequal). 14.4 per 
cent of the population lives below 
the national poverty line. 
Continued issues between 
government and the Mapuche, 
with the police in Chile accused 
of “a systematic use of force.”  
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Responsiveness Some government 
responsiveness, still facing 
significant protests 
regarding a number of social 
issues including education, 
indigenous rights and 
general social justice. 
Praised for quick action after 
recent earthquakes, government 
responsiveness depends on issue. 
Social spending at 10.2% of GDP 
(2012), significantly lower than in 
earlier democratic period. 
 
 While democracy has gradually been consolidated in Chile, a number of 
concerns remain. Commentators have remarked on the continued shadow of the 
Pinochet regime and his authoritarian legacy, arguing that institutionally, at 
least, Chile has been slow to adapt.326 Inequality and low spending on social 
issues has perpetuated long existing divisions in the electorate, as well as 
becoming a potential cause for low participation levels now that voting is 
voluntary. 
 
2.6.2 Justice for Human Rights Violations in Chile 
The democratization experience of Chile over the last 25 years reveals the 
constant presence of the debate over justice, potentially drowning out other 
issues until, ostensibly, it is resolved. In the abstract, according to Zalaquette,  
justice is an essential element of society. Dealing with the past is essential for healing a 
broken society…But the reality is, even those who must be prosecuted may not be able 
to be now…The question is, if you are not in a position to met out justice, at least don’t 
condone what you can’t prosecute.327 
 
Whether the current demands for justice will change as victims eventually 
die, as is expected by a number of observers,328 remains to be seen. Successive 
governments have had to ensure governability and social stability by 
maintaining amnesty legislation and resisting taking an active role addressing 
claims for justice. Leaders, moreover, have emphasised that to ensure the 
viability of the democracy project, Chileans needed to move beyond the 
perceived need for justice, or as some argue, vengeance, and embrace a certain 
level of forgetting.329 Aylwin calculated that this was the best possible outcome 
for Chile. “Undoubtedly, we could have had a collective vendetta against the 
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tormenters but we chose the path of the judiciary not a vendetta.”330 However, 
the arguments for separating impunity from the violence have continued to be 
questioned by survivors as well as members of the international community. 
The quest for justice by organisations in civil society has spilled over into a 
general debate around the possibility of a culture of impunity regarding 
government interaction with marginalised groups.331 Chilean academic 
Elizabeth Lira observed that the world has changed since the transition. She 
argues that “amnesty has become problematic.”332 
Chile continues to foster a highly legalistic culture333 with mainstream 
faith in the legal processes acting as a legitimising force. But a number of the 
elements that could be expected in an effective system of justice are weak or 
absent, particularly punishment of past CAH. The continued push 
memorialisation, by successive governments has left victims on their own 
regarding seeking punishment. Lira argued that “none of these things resolves 
the issues. We have to ask: how do we take the past positively forward? Audio 
visual documentary, television, and books don’t help that much anymore.”334At 
times, court cases have involved victims challenging the established 
mechanisms of impunity. When cases have succeeded, perpetrators have been 
given extremely lenient sentences. 
 There is also little certainty of success in these cases, and the outcome of 
a case can often depend more on location and judge than on universally 
established law or mandate.335 While civil liberties are generally protected by 
the 1980 Constitution, the application of state terror laws and Pinochet-era anti-
terror legislation, have raised concerns and been internationally condemned as 
a potential abuse of human rights. Equality in the application of these laws is 
also in question. The anti-terror laws for example, are used almost exclusively 
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as part of the government’s solution to the Mapuche crisis.336 Table 3.4 below 
briefly outlines the dimensions of the quality of justice, as applied to present-
day Chile. 
 
Table 2.3 Quality of Justice Dimensions in Modern Chile: An Analysis 
Dimension Chile Commentary 
Fairness Limited. Continued presence of 
Amnesty legislation has 
been slated as unfair by 
victims of the regime, as 
well as ensuring general 
impunity. 
Equality of 
application 
Unequal, with increasing success 
and some noticeable failures. 
Success of human rights 
cases depend on location 
and sitting judge as there 
is no national policy. 
Leniency of convictions 
has also been unequal 
compared to the 
punishment handed out 
for a similar non-
political crime. 
Law Civil liberties along democratic 
traditions established by the 1980 
Constitution. Some concerns 
over the legality of some of the 
remaining dictatorship era laws 
regarding state security etc. 
State Terror Laws have 
raised concern regarding 
use during Mapuche 
crisis, particularly 
regarding impunity for 
police in regard to 
violence committed 
against protesters. 
Legitimacy Strong legitimisation for legal 
structure. 
The continence of a 
strongly legalistic 
culture, particularly 
amongst the mainstream. 
 
Justice for crimes against humanity has been slow to come and unequal in 
its application. Chileans in general still seem to have faith in a highly legalistic 
culture, although victims have continued to despair of what they see as a lack 
of options to oppose overwhelming impunity. There has been some visible 
progress however, although whether that progress has been enough to establish 
the perception of justice in the wider Chilean community is debatable. On the 
40th anniversary of the coup, over 60,000 Chileans protested on the streets of 
Santiago, calling for the end to the continued impunity for crimes against 
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humanity. The FUNA, an organisation which has taken public shaming into its 
own hands, has continued to be active with actual victims of the Pinochet 
regime as well younger Chileans taking part in the group’s protest activities.  
 
2.7 Perspectives on the tension between justice, amnesty and democracy 
Over the last 25 years, interest groups have developed distinct 
perspectives on the progress made in Chile regarding democracy, justice and 
the continued use of the amnesty law.337 H2 proposes that amnesty becomes 
widely acceptable with time as population demographics shift. However, the 
threads of discourse regarding the amnesty decree and related issues point to a 
continued resistance to the ongoing impunity. This is particularly the case for 
those that identify with the left, and members of victim’s advocacy groups. 
Personal interviews, public statements and position documents have all 
informed the examination of H2 in relation to the Chilean case study. It is clear 
from the development of FUNA, an organisation that organises protests outside 
the homes of former members of the Pinochet regime and military apparatus, 
that the quest for justice has become intergenerational.338 
The perception of each group regarding culpability for the initial rupture 
and continuing impunity has had an impact on how they interact with efforts at 
securing justice as well as how they view Chile’s progress in democratization. 
It is clear that no one opinion can speak for all of Chile, nor can a single 
perspective represent all opinions within a group. However, specific strains of 
discourse can be identified. These strains were explored through the personal 
interviews with political elites, human rights advocates, academics and 
members of the judiciary, as well as through an extensive canvas of public 
statements, media commentary and related documents. The evidence shows 
that the military and political elites tend to view questions of justice resolved, 
arguing that those that continue to discuss the past may threaten hard-fought 
stability. A number of human rights lawyers agree, to some extent, with this 
perspective. In another strain, human rights lawyers call for more government 
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action to challenge persisting impunity, arguing that inaction has intensified a 
growing problem and that avoidance can make continuing calls for justice 
impossible to deal with in the long run. A wide range of groups in civil society 
representing the interests of victims continue to be vocal regarding these 
interests.  
  
2.7.1 Military Perspectives 
The military has seen the most change both in regards to the way in which 
it views its role in the past violence, and in regards to demands for justice. It 
has generally resisted any demands for accountability, holding on to the 
established narrative of national saviour from the chaos of socialist efforts.  
This view was particularly dominant in the initial transition period, 1990-1998, 
with Pinochet threatening a return to military rule if the new civilian 
government pursued accountability measures.339 During this early period, 
military disdain for civilian accountability efforts was publically illustrated 
twice.340 The military leadership rejected the Rettig Report,341 while the armed 
forces universally believed that the coup was justified and that any violence 
committed was done by a handful of rogue officers. This belief began to 
weaken in 1997 with the claim from former DINA head Miguel Contreras who 
was facing a lengthy jail term, that he had “always acted according to the orders 
given by the President of the Republic who, as the maximum authority behind 
the DINA, was the only one…who could order missions.”342 A number of 
human rights successes, including the multiple convictions against Contreras 
for the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, and the Spanish 
extradition attempt against Pinochet, ultimately forced the Chilean military to 
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change publically expressed attitudes towards human rights violations and 
impunity. The military participated in the evidence gathering Mesa Dialogo 
(1999-2001), though the information revealed during this process was 
questionable at best.343 Since 2001, the military has accepted the assumption of 
some guilt for the human rights violations of the coup. In 2004, the then 
Commander-in-Chief, Juan Emilio Cheyre, wrote that “the Army of Chile took 
the hard, but irreversible decision to assume responsibilities that fall on it as an 
institution for all the punishable and morally unacceptable events of the 
past.”344 
 While some members of the military leadership have publically accepted 
responsibility for Pinochet-era crimes, others have not. Academics have noted 
the discrepancies between Cheyre’s words and actual behaviour as leader of the 
military. Through payroll deductions, the military continues to finance the 
defence of accused participants as well as continuing to place the blame for the 
coup on left wing political elites.345 
Out of all those charged with some degree of accountability for human 
rights violations in Chile, in its discourse of the last 14 years the military has 
been the most resistant in accepting culpability. The military continues to view 
the on-going trials as unnecessary and a product of the politics of revenge.346 
However, members of the military are less vocal against the efforts of 
government and civil society to achieve justice for human rights violations of 
the Pinochet regime than ever before. Their view acknowledges the past and 
pushes, albeit gently, for closure of that chapter.347 
  
2.7.2 Perspectives of Political Elites 
 Political elites emerged from the 17 years of dictatorship relatively intact 
considering the level of repression experienced across the ideological 
spectrum.348However, hamstrung by the strength of the outgoing military 
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regime, the 1980 Constitution, the amnesty decree and a significant minority 
that supported Pinochet, the new governing parties were limited in what they 
could achieve in the arena of transitional justice. The promise to revoke the 
amnesty decree was quietly dropped, as was the hope to significantly 
restructure Chile’s institutional base.349 Rightly or wrongly, any direct action 
against the Pinochet regime was perceived as a potential threat to democracy 
and, beyond that, governability. Reflecting on his role in the transition of Chile, 
former president Aylwin argued that he had no regrets.  
In terms of justice for crimes committed by the dictatorship, I continue to say [that] 
justice must be found through judicial means. I don’t have any regrets in the idea that 
my government didn’t seek to limit or that we protected the responsible. Pinochet has 
been charged so he didn’t have absolute impunity.350 
 
Aylwin believed that anything more than what had been achieved under his 
government would have bordered on vengeance rather than justice. From his 
perspective, that would have converted the topic of transitional justice into a 
fundamental characteristic of Chile’s society and would have made it 
impossible for his “nation of enemies” (nación de enemigos)351 to find common 
ground. “We did what we had to. Some wanted more but personally, I think 
more would have been about vengeance rather than justice. This sort of politics 
would have converted the topic of violations into a fundamental characteristic 
of society.”352 
A “conspiracy of consensus”353 marked the majority of political 
perspectives on the transitional justice process in Chile, with successive 
Concertación governments almost actively unwilling to take action on securing 
accountability for the human rights violations of the Pinochet regime.354 Right 
wing political elites viewed any effort at securing justice as unnecessary 
vengeance against the “saviour” of Chile from the communist threat of 
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Allende’s leadership. On the left, there was a general unwillingness to 
destabilize Chile’s governability as an emerging democratic state. In line with 
the tradition established by Aylwin, the majority of the political elite believed 
that any movement on issues of justice beyond the Rettig Report belonged with 
the judiciary.355 For Aylwin, the Report also served as a justification for the 
transition to democracy, something that should not be undervalued. “If we 
didn’t have it, it would have been hard to explain the difficulties of the change, 
the reasons behind it and to weaken the power of Pinochet.”356 
On the rare occasion that human rights issues were brought to the 
Congress, they tended to fail in the face of right wing, and some left wing, 
resistance. The newer generations of political elites were comfortable with the 
memorialisation of the past,357 allowing for the establishment of the Museum 
of Memory and Human Rights, as well as the Human Rights Institute.358 
Of those that were involved in the transition other than the military, the 
political elites have been the most comfortable with relegating demands for 
justice to simply a necessary sacrifice of the bargaining process. Along with the 
political leadership’s satisfaction in hindsight that the process took the best 
possible course considering the alternatives, the elites have been actively 
resistant to any efforts to pursue more traditional justice measures.359 At times, 
human rights groups seeking justice have been in direct conflict with the 
government.360 Truth and memory361 have taken precedence over retributive or 
restorative justice measures. The bargain was for democracy, according to the 
																																																						
355 The judiciary was assisted in seeking justice through what came to be known as “the Aylwin 
doctrine”. In an open letter to the Supreme Court, the president encouraged justices to apply 
amnesty only once a case had been fully investigated, allowing for full disclosure, if not 
punishment. See Hayner; Ferrara. 
356Aylwin, Personal Interview. 
357Wilde; Katherine Hite and Cath Collins, ‘Memorial Fragments, Monumental Silences and 
Reawakenings in 21st-Century Chile’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 38.2 (2009), 
379–400. 
358 Even these efforts have faced significant political resistance, with both the museum and 
institute fostering significant debate in Congress before being allowed.  
359Collins, Post-Transitional Justice; Loveman and Lira, ‘Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and 
Impunity as Historical Themes: Chile, 1814 - 2006.’; Brian Loveman and Elizabeth Lira, Las 
Ardientes Cenizas Del Olvido: Vía Chilena de Reconciliación Política 1932-1994 (LOM 
Ediciones, 2000); Kornbluh and Hite. 
360S. J. Stern, Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989–2006 
(Duke University Press, 2010). 
361Truth and memory efforts in transitional justice refer to truth commissions and memorialization 
such as the establishment of museums, art projects and official historical accounting of the 
authoritarian period. 
	 89	
political elites and articulated by Aylwin.362 The goal of a fully democratic 
government, however, has taken significant time to eventuate, with Bachelet 
still removing some of the vestiges of the Pinochet regime in her second term. 
The 1980 Constitution, while altered, is still the law of the land. Other Pinochet-
era laws, particularly relating to police responses to the mobilization of the 
Mapuche Indians, continue to be used.363 
 
 2.7.3 Perspectives from the Legal Community 
The legal community has played the most significant role in the 
development of justice and the ways this justice has been perceived in Chile 
during and after the transition period. From the earliest stages of the coup, the 
Comité de Paz and then La Vicaría de la Solidaridad acted as legal 
representation for victims. Both church based organisations, the goals of the 
Comité and La Vicaría, according to Garreton, were “for the family to have 
action, to second guess the authorities, to have the effect of a drop of water on 
a rock, and finally, as a way to reconnect all the information. It gave us 
evidence, contemporary evidence.”364As the only organizations that could 
protest the regime, the groups became the main source of answers for 
victims.365 
However, since the transition, the legal community has also been the 
group that is most divided over the methods and degree of justice to be meted 
out for crimes against humanity committed by the Pinochet regime.366 
Perspectives on efforts at securing justice over the last 25 years via legal means 
can be divided along two main lines: those of human rights lawyers, and those 
of the judiciary. Amongst the lawyers, there have been marked differences over 
perspectives on justice, which will be discussed below. Such differences appear 
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to depend on the view that individual lawyers take regarding the transition and 
subsequent efforts to secure justice, thus complicating the identification of a 
single discourse. Nevertheless, there are two identifiable opinions regarding 
justice in these cases. There are continuing beliefs shared by Zalaquette and 
Garretón, among others that the time for traditional justice is over.367 However, 
other lawyers, such as Carmen Hertz,368 have argued that the lack of 
accountability creates a fundamentally flawed society. Hertz, along with others, 
has continued to pursue justice through judicial means for victims of the 
Pinochet regime. The judiciary, on the other hand, has actively resisted efforts 
for justice, opting rather for a wide application of amnesty, handing out short 
sentences and resisting international pressures to remove amnesty from 
widespread usage.369 
 Reflecting on transitional processes of justice, both Zalaquette and 
Garretón described the choices and compromises made by the incoming 
Concertacion government as part of the political realities of the transition. 
According to Zalaquette, one of the architects of the human rights policy and a 
lawyer who was part of the Truth and Reconciliation process, the term 
‘transitional justice’ is misleading, because there are variables that make this 
type of process unique.  
The concept of justice, when you are dealing with it like here, has to take this into 
consideration. Criminal justice punishes crimes. There is a degree of criminality in 
every society. When a society breaks down, criminality is a result of a nuclear fission. 
It tends to be massive and more cruel than usual. You can’t just extrapolate normal 
justice during un-normal times.370 
 
Zalaquette said that from an ethical standpoint, leaders of the transition 
had to reconstruct a broken society. They also had to establish a path that would 
handle the past, the present and have a mind on future aims. These aims, 
according to Zalaquette, were twofold: “attempting to guarantee non-repetition 
as well as repair what was repairable.”371 Zalaquette said that while the personal 
responsibility for atrocities is an absolute value, within the western ethical 
debate this has not yet been fully united with responsibility during war. The 
																																																						
367Zalaquette, Personal Interview. 
368Hertz,‘Q&A’. 
369Requa; Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley. 
370Zalaquette, Personal Interview. 
371Zalaquette, Personal Interview. 
	 91	
international community has decreed that some crimes must be prosecuted but 
the question, according to Zalaquette, is what happens when you are not in a 
position to mete out justice? Is it enough to simply condemn what you cannot 
prosecute? In many respects, he argued, this is where a truth commission, in 
acknowledging the violence of the past, plays an important role. It is an 
acknowledgement of what cannot be prosecuted.372 
Garratón, the director of the Law Department of the Vicaria de 
Solidaridad373 during the Pinochet regime, was a little less circumspect in 
regard to the progress made during the last 25 years. He described the amnesty 
decree as a “cursed inheritance” of the former Pinochet regime. “Amnesty is a 
message to criminals: continue killing because we will continue granting 
[impunity].”374 Regardless of the restrictions of the amnesty legislation and 
authoritarian institutional structure, Garretón argued that Chile had made more 
progress during the last 25 years than many other countries.   
I don’t know of any country that has so many criminals in the process of being 
convicted. But this is also full of frustrations. It’s not the justice that we worked for 
but at least it is a form of absolute justice. Chile has made a lot of progress.375 
 
According to Zalaquette, the progress may not be enough, particularly for 
the victims of the regime.  
For relatives of the disappeared, the cause is just but it also becomes a way of life. 
The search for justice becomes a meaningful role. The cause becomes a way of life. 
Some creeds have become sacred – just cause and a heroic existence – criminal justice 
to the last extent.376 
 
Hertz, one of Chile’s best known human rights lawyers and a staunch 
advocate for justice, has been critical of the process that involved both 
Zalaquette and Garretón. Hertz’s views reflect those who continue to represent 
victims of the Pinochet regime in the court of law. She also straddles the 
boundary between the legal fraternity and victim; her husband was killed as 
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part of the Caravan of Death in October 1973.377 In a newspaper interview just 
before the recent elections, Hertz discussed contemporary justice in Chile. 
In terms of justice, progress has been relative. The doses of justice are small or 
insignificant compared to the magnitude and importance of the crimes committed, 
which are crimes against humanity. In Chile, violations to fundamental human rights 
were systematically committed on a large scale and these are crimes against humanity, 
ordered by the state apparatus. This is what happened in Chile. And the justice that 
has been served is not equivalent to the nature of the crimes that were committed.378 
 
According to Hertz, the pervasive impunity holds back the democratic 
reconstruction process. The impunity “generates an erosion of institutions, a 
distrust in them, and in the end, less democracy, less democratic sense and less 
civic sense.”379 According to Hertz, the on-going impunity is the real scandal 
of the last 25 years.  
There has been an absolute social, moral and political impunity and that is a scandal. 
It is very bad for us as a society to see impunity of this kind, of this nature, because it 
mostly affected citizens and nothing good can come of that. It is not possible to really 
reconstruct a democratic and decent society with this impunity.380 
 
 Zalaquette rejects the idea that impunity has been universal. The Rettig 
Report and the Valech Commission awknowledged the CAH. Reparations have 
been paid, and over 150 former members of the Pinochet regime have served 
time in jail. “But I believe the time [for justice] has passed. The last time for 
traditional justice was 2005.”381Zalaquette also pushed back against calls for a 
more transparent process, along the lines of the public hearings in South Africa.  
I consider the criticisms to be superficial. An open commission like that of South Africa 
would not really have been possible. The executive branch issued the order for the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. This came from the executive and not the congress.382 
 
The other half of the judicial equation, the court system, persistently 
resisted any question regarding the court’s pro-Pinochet stance during the 
authoritarian regime, and the generous application of amnesty since.383 This 
contradicted the hope expressed by Aylwin that the courts would take up the 
mantel of justice once the Rettig Report concluded its investigations.384 The 
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changes made to the structure and make-up of the courts in 1997/1998 by 
President Eduardo Frei led to a greater presence of liberal or centrist judges 
examining Pinochet-era cases, allowing for some cases to be prosecuted.385 
However, amnesty has continued to be used and, where amnesty is not 
applicable, the court has handed out significantly reduced sentences.386 While 
there is significant judicial opposition to the involvement of the courts in 
amnesty cases, there are an increasing number of dissenting voices, particularly 
as those loyal to Pinochet and his memory begin to fade in prominence. In a 
speech given to Amnesty International in 2005, Judge Juan Guzman Tapia, the 
first Chilean judge to prosecute Pinochet, criticised the continued resistance of 
the Chilean Courts to full and open justice. After stepping down from his seat 
on the Santiago Court of Appeals, Guzman argued that a siege mentality still 
existed in the courts, with judges fundamentally opposed to reform and 
implementation of measures of justice.387 However, this mentality may be 
shifting beyond lone voices. In the lead up to the 40th anniversary 
commemorations of the coup, the National Association of Magistrates of the 
judiciary released a statement apologizing for the actions of judges under 
military rule. The judges admitted that they had abandoned their role as 
protector of the Chilean people. The judges went on to say that “the time has 
come to ask for forgiveness of victims…and of Chilean society.”388 
  
2.7.4 Perspectives of Organisations in Civil Society 
Many advocacy groups have emerged since Chile’s transition from 
authoritarian rule and these groups, with some crossover in representation and 
end goals, have played a significant role in the push for truth and accountability.  
Despite progress, a number of these groups argue that not enough has been done 
towards accountability and justice. Some, like FUNA, have publically named 
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and shamed perpetrators rather than waiting for traditional judicial measures.389 
Cataldo, an active member of Agrupacion de Ex-Presos Politicos (Association 
of Former Political Prisoners/AEXPP), whose members are the survivors of 
torture and military imprisonment, insisted that the starting point for dealing 
with the past must be an understanding of the fundamental nature of human 
rights.390 He noted that this is often forgotten when the past is manipulated for 
political means. From Cataldo’s perspective, the amnesty decree has been a 
source of significant difficulty for Chile, a negative legacy of the transition 
period. He was critical of the impact the decree has had on the country’s 
democracy.  
We don’t accept impunity. For us, democracy is not an electoral game. It is more 
complete. A government for the people, by the people, of the people. Democracy here 
is described as that, but it is not like that at all…we do not have democracy.391 
 
Cataldo is not alone in his disgust at the lack of progress in justice. Lorena 
Pizarro, President of the Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos 
Desaparecidos (Association of the Families of the Disappeared 
Prisoners/AFDD) was part of the protest in 2013 marking the 40th anniversary 
of the Pinochet coup. Over 60,000 Chileans carried pictures of family members 
who had been killed or kidnapped by the state, along with signs that reiterated 
that not one of the victims had been forgotten. According to Pizarro: “Forty 
years on, we are still demanding truth and justice. We won’t rest until we have 
found out what happened to our loved ones who were arrested and went 
missing.”392 
The table below outlines the opinions regarding the justice process 
expressed in personal interviews with politicians, human rights lawyers and 
victims groups, and public statements made by members of the above groups, 
as well as by the military and judiciary. 
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Table 2.4: Long-term opinions regarding justice, amnesty and democracy 
Accountability 
Actors 
Justice Amnesty  Democracy 
Military Not necessary. Coup 
justified, violence 
sporadic.  
Eventually, limited 
apology given. 
Necessary for the 
transition to 
prevent civilian 
led vengeance. 
Established after 
the completed 
mission of the 
coup. Built on 
the path deemed 
appropriate by 
the armed 
forces. 
Political Elites Truth over justice a 
necessary 
compromise. Further 
justice efforts belong 
to the courts not the 
government. 
Necessary 
compromise to 
ensure 
democratic 
consolidation.  
Successfully 
consolidated 
after the 
declared end of 
the transition 
(1993).   
Judiciary 
(Lawyers) 
General agreement 
that traditional 
justice is absent. 
Split over whether 
there should be 
continued justice 
efforts. 
Split opinion. 
Some agree with 
political elites. 
Others believe 
Amnesty is illegal 
as a piece of 
legislation and 
impunity is 
problematic.  
Split opinion. 
Viewed either 
as a complete 
success, with 
military 
subordination 
and successful 
election process, 
or materially 
weakened by 
continued 
impunity of 
dictatorship era 
crimes. 
Judiciary 
(Courts) 
Limited, subject to 
liberal use of 
amnesty legislation. 
Court organizations 
have recently 
apologized for court 
complicity in the 
Pinochet era 
breeches of justice, 
as well as resistance 
to recent justice 
efforts. 
Key piece of 
domestic 
legislation. 
Protected from 
international 
interference by 
the sovereignty of 
the domestic 
court system. 
N/A 
Victim’s 
Groups/HROs 
Lacking and must be 
addressed. The lack 
of justice places 
serious burden on 
the nation’s 
democracy. For 
some, truth is 
enough. For others 
retribution required.  
Fundamentally 
problematic. 
Must be removed 
from the 
country’s 
legislation. 
Significantly 
weakened by 
the lack of 
justice.  
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Demands for perceived justice continue to form part of the national 
discourse as well as having the potential to influence the political agenda, as 
has recently been experienced by Bachelet.393  Political elites are now being 
pushed beyond their own preferences, and forced to face questions of justice.   
 
2.8 Conclusion: Examining Chile in Relation to Hypotheses 
   
The Chilean experience is illustrative of the gauntlet that can be run during 
and after a democratic transition that is predicated on the use of amnesty 
legislation. The Pinochet regime passed a wide-reaching amnesty decree in 
1979, while still in power. This decree forgave the significant human rights 
violations committed during the first four years of the military regime. Under 
direct threat from Pinochet, groups steering the transition process gave up 
earlier promises to revoke the amnesty law after the transition.394 Without the 
support of congress, a truth commission was instituted via executive order and 
focused on the most easily identifiable victims, the dead and missing. However, 
as a product of an executive order rather than a legally binding process, the 
commission lacked sufficient power to fulfil its mission and the perpetrators of 
human rights violations remained officially unidentified.395While the 
government funded reparations were paid to some of the victims, the first eight 
years after the transition saw little in the way of punishment of those who had 
committed the CAH. As the experience with and stability of democracy 
deepened, victims began to question the blanket amnesty that remained.396 
These questions culminated in a direct challenge to Pinochet,397 as well as a 
rejection of the continuing existence of the amnesty law by the Inter-American 
Court.398 After the attempted extradition of Pinochet by a Spanish judge and 
domestic efforts to have him charged, the issue of amnesty, impunity and 
justice became a regular part of the political discourse in Chile, reflected in the 
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political agenda, media coverage and community protests.399The amnesty 
decree was challenged in a legal context, with judges taking alternative judicial 
measures, such as giving light sentences, rather than directly implementing 
amnesty. Democracy and its institutions were occasionally challenged through 
protest, however the overall stability remained intact. 
What then of the three hypotheses that form the key underpinning of this 
research? The first hypothesis addressed whether justice can be sacrificed for 
democracy in the long run. This hypothesis is stated in the following: 
H0) Amnesty legislation is compatible with expectations and norms of a 
liberal democracy. 
Transitional and post-transitional justice efforts in Chile have put the 
continued existence of the state’s amnesty decree at the centre of the political 
debate.400While Chile has an established democratic system that is thriving 
according to many of the indicators used to measure the quality of 
democracy,401 questions involving justice remain. As discussed above, 
association with the previous authoritarian regime can trigger public outcries 
and the removal of certain political actors from public office.402 There are also 
questions surrounding the culture of police impunity and the continued use of 
authoritarian-era laws in relation to the Mapuche Indian movement. According 
to Collins, it may be that these questions merely arise because of the maturation 
of the democracy, which allows the room for direct challenges without 
undermining institutional stability.403 In Chile there are indications that validate 
Collins’ argument. Ongoing legal efforts sponsored by organizations within 
civil society, protests and memorialization have found space in a society 
entrenched in liberal democratic ideals.404 The ability to protest has 
emboldened a community that no longer fears the heavy-handed reprisals of an 
authoritarian regime.  
The mobilization of victims, families and young people raises the question 
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as to whether the protests and legal challenges to the amnesty law were 
inevitable in a liberal democratic environment. Should citizens of a democratic 
state challenge the amnesty law, simply because they can? Do such challenges 
necessarily create instability? In the case of Chile, amnesty was regarded, at 
least at one juncture, as the price of democracy.405 As a pre-existing decree, and 
then an unmovable part of the transition process, amnesty was agreed to by the 
political elites in order to re-establish the via Chileña.406 The closed-door Truth 
Commission mandated by executive order, with members of the Commission 
appointed by the President, was viewed by political elites as the limit to what 
the government could do. Victims and the wider public had no say in a process 
that directly and intimately affected them. Persistent challenges to amnesty may 
be civil society’s way of challenging both the bargain (in favour of the victims) 
and the political solution (in favour of justice) going far beyond the narrow 
constraints of politics.407 The evidence seems to indicate that the more 
democratic Chile has become, the more space victims, and civil society in 
general, have found to pursue justice, with varying degrees of success. By so 
doing, they are challenging the decree that allowed democracy to be possible 
in the first place.  
H1) Amnesty (and the trading of justice for democracy) is agreed to in 
good faith. 
 When opposition leaders participated in Chile’s highly negotiated pacted 
transition,408 all the evidence indicates that they did so in good faith. By the 
time that Aylwin took power, it was clear that his administration was unlikely 
to revoke amnesty, despite promises to do so during earlier campaigning. As 
argued by Zalaquette, attempting to revoke the amnesty decree would have 
been a waste of political power409 when democracy was still dependent on the 
compliance of a powerful and watchful military apparatus. There is evidence 
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that Aylwin and Frei actively supported the amnesty law as a way to ensure 
continued stability or via Chileña.410 That is not to say that Aylwin, and his 
colleagues in the negotiation process, unequivocally supported the idea of 
amnesty. It is clear from the opposition discourse prior to the 1988 plebiscite, 
and subsequent negotiations, that impunity for human rights violations was 
considered to be a controversial issue. However, faced with continuing support 
for Pinochet, and the contradictory discourses on the causes and ramifications 
of the coup, there was little-to-no political will to alter the pact that promised 
to make democracy possible. By moving efforts for justice into the judicial 
sphere, Aylwin ensured that he could continue to claim that, from the 
perspective of the politicians at least, amnesty was agreed to in good faith and 
that, through the Rettig Commission, all political responsibility had ended.411 
H2)  Amnesty becomes acceptable with time in a given democracy as 
population demographics shift.   
 From interview responses and other gathered information, it seems that 
perceptions of Chile’s amnesty decree over time are based on an individual 
experiences with the authoritarian regime, the transition and political process 
in general. There is no single discourse. Victims and families, related groups in 
civil doesn’t sound right society groups, have all continued to seek justice and 
to challenge the ongoing impunity that continued to exist for crimes committed 
by the Pinochet regime. There is an underlying belief that the amnesty decree 
is problematic for the democracy,412and that justice should be served.413In 
contrast, political elites who were part of the process, even those from the centre 
left, believe that the amnesty law served its purpose, making the transition 
possible. They argue that if justice in the traditional, retributive sense were ever 
possible, it needed to have happened sooner.414The political division that 
marked the plebiscite, and led Aylwin to describe Chile as a “nation of 
enemies”,415 has persisted, with the debate over Pinochet’s amnesty decree 
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continuing amongst a new generation of politicians.416To argue that the decree 
is generally perceived to be un-democratic would negate the presence of a large 
percentage417 of the Chilean community that continue to support the legacy of 
Pinochet. However, there are also vocal groups pushing for the removal of the 
amnesty law on the basis of its perceived illegality.418 
Protests in Chile have continued despite the passage of time. The political 
influence of the protesting groups has been varied, although the mobilization 
of victims and other human rights groups is occasionally very effective.419The 
protests tend to coincide with memorialisation efforts and coup-related 
anniversaries, with an estimated 60,000 marking the 40th anniversary of the 
Pinochet takeover in 2013.420 While some commentators argue that a human 
rights voting bloc has developed to influence electoral outcomes,421 the real 
influence of these groups has been in the persistence to pursue justice through 
both domestic and international courts. Despite the continued existence of the 
amnesty decree, 260 people have been convicted of dictatorship era crimes, 
though only 60 have spent any time in jail. Over 1000 cases are slowly grinding 
their way through the court system.422 
 Demands for what the public perceives as justice have not diminished as 
the military and politicians would have liked. Implicitly related to equality and 
equal treatment, the public’s perceptions of justice do not necessarily demand 
prison sentences. Many would like to see the perpetrators simply named so that 
those who committed the crimes experience some public consequences for the 
human rights violations that they committed. This is the goal of FUNA, and has 
been underscored in a number of cases over the last 25 years. But this grass 
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roots justice, outside of the institutional structures of government, has the 
potential to trigger vigilantism and become a threat to the governability (the via 
Chileña) that is so prized by Chilean politicians. Had the human rights 
violations of the 1973 coup not been so violent or widespread, the victims may 
have been willing to allow some form of universal impunity. However, in Chile 
this was clearly not the case. On the promise of stability and a ‘greater good’ 
(democracy), Chileans were told to accept something that was almost solely 
directly beneficial to the military and political elites. The one-sided nature of 
amnesty and the impunity that has followed, discussed at length by Cataldo,423 
and voiced by other victims, is part of a nexus of perceived injustices. The 
absence of the perception of equality before, during and after the authoritarian 
period has been a source of unrest for marginalised communities. The failure 
to address this issue has potentially weakened Chile’s democracy, potentially 
undermining the hoped-for stability. As illustrated by an examination of the 
period preceding the coup, the Pinochet regime became an interruption of 
democracy and seriously compromised an existing framework of justice. The 
human rights violations that accompanied the coup, the ensuing repression, 
compromised reasonable measures of justice. The exceptions to this were in 
those who supported the coup, many of whom felt that the regime was doing 
what was needed to return Chile to a path of stability.424 Regardless of 
ideologies, the coup violated the letter of the 1925 Constitution, and thus the 
military intervention was illegal. Once the democratization process began with 
the inauguration of Aylwin, a number of questions were raised regarding the 
continued viability of the amnesty decree. Twenty-five years on, the evidence 
seems to show that legalised impunity cannot coexist with the perception of a 
fully developed democracy. Rather than the amnesty decree undermining the 
ensuing democracy, it seems that the nature of democracy, with the opportunity 
it provides to challenge the state and to be vocal regarding popular perceptions 
of justice, has undermined Decree 2.191. That is not to say that the amnesty 
law is without power. It is still used, though not uniformly, and judges are just 
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as likely to hand down lenient sentences as they are to continue to grant blanket 
impunity.   
 The overarching question of this thesis is whether justice can be sacrificed 
in the long run for democracy. The experience of Chile shows that the 
perception of an absence of justice for past crimes can become a significant and 
continuing issue, one that is unlikely to go away while impunity for human 
rights violations remains. The Chilean interviewees were split over whether the 
time for justice has passed. Many of those who directly participated in the 
political transition process, such as Aylwin, argued that a deal was struck and, 
despite ongoing concerns over the legitimacy of amnesty in a democratic 
system, these interview subjects felt that the Republic needed to honour that 
bargain. Interviews with former political and legal operatives revealed a desire 
to move beyond the dictatorship, arguing that the time for justice has long past. 
On the other hand, other interviewees expressed a persistent refusal to let go of 
their demands for justice. Their claim is built on the argument that a societal 
and political organisation cannot move forward before dealing with the most 
egregious crimes of the past. To do so would allow a rot to develop from within 
the institutional structure itself.425 As is clear from the interviews as a whole, 
the debate is ongoing and has become intergenerational, possibly providing an 
illustration of the point made by Zalaquette, that the quest for justice may have 
become a sacred and heroic creed.426 Ultimately, democracy has afforded a 
climate that allows justice to be demanded. However the quality of that 
democratic system can be undermined by the popular dissatisfaction with the 
government’s response to past CAH and by persisting perceptions of inequality 
and injustice.  
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Chapter Three 
Brazil 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 At times highly restrictive and violent towards opponents though at other 
times more open to left wing elements, the five presidencies of Brazilian military 
rule (1964-1985) had a significant impact on the subsequent development of 
Brazilian democratic institutions. While vestiges of authoritarianism remain in the 
legal and political framework as well as the national symbols of Brazil such as the 
flag, the violence committed by state apparatus following the 1964 coup is less 
widely known. The pact between the military and incoming civilian leadership 
pivoted on an amnesty law passed in 1979 which ensured a state-mandated culture 
of amnesia that continued for almost three decades. On the surface, Brazil’s 
transition experience confirms that justice can be sacrificed for democracy. The 
almost blanket forgetfulness over past state crimes meant that there were few public 
challenges to the state-granted impunity. However, the simple narrative of Brazil’s 
democratic transition belies several important factors that become clear when the 
case is examined more closely. These factors include the continued violence 
committed by state operatives, widespread corruption, the conviction of the former 
president and the questionable impeachment of a democratically-elected 
president.427 According to Marlon Weichert, a federal prosecutor who has been 
active in seeking justice for victims of the previous regime, the 1979 amnesty law 
has damaged Brazil’s political system.428 During a personal interview, Weichert 
argued that by maintaining impunity Brazil’s democracy has failed to mature with 
all the rights expected of a liberal democratic system. 
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In Brazil we have a political democracy, and it’s working. But we are not a complete 
democracy. Brazil has an enormous gap between civil rights and social economic rights – 
with this I mean security and state violence. It’s clear to me that it’s connected with the 
oblivion and accountability for human rights violations.429 
 
Brazil’s stunted democratic growth, illustrated recently in the continuing 
corruption scandals and the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, seems to 
provide a relatively clear answer to the question of whether amnesty can be 
sustained alongside democratic development. The answer, for Brazil it seems, is no. 
Democracy remains fragile, with the current president, as of June 2017, Michel 
Temer, viewed as illegitimate by a significant portion of the Brazilian public.430 
The reasons for the lack of depth in Brazil’s democratic culture can be seen in the 
causes for the 1964 coup, the nature of the subsequent authoritarian regime, the 
slow eventual transition to democracy, and the political elite’s commitment to the 
amnesty legislation over the last 30 years.  
As was the case with Chile, the characteristics of justice and democracy are 
relevant to the country’s institutional structure and to the public perception of the 
transitional justice process in Brazil. Public perception can play a key role in a 
country’s transition, legitimising or delegitimizing the political process and the 
developing institutional structure.  
 The 1964 military coup in Brazil was a response to increasing political 
polarisation, a series of economic crises and a governing leader with populist 
tendencies. Out of the coup developed a hybrid system of governance that 
incorporated both authoritarian and democratic elements, with fluctuating periods 
of repression. Between 1964 and 1985, five generals held the position of president, 
giving Brazil both continuity and change. General Emílio Garrastazú Médici (1969-
1974) oversaw the period of most severe repression, with thousands of leftist rebels 
tortured and hundreds killed. His successor, General Ernesto Giesel, began what 
was a repudiation of Médici’s hard-line leadership, moving Brazil towards a 
transition that took almost a decade to complete.  
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 Amnesty in Brazil was first fought for by the left, seeking to annul some of 
the restrictions placed on them by the regime’s judicial system. The expansion of 
the law’s coverage to include crimes committed by the state met initial resistance 
from the law’s supporters, however this was considered non-negotiable by the 
government. The blanket amnesty passed into law in 1979 as Law 6,683 and 
benefited members of the opposition as the civilianisation of the government began 
in earnest. However, the law also blocked any avenue for justice once the country 
became democratic. This pact between civilian and military leaders has been strictly 
maintained since the democratic transition in 1985. Until recently, political leaders 
refused to consider annulling the amnesty law, and in 2010 the Supreme Court 
confirmed its legitimacy. The rise of a former leftist guerrilla to the presidency of 
Brazil, and the continued push from the legal community and groups in civil society 
to reassess the question of impunity, have introduced the issue of justice for human 
rights violations back into the Brazilian consciousness. The conversation though, is 
limited by the general lack of interest, ongoing state-sponsored violence and other 
high profile political crises, leaving advocates and victims fighting for attention in 
a crowded political environment.  
 
3.2 Historical Background 
 3.2.1 Setting the stage for the coup 
Like many of its neighbours, Brazil had an established tradition of military 
involvement in the political sphere well before the 1964 military coup. The military 
facilitated the demise of the First Republic (1889-1930), and was a source of 
legitimacy for Getúlio Vargas’ 1937 coup and eight-year dictatorship. When 
Vargas began to court the left in the lead up to the long-promised 1945 election, it 
was the military, this time a group of army generals, who forced him to resign and 
return to his ranch in Rio Grande do Sul.431 A two-decade experiment with 
democracy was ushered in at the will of the nation’s generals, setting the tone for 
future interactions between the democratic government and military 
institutions.432Much like Brazil’s previous flirtation with democracy (1930-1935), 
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the first years of the so-called Second Republic followed a particular pattern. The 
political opening of the democratic system was followed by a burst of leftist 
activity, climaxing in government repression and the outlawing of the Communist 
Party.433 Throughout this period, the military stood as an autonomous institution 
with the belief in its role as protector of the state from both external and domestic 
threats to national order.434 At times the perception of domestic threats included 
politicians and political movements perceived to be triggering economic and 
political instability. 
 Between 1946 and 1964, franchise was limited to literate adults over the age 
of 18 years old.435This benefited the urban and rural elites, who were able to afford 
higher standards of education. A secret ballot for elections was introduced in 1962. 
During the Second Republic, electoral participation of registered voters was 
unpredictable, ranging between 60 per cent and 83 per cent.436 These numbers 
represented about 25-30 per cent of the population over 18 years old.437 
While access to the ballot was limited by literacy requirements, the 
Brazilian population still saw significant mobilization and polarization over the 
course of the almost two decades of democratic government. Academic Renato 
Colistete has argued that the conflict that emerged between the labour movement 
and employers was one of the primary reasons for Brazil’s failure to consolidate 
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democracy during the Second Republic.438 Indeed, a number of authors have 
claimed that the military’s fear of populism in general and the trade union 
movement in particular, contributed to their involvement in the democratic process, 
and eventual interruption of the nation’s democracy.439 The debate around Brazil’s 
labour movement became a prominent characteristic of the political discourse, 
without members of the movement being able to wield any real policy power. As 
outlined by Colistete, “Although left-wing trade union leaders took over key 
positions in the Brazilian labour movement, demanding substantial improvements 
in workers’ social standing, they were not seen as reliable partners by industrialists 
and other elite groups in Brazil.”440 
This polarized political climate, with unions seeking to break the residual 
corporatist structure that remained from Vargas’s Estado Nôvo441and the right 
attempting to maintain the status quo, led to policy instability during the Second 
Republic, with six economic stabilization measures attempted and then 
abandoned.442During this period, inflation was a significant issue, as was the 
question of raising the minimum wage. Rather than following internationally 
supported prescriptions to control the overheated economy, the response by Brazil’s 
leaders was to “act favourably on a series of political demands that piled more 
obligations on the federal budget, without any concomitant measures to increase 
revenue.”443 
Though quantitative data covering the social development and spending is 
sparse for a number of reasons,444 the general picture of post-WWII Brazil is one 
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of significant social inequality and exclusion. Cultural and social norms, rapid 
industrialisation coupled with rampant urbanisation, and unequal regional growth 
all contributed to the lack of equality in Brazil. For much of this democratic period, 
rural communities were dominated by a system of patronage that quashed any real 
communal action.445This reticence towards collective action by rural workers 
during the first decade of democracy only compounded the prevailing inequality, 
with the benefits of Brazil’s economic growth going to the landed elites. Industrial 
workers fared little better. Despite an average GDP growth of 7.3 per cent, and an 
increase of 9.5 per cent a year in industrial output, wages remained static.446Labour 
action found its footing in the latter half of the democratic period. Peasant Leagues 
representing the interests of rural workers began to crop up in 1955, along with 
mobilization in other sectors. However, the coup interrupted any real progress 
achieved by these organisations.  
Although the 1946 Constitution that governed this period seemingly 
embraced liberal democratic ideals such as a division of power between president, 
legislature and judicial system, it also maintained the bases of the previous power 
structures that favoured the political elites, industrialists and landowners.447 
At their best, the Vargas-era innovations forged an idealized form of Brazilian citizenship, 
creating a wide array of political, social and economic rights that gave working people hope 
in the possibilities of law and politics. Yet that citizenship mostly excluded rural people, 
and it extended only partially to the urban poor, thus also helping to create an urban 
underclass whose position in Brazilian society was often akin to those of undocumented 
migrants: people for whom neither economic prosperity nor citizenship was fully 
attainable, who built their lives with a patchwork of scanty rights and hard-won tolerance, 
and whose access to theoretically public benefits and guarantees was scarce or non-
existent.448 
 
Technically democratic with a somewhat competitive electoral cycle, and 
rules of succession and representative leadership, there were also features of the 
Second Republic that point to Brazil being, at best, a semi-democracy. Equality 
tangible or perceived, was lacking to a very great degree, and the franchise was 
significantly limited by literacy requirements. The exclusion of large swathes of the 
adult population, and the banning of the Communist Party,449 meant that the 
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representative democracy could only be claimed to represent a small section of 
society. The instability of the political climate caused by a series of economic crises, 
while not inherently undemocratic, raises questions about the consolidation of 
democratic principles in the Second Republic. The ever-present military threat 
contributed to a constrained political climate that limited the government’s ability 
to be responsive to the needs of the general population.  
 
3.2.2 Justice in the Second Republic 
The democratic period (1945-1964) of the Second Republic was built on an 
essentially liberal constitution. Basic individual rights were established, at least 
legislatively, and Brazil’s political structure was defined as a representative 
democracy. However, the law was subject to the pervading system of patronage and 
was applied unevenly across the class structure.450This phenomenon was not 
limited to the Second Republic and has been characteristic of Brazilian 
constitutional development in general. As pointed out by Paulo S. Pinheiro, “far 
from the ideals present in its constitutions, judicial procedures and the workings of 
the law reflect the cruel realities of Brazilian society and never manage to moderate 
the vast differences between the rich and the poor.”451The nature of Brazilian 
patronage circumvented collective action452 and the successive leadership of the 
populist democratic period was more inclined to ignore gross human rights than 
intervene and potentially aggravate military or police interests.453 Amnesty was also 
common throughout Brazilian post-colonial history, with 38 amnesties granted for 
political crimes since 1889.454 
 If fairness, equality in application, legitimacy and legality are considered 
necessary for the perception of justice then the limited data available regarding 
Brazil’s levels of social exclusion, mobilization (particularly after 1955) and 
judicial procedures highlight a society that can only be perceived as unjust. The 
absence of justice, either perceived or tangible, can be identified in varied levels of 
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access to resources experienced by the different classes and races, as well as in the 
interactions between vulnerable communities and the state judicial apparatus. 
Despite lofty claims of being a racial democracy,455 successive censuses 
from 1940 onwards have highlighted “persistent disparities between the white and 
non-white populations in education, vocational achievement, earnings, and life 
expectancy.”456However, race was not the only divider. Class in Brazil played a 
significant role in who was able to access justice, with the poor in both rural and 
urban communities suffering the most from state-sponsored violence during the 
Second Republic, as well as being the only group to be punished or imprisoned for 
the majority of crimes.457 Levels of political violence varied across the different 
administrations of this period, though limited access to courts was a consistent 
feature of Brazilian justice in the Second Republic.  
 Torture remained a consistent feature of police interrogation, particularly of 
lower class groups, with the vulnerable, such as the homeless and beggars, facing 
summary execution by those that were supposed to protect them. “Thus, even 
during democratic eras, judicial procedures and police investigations were officially 
inquisitorial, making the systematic recourse to torture seem a “legitimate,” albeit 
unofficial, means of obtaining confessions from common prisoners.”458 
 During the Second Republic, the tradition of justice in Brazil was limited to 
the rural and urban elites above all others, to the detriment of both fairness and 
equality of application. That the laws benefited the elite, and ultimately right wing, 
undermined the legal legitimacy of the 1946 Constitution.459 Faith in the judiciary, 
and in the laws that supported the institution, is not readily apparent. Justice for all, 
in its most basic form, is imperceptible. Although the populist appeals of Joâo 
Goulart targeted key economic justice issues, such as wage increases and cost of 
living, however it is unlikely that the fundamental elements of repression that 
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marked both the democratic and dictatorial periods460 would have changed had 
Goulart been allowed to complete his term.  
 
3.3 The Fall of the Second Republic: The end of the populist democracy  
 3.3.1 Goulart’s demise 
The final years of the Second Republic in Brazil were characterised by 
increasing polarization, mass mobilization and economic instability. The military 
was ever watchful of, and at times directly involved in, the volatile political 
environment. While the causes of the 1964 coup can be partially traced back to the 
nature of the 1945 transition to democracy, and the maintenance of the military as 
a deciding force in the electoral process, the development of populism between 
1955 and 1964 as a direct threat to the political elites brought to the surface the 
tension that had long been present. Some authors have emphasised the role the 
economic crisis had in causing the military coup, while others, such as Youssef 
Cohen, argue that it was the political crisis, rather than the economic one, that 
triggered military intervention.461Economic crises were not unusual during the 
democratic period, partially caused by Brazil’s reliance on a single export crop462 
and unwillingness to follow economic stabilisation packages that came with a high 
political cost. However, despite rising inflation,463 failed stabilization measures and 
a significant increase in the cost of living, the military resisted intervention. During 
the Second Republic, military involvement in the political process increased with 
political changes and threats to the existing power balance. By the early 1960s, the 
military elites perceived “an internal enemy threatening the socio-political and 
ideological (‘moral’) integrity of the nation.”464 
The path towards the 1964 coup began with the election of Joâo Quadros in 
1960. The popular leader seemed to unite Brazilians tired of the pervasive 
corruption as well as conservative interests in/of the National Democratic Union 
(União Democrática Nacional, UDN). Quadros was a hugely popular candidate and 
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won the 1960 election by a relative landslide with 48 per cent of the vote.465 
However, his popularity was personal rather than party based. The vice presidency 
went to Goulart, the candidate on the opposing party’s ticket, rather than Quadros’ 
own running mate. Quadros tried to unite interests from both the right and left, 
leading to general disappointment. After attempting to stabilize the economy, 
Quadros suddenly quit. He had been president for seven months.466 According to 
the Constitution, Goulart’s ascension to the presidency was straightforward. 
However, the former labour minister was  
unacceptable to many high ranking officers as well as to powerful civilians. They 
considered Goulart, the most prominent national leader of the Labour Party, dangerous not 
only because he was the heir of Vargas’s labour populism, but also because he had strong 
political ties with the left.467 
 
 Legalists within the military ensured the inauguration of Goulart, though his rise 
came with a compromise – Brazil became a parliamentary system, with the 
presidency an almost figurehead role.468 The majority of presidential power was 
transferred to the newly created position of prime minister. While attempting to 
minimise the risk of a shift towards communism, the military pushed the nation 
towards greater instability, requiring Goulart to move further left as he sought 
political support. This political manoeuvring polarized the country, as well as 
creating unease amongst international financial institutions and U.S observers. A 
plebiscite in 1963 restored Brazil to its former presidential system. With less than 
two years left as president, Goulart attempted to implement another economic 
stabilization policy before abandoning the restrictions in favour of radical 
nationalism.469 By March 1964, the president appealed to the people to support his 
policies in the face of rigid congressional resistance. Goulart organised several 
rallies where he planned to announce policies, including the decision to expropriate 
land and the nationalization of all privately-owned oil refineries. The first rally was 
held on March 13 in Rio de Janeiro. One of the key outcomes of the rally was to 
																																																						
465Fausto. 
466Though never fully explained, the general consensus is that Quadros expected the Brazilian 
Congress to refuse his resignation and request his return to the presidential palace. Whatever the 
reasoning, Quadros’s resignation triggered one of the worst political crisis in Brazilian history, and 
lay the foundation for the military coup three years later. 
467Cohen, ‘Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil’, p. 
36. 
468Skidmore and Smith, p. 176. 
469Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
	114	
unite and mobilise the anti-Goulart factions in the military, congress and amongst 
the business and political elites. The polarised political climate motivated even 
centrist military officers to support a proposed coup.470The core group of 
conspirators, led by General Humberto Castelo Branco, had the political and 
military support they needed. On March 31, military units seized control of key 
government offices in both the capital, Brasília, and in Rio. Appeals for mass 
mobilization of the people against the coup were ineffective. Goulart fled to 
Uruguay, leaving Brazil on the hands of a military-technocrat coalition. Congress 
elected Castelo Branco as president, while the UDN benefited by political 
appointments. The economy fell under the management of Roberto Campos, an 
economist and former diplomat. Campos instituted a new stabilisation policy, with 
the hope of reining in inflation, encouraging new foreign investment and improving 
the overall economic outlook.471 
 
3.3.2 The military regime: neither fully authoritarian nor fully 
democratic 
 Brazil’s authoritarian period (1964-1985) was atypical for its time and 
place. Unlike the military regimes that emerged throughout Latin America during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the Brazilian military allowed the continuance of traditionally 
democratic processes,472 such as local and regional elections. In this way, the 
authoritarian period can best be described as a partnership between conservative 
civilian elites, the middle classes and the military, with a high-ranking general 
chosen to fill the role of president for a set period of time.473Non-military 
technocrats played a role in each successive government, with varying degrees of 
influence.  
Between 1964 and the election of a civilian in 1985, the presidency was 
filled by five four-star generals. These five military leaders, along with much of the 
armed corps, were generally divided into two groups, the hardliners and the 
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moderates.474 This divided political outlook influenced their policy approach as 
well as how they interacted with the surviving opposition. Each of the regimes was 
distinct, reflecting the political factionalism that had long been a characteristic of 
the military as an institution.475 Selected from within the military hierarchy, the 
presidential candidates had to be approved by Congress via an electoral college. 
After 1965, only two parties were permitted – the government’s National Alliance 
for Renewal (Aliança Renovadora Nacional, or ARENA) and the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, or MDB) as an 
umbrella organisation for the opposition. The government party dominated 
Congress for much of the authoritarian period, assisted by political manoeuvring 
and an emerging media (TV) dominated by the regime. 
Under moderate Castelo Branco, the military maintained the façade of 
restricted democracy. Castelo Branco was a legalist who had supported the 
constitutional succession of Goulart in 1961. On taking power, he was committed 
to the traditional moderating power of the military. In the immediate aftermath of 
the coup,476 Brazil experienced a “negative phase” that included purges of both 
political elites and leftist military,477 significant human rights violations478 against 
left-wing opposition and restrictions on political norms via the first Institutional Act 
I (Acto Institutional, or AI).479 This negative phase lasted a few months, followed 
by restricted political activity dominated by the military leadership. This moderate 
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approach changed with the 1965 gubernatorial elections. Direct elections were held 
in 11 states, with the opposition winning in Guanabara and Minas Gerias. For the 
military hardliners, these results proved that the government was being too soft on 
the opposition. Facing mounting pressure from within the military, Castelo Branco 
decreed AI-2, which increased the powers of the president and expanded the reach 
of the national security apparatus.480 The AI-2 also outlawed all existing parties and 
replaced them with the two-party structure that favoured the government.  
General Artur da Costa e Silva ascended to the presidency in 1967 supported 
by military hardliners. Despite coming from the section of the military that believed 
in “…the idea of the armed forces as the country’s proper and semi-permanent 
ruler…”481 the new president promised to “humanise the Revolution”.482It took the 
significant mobilisation of political opposition in 1968 for Costa e Silva to fully 
embrace the hardliner’s authoritarian perspective with his declaration of AI-5. Any 
pretence of a restricted democracy ended. “With AI-5, the military nucleus of power 
became concentrated in the so-called information community, that is among those 
people in command of intelligence and repression.”483Congress was again purged, 
repression increased and censorship, previously conducted in an ad-hoc and 
unorganised manner, became significantly more systematic.  
Costa e Silva’s death in 1969, followed by the election by Congress of 
General Emílio Garrastazú Médici ended any doubts about the character of the 
regime. Medici maintained the climate of control that had begun in 1968 under 
Costa e Silva. In maintaining, and even increasing government led repression, 
Médici was able to finally achieve the long-hoped for political stability. This is not 
to say that the opposition was dormant. Rather, government control of the media484 
as well as brutal reprisals by the military and police muted effective subversive 
action.485 
It was during the Médici administration that Brazil became a fully-fledged 
authoritarian regime, and his time as leader was also to be the peak of the hardliner’s 
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power. After significant deliberation, General Ernesto Giesel was elected to the 
presidency in 1974. Giesel marked the return of the military’s moderates. Giesel 
began his term with four principal goals: to maintain the unity of the military while 
reducing the power of the hardliners; to control subversive elements that sought to 
undermine the government’s overtures towards liberalization; to (slowly) return to 
some form of representative democracy; and finally, to maintain economic 
growth.486The distensão (decompression or softening) progressed slowly, facing a 
sceptical yet increasingly politically active civilian opposition, as well as 
determined hard-line resistance. The transition to democracy was to be “slow, 
gradual, and certain.”487 
Geisel’s successor, João Batista Figueiredo, expanded the liberalisation 
project to abetura (opening). A blanket amnesty was passed by Congress in August 
1979 and covered all political crimes, allowing exiles to return. At the same time, 
unions and other centres of leftist opposition began to mobilise, seeking a number 
of concessions from the softening regime. The old multi-party system was 
abolished, leading to a splintering of the left and right movements.  In 1982, 
Brazilians voted in their first direct gubernatorial election since 1965. The 
government-supported Social Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Social, or 
PDS) won most states, however the opposition party, the MDB, won the important 
states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro.  Opposition leaders called 
for direct presidential elections, though the 1985 elections were still decided 
through Congress. The difference was that this time there was a real competitive 
edge to the electoral process. In the end, the loyal opposition candidate, Tancredo 
Neves,488 running on the Democratic Alliance (Aliança Democrática) ticket, won 
the Electoral College. His vice-presidential candidate, José Sarney, was an 
established member of the political elite. He had been part of the government 
supported PDS before defecting to support Neves. While running and winning on 
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the opposition ticket, Sarney was less a revolutionary and more a continuation of 
the military abetura in civilian dressing. 489 
 
3.3.3 Levels of repression 
The levels of repression throughout the authoritarian period were 
inconsistent, and depended directly on the presidential policy regarding opposition, 
as well the levels of mobilisation on the left. According to academic Brasillio 
Sallum Jr., “in comparison to neighbours, to other countries, Brazil had a very light 
regime.”490In the lead up to the coup, leftist radicals and student organisations in 
particular, placed pressure on Goulart to embrace their agenda. These radicalising 
elements were obvious targets of repression once the military took control of the 
government.491Over the course of 21 years, the authoritarian regime targeted labour 
unions, church-based organisations, the student movement, leftist politicians and 
other perceived dissidents. Torture became part of state policy, despite sporadic 
outrage from the public.492 The state-led crimes against humanity (CAH) became 
more selective after the initial negative phase of Castelo Branco’s administration, 
though the military and police apparatus set up to deal with the opposition remained 
in place. CAH peaked again as a response to urban warfare waged by subversives 
that included the kidnapping of diplomats during the student protests of 1968, and 
during the guerrilla war waged in the region of Araguaia between 1972-1974.493 
The initial wave of repression was driven by the military, with the worst violence 
committed in rural areas and in the Northeast in particular. The first institutional 
act (Ato Institucional, or AI) passed just days after the coup, allowed for the 
creation of Police and Military Investigations (Inquéritos Policial-Militares, or 
IPMs), setting the stage for detention of perceived subversives.494 In June 1964, the 
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regime set up the National Information Bureau (Serviço Nacional de Informações, 
or SNI), which became a key centre of power in the “struggle against the internal 
enemy.”495The legal foundation for the regime, particularly during the peak of state 
repression (1967 – 1974), was the Military Criminal Code, the Code of Military 
Criminal Procedure and the Military judiciary Organization Law, decreed in 
1969.496Each branch of military had their own secret services and intelligence 
centres, subordinated to the SNI. The military police, which had been governed at 
a state level, was also brought under federal control. The security apparatus of 
Brazil’s military regime became a pervasive and controlling force in Brazilian 
politics.497 
Government repression, and the subsequent CAH, targeted those groups 
seen as threatening the national security of the state.498Groups targeted included 
student movements, church affiliated groups, labour unions and rural peasant 
leagues. The size and level of activity of the student movement fluctuated during 
the regime, split by the ideological differences of Communism at the 
time.499However, students and activists united after the death of Edson Luís Lima 
Souto during a peaceful protest in March 1968. Tensions between police and 
students spilled over in every state, accompanied by increased repression.500 The 
unrest peaked in June with the “March of 100,000” in Rio de Janeiro, and was 
followed by significant repression enhanced by the declaration of AI-5, considered 
the key piece of legislation for the hardliners in entrenching Brazil’s authoritarian 
state and in legalising the CAH committed against the opposition. 
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Despite periods of unrest, public awareness of government repression was 
limited. Weichert argued that the censorship of the media has influenced public 
understanding of the regime’s repression.  
 
It’s very important to understand at this time we had strong censorship over the press. So 
it was unknown amongst civil society that torture was widespread and that we had legal 
provisions protecting exclusively the government. And, so [at the time that amnesty was 
passed] civil society had no idea what happened and what was still happening connected 
to the repression.501 
 
The scale of the CAH committed by state agents was first highlighted in 
Brasil: Nunca Mais,502 a secretly prepared report on torture in Brazil. 
Approximately 1,843 victims provided evidence to church-based investigators. The 
report outlines 283 torture techniques used by agents of the state, identifies 242 
clandestine torture centres and names 444 torturers.503 Released in 1985, the report 
revealed a side of the authoritarian regime that many Brazilians had been able to 
ignore. Victims testified to being used as teaching tools in classes on torture504 that 
included electrocution, beatings and the parrot’s perch.505Electric shocks were 
given across the body, including to the genitals, and drowning was common (often 
as complementary to the parrot’s perch). Victims were also subjected to 
psychological torture (watching loved ones tortured etc.), rape and forced 
abortions.506While the law at the time allowed for a death sentence to be handed 
out, the majority of deaths in police custody were a result of summary executions, 
excessive torture or faked suicides.507 
Though rare, judicial action against the regime was not unheard of. On 
October 25, 1978, federal judge Márcio José de Morais decided against the state in 
the death of journalist Vladimir Herzog. Officials claimed that Herzog committed 
suicide; however the judge found the state guilty of detention, torture and death. 
Morais ordered the state pay reparations to Herzog’s widow. Between 1979 and 
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1981, similar decisions were reached in the deaths of Manoel Fiel Filho and Mario 
Alves.508 
The National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, or CNV) 
has identified 434 murdered or disappeared victims of the authoritarian 
regime.509The CNV also highlighted the widespread practice of torture, arbitrary 
detention and other human rights violations during the military regime, as was 
initially outlined in Brasil: Nunca Mais.  
 
3.3.4 Left and Right-Wing Perceptions of the Authoritarian Regime 
The civil-military coalition that took power in 1964 under the guise of 
saving Brazil from the communist threat was able to maintain support with a focus 
on the economy, as well as the effective use of propaganda.510 The regime’s initial 
supporters were typical of the time – anti-communist, right wing, U.S supported 
and church based.511Over time, the military was able to build and maintain 
significant levels of support from the wider public. In a survey conducted 
during1972-1973, 59 per cent of respondents said that they could either “always 
trust the military” or “trust it [in] most cases”.512Researchers Barbara Geddes and 
John Zaller found that the greatest supporters of the authoritarian regime were those 
who were somewhat politically literate – “… that is, [those] who pay enough 
attention to be heavily exposed to the government line but who are not sophisticated 
enough to be able to resist it.”513This support was influenced by the state of the 
economy, government propaganda and restricted coverage of the regime’s human 
rights violations. 
Opposition to the authoritarian regime did exist but was fragmented. 
However, there were multiple strains of opposition, weakening the effort against 
the regime. According to Sallum 
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The divided opposition gave the regime a greater deal of breathing room. The people that 
lead the opposition in the late 70s were not the same as those that were defeated in 1964 
… In 67/68 there was a rupture in the communist leadership and the mainstream of the 
party took arms. In the 70s there was a battle of the ideas … The leading role was a 
traditional opposition – the ARENA – the professional middle class. The leading role 
belonged to these guys. But the left did not have the leadership, and even less so the armed 
left. Take the PT for example. They took a leading role in the transition, but not the initial 
resistance. This difference is important to explain why the quest for justice has been so 
weak.514 
 
The opposition emerged from within a number of sectors of society. The 
MDB maintained a presence in the Congress, albeit generally muted by the removal 
of political rights of many of its members, by the lack of coverage of left-wing 
political activity in the media and the threat of violence. Student organisations were 
vocal in their opposition to the military repression and militant groups attempted to 
reverse the slide to full authoritarianism in the late 1960s. The Catholic Church, 
long an important institution in Brazil, “walked a tightrope between the desire for 
justice and the need to avoid further violence.”515 The regime was unable to gain 
full clerical support516 and at times faced blatant criticism from militant groups 
within the church, as well as from mainstream clergy. After 1974, and the softening 
of the political environment, professional organisations such as the Order of 
Attorneys of Brazil (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, or OAB) began to call for 
greater freedom of expression, freedom of the press and a greater commitment to 
human rights.517 
 
3.3.5 Law No. 6,683/1979 
Amnesty laws, passed either by Congress or by executive order, were 
frequently used in Brazil as a method of conciliation.518 These laws consistently 
emphasised the policy of oblivion and impunity. “Over time, amnesty evolved as a 
political convention that aimed to advance state legitimacy, secure civil peace, 
deliver justice and otherwise guarantee citizenship rights.”519In the Brazilian 
context, amnesties were used as a tool to either pacify “rebels or to conciliate former 
																																																						
514Sallum Jr, p Personal Interview. 
515Serbin, p. 3. 
516Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘The “Portugalization” of Brazil’, in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, 
Policies, and Future, ed. by Alfred Stepan (Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 170–232. 
517Alves. 
518Ann Schneider, ‘Amnestied in Brazil, 1895--1985’ (University of Chicago, 2008). 
519Ann Schneider, ‘Amnestied in Brazil, 1895--1985’, p. 7. 
	 123	
enemies.”520 They were also used, as Paul Ricoeur argued “…to interrupt 
violence.”521 
The Brazilian Congress passed Law No. 6,683/1979522 after debate over 
both content and coverage. Unlike other Latin American states such as Chile or 
Argentina, the amnesty law in Brazil initially grew out of the opposition’s efforts 
rather than those of the military regime.523“According to Weichert,  
 
Amnesty in the beginning was a demand of the families of political prisoners. During 1979, 
the families, especially the women, started claiming for amnesty cooperation. At the time, 
I would say all the leftist movements were already destroyed in Brazil, there was no danger 
for the government to start a kind of distension of our dictatorship in order to some way 
prepare for our return to democracy.524 
 
The first calls for political amnesty came after the declaration of AI-1, and 
the political purges that followed. As the political atmosphere eased during the 
distensão, and then opened during the abetura, the opposition ramped up pressure 
for amnesty with debates, marches, demonstrations and rallies.525The level of 
support for amnesty was such that when Congress passed Law No. 6,683/1979, the 
“Brazilian civil society viewed it as its first victory against the regime.”526 Marcello 
D Torelly, a member of the 2001 Amnesty Commission, explained, “At the time 
amnesty was associated with liberty. And we have, of course, on the other side [it 
was associated with] impunity.”527However Law No. 6,683/1979 was a significant 
compromise for the law’s original proponents.528Rather than being “broad, general 
and unrestricted”, the law came with conditions benefiting state agents accused of 
CAH. “The government took the opportunity, it was then the military government, 
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to introduce a provision guaranteeing amnesty impunity for their own officials that 
could have committed any crime.”529 
The 195 militants accused of “blood crimes”530 were explicitly excluded 
from receiving amnesty.531 Those prisoners who were sentenced under the National 
Security Law (1969) were also excluded in the short term.532The amnesty law 
allowed for over 5000 exiles to return to Brazil, and those who suffered from the 
periodic political purges were allowed to return to work or receive some form of 
restitution. In a key stipulation, perpetrators of the state-sponsored torture and other 
repressive tactics received a complete blanket amnesty.533 As pointed out by Paulo 
Abrão and Marcelo D. Torelly the subsequent impunity for CAH was a clear victory 
for the military’s hardliners.  
This amnesty was constructed by the regime and; though it did allow for some benefits to 
the politically persecuted, it also set the political basis for an extensive interpretation 
bilateralism, including a dimension of amnesty as oblivion and impunity” for the 
perpetrators.534 
 
According to Brasillio Sallum, an academic at the University of Saõ Paulo, 
the government passed the amnesty law at a time that it could control the 
negotiations and narrative.  
The amnesty law and the political reform were done before the complete loss of control, 
and this makes all the difference. When the reforms started, the opposition was weak. The 
reforms and amnesty law were passed while the opposition was still coming together. The 
regime had control. That’s why the amnesty was so pro-government. The amnesty had no 
control of the direction or wording of the law, Usually we say there was a “pact”, but that’s 
not true because at that moment the regime had control, which they only lost later.535 
 
There are two ways to understand the Law 6.683/1979. The first is as a 
method of impunity for a wide range of crimes. By 2010, the initial restrictions of 
the amnesty law were expanded so that what was once limited, though ambiguous, 
became instead a blanket amnesty. The second lens through which to understand 
the amnesty law is as a piece of legislation that established a programme of 
reparations essential to Brazil’s ensuing transitional justice process.   
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The Amnesty Bill of 1979 was presented to the public as a way to unite the 
Brazilian “family”,536and as a bridge between the authoritarian past and a 
democratic future.537According to Weichert,  
The Brazilian dictatorship h[ad] a very different character…Congress was kept 
working almost all of the time, so the draft of the bill was sent by the government 
to the Congress. But it had a very complicated clause, saying that crimes connected 
to some sort of political [motivation] were amnestied as well…there was no public 
discussion over this provision. It was kind of like this “look family, you take it or 
you leave it. To have amnesty for your relatives, you have to agree.” It was the 
only provision.538 
 
The military insisted  this bilateral provision be included for the whole 
process to move forward.539In response to concern over the blanket impunity for 
agents of the state, OAB President Raymundo Faoro made it clear to victims and 
their families that there was no real prospect of punishing the torturers.540The 
likelihood of impunity was compounded by the fact that Giesel had quietly changed 
the rules so that the jurisdiction for prosecution of military crimes committed 
against civilians fell under the purview of the military courts, where victims had 
little chance of achieving a conviction.541 
Weichert argued in a personal interview that, in his opinion, “the amnesty 
played an essential role in our transitional process because according to this model, 
it is a transition without any rupture, any break, any truth, and any justice. 
[Amnesty] is part of the package, I would say.”542 While Law 6,683/1979 was 
somewhat unique in that while it may be seen as an “interruption of violence”, it 
did not result directly in a transition to democracy.543According to Torelly,  
what is generally agreed is that the amnesty allowed for the reopening process … so the 
amnesty helped to bring back people that belonged to different political forces that weren’t 
allowed in the opposition due to exile or living clandestinely. It allowed people to come 
back to the country. [However] there are some people that say the amnesty law has helped 
diminish the violent social struggles in the country… The amnesty helped set the stage to 
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the indirect elections we had just a few years later. The amnesty was certainly the inflection 
point where the military started to step back and give power to civilians.544 
 
The military regime continued to control the process through to the election 
of Neves, and the ascension of Sarney, after Neves’ death. The government of 
Sarney refused to challenge the amnesty law and embraced instead what Rebecca 
Atencio describes as “the politics of reconciliation by institutionalized 
forgetting.”545 This official commitment to reconciliation expressed via the 
maintenance of the amnesty law has become deeply engrained in the Brazilian 
political and judicial sphere. Though two reparation commissions were created 
during Fernando Henrique Carodoso’s presidency (1995-2002), these were to 
establish economic restitution in accordance with the requirements of Article 8 of 
the Transitional Constitutional Act (1988),546 which at the same time validated the 
constitutionality of the 1979 amnesty law. 
In 2008, the OAB filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of amnesty for 
state crimes. However, when the STF released its decision in April 2010, it not only 
defended the law, but also expanded the law’s scope to include a broader range of 
beneficiaries and to extend the time frame of coverage to include events that took 
place after the original 1979 deadline.547 The court wrote in its 7-2 decision that it 
was not in the position to review the law that had allowed the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy.548The STF reiterated that the amnesty law had been 
bilateral and had benefited both state and non-state actors. The two dissenting 
judges argued that this point was meaningless. According to Judges Ricardo 
Lewandowski and Carlos Ayres Britto extending amnesty to both sides does not 
change the fact that the authoritarian regime was also granting itself a self-amnesty. 
Lewandowski and Britto also argued that applying amnesty to crimes against 
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humanity, including torture, was both unconstitutional and against international 
treaties.549 
The dissenting judges’ argument was prescient. Six months after the release 
of the STF decision, the IACtHR released its decision in the Gomes Lund et al. v. 
Brazil case.550 The court found that the Law No 6.683 was incompatible with the 
American Convention and therefore declared it “void of any legal effects.”551 The 
IACtHR also reaffirmed victims’ rights to truth regarding CAH and access to 
information, dismantling the government’s claim that information regarding what 
had happened in Araguaia was security sensitive and therefore couldn’t be released. 
The court also recommended further compensation and truth gathering efforts.552 
Though the court decision sparked debate in Brazil, a number of prominent political 
figures including President Dilma Rousseff herself declared that the amnesty law 
was “untouchable.”553 
Leonardo Avritzer raises a key point when discussing conservative 
continuity in the make-up of the courts. The judges who contributed to the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian regime in Brazil are the same judges who now 
preside over challenges to the transitional justice status quo. There were no purges 
of the judiciary by successive democratic governments. By changing the structure 
of the legal system, the authoritarian regime ensured that it would be difficult to 
retroactively apply political accountability.554 
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 There is extensive evidence that amnesty was fought for in good faith, and 
agreed to with an overwhelming sense of both inevitability and the belief that there 
were few alternative options available for opponents of the authoritarian regime, 
supporting the argument presented in H0. The unwillingness of political elites to 
challenge the amnesty law in the decades since the transition shows that this good 
faith has been maintained with the oft stated argument that the democratic state 
cannot undermine the agreement that allowed democracy to be possible in the first 
place.555 
 
3.4 The Transition Period and Transitional Justice 
The 16-year transition in Brazil began in 1974 with the election of Giesel as 
president and only really ended with the direct election of Fernando Collor de 
Mello, who was inaugurated on March 15, 1990. The military controlled the pace 
and direction of the process employing what Stepan called a dynamic of “regime 
concession and societal conquest”.556Though Sarney was the first civilian to hold 
the position in 21 years, the nature of his ascension to the presidency after the death 
of Tancredo Neves along with his long history with the pro-regime ARENA party 
before he defected to run on the PMDB ticket, left some wondering if his rule was 
simply a continuation of the previous administration.557 There had been widespread 
faith in Neves’ ability to navigate Brazil out of authoritarianism and towards a 
functioning democracy. Sarney, on the other hand “was met with reserve, suspicion, 
distrust, or even distaste by much, perhaps most, of the PMDB, the dominant 
element of the Democratic Alliance.”558 As a consequence of circumstance, 
established preferences and limited leftist support, Sarney maintained a close 
relationship with the military, failing to challenge the existing institutional structure 
and prerogatives.559The decision to have Congress act as the Constituent Assembly, 
for example, was a clearly expressed preference of the former authoritarian 
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regime.560 In the final draft of the constitution, the military was able to ensure the 
inclusion of a clearly defined role, though not to the extent that a number of the 
military elite had hoped.561 
The Constitution of 1988 came to be described as the Constituição Cidadã 
(Citizens’ Constitution), a document focused on the rights of the people over their 
“duties”.562 While deeply democratic in language563 the military’s interests were 
preserved, including negotiating points that had been agreed to as part of the final 
“pacted” step of the transition.564The final draft of the 1988 Constitution established 
the military as guarantors of law and order (Article 142), though the right to call on 
the military to act was also given to the legislature and judiciary.565 The 
Constitution also reaffirmed the 1979 Amnesty Law, through Transitional Act 8.566 
Constitutional expert Andrei Koerner argued that the amnesty and the 
Constitution were inextricably linked.  
Amnesty legislation came with the question of constitutional reform. There was limited 
negotiation, and what negotiation was there was unequal. Amnesty was the cone at the end 
of the war. Amnesty unblocked everything, amnesty was the key to the opening, and 
amnesty completed a process while beginning another.567 
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Koerner also described the Constitution as a generally liberal document, 
with conservative elements. Under Sarney, accountability remained off the agenda. 
Transitional justice was absent from the democratization process, with debate 
focusing on Brazil’s volatile economy and on the development of a democratic 
constitution. When Brasil: Nunca Mais was released in 1985,Sarney steadfastly 
refused to acknowledge the book or discuss the topic of military-era CAH in 
general.568The Constitution of 1988 reaffirmed the amnesty law and expanded its 
application.569Throughout Brazil, members of the military and secret police who 
had been accused of torture were promoted into positions of power, though in the 
instance of a few high-profile cases, the accused were stripped of some prestige, or 
shuffled horizontally into other positions.570 
According to H0, the experiences of transitioning states show that amnesty 
legislation is compatible with the expectations and norms of an entrenched liberal 
democracy. Brazil’s transition period extended longer than many of its neighbours, 
with a focus on “oblivion” over transitional justice measures.571 The evidence, as 
discussed below, shows that the efforts of successive governments to ignore 
demands for recognition of CAH of the past regime have delayed justice, and 
potentially put traditional measures of justice out of the reach of victims. However, 
there are indications that this has undermined the depth and quality of the 
democratic development in Brazil, particularly in regard to the impunity enjoyed 
by police and military officers for significant acts of violence committed by them 
against Brazilian citizens. This directly challenges the expected outcome presented 
by H0, that amnesty and an entrenched liberal democracy are compatible in the long 
run. 
The election of Collor de Mello marked the first truly democratic 
presidential election in Brazil since the 1964 coup. His presidency also marked the 
first political impeachment of a president in the new democratic era. Collor de 
Mello was elected on the strength of his personality in the television era, and his 
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neo-liberal policies that appealed to business leaders.572However, with little 
“inclination to negotiate with the Congress”,573 and a “presidency backed by a 
political party that controlled less than 5 per cent of the seats in congress”,574 Collor 
de Mello’s presidency struggled to maintain public support for restrictive economic 
policies intent on managing Brazil’s runaway inflation. Corruption rumours became 
persistent and public support for democracy plunged. Collor de Mello faced direct 
accusations of corruption in May 1992, when his own brother accused him of both 
financial and moral improprieties. The public mobilized against the president, 
pressuring the Congress to take action. On September 29, 1992, Congress voted 
(441 to 38 in the Chamber of Deputies and 76-5 in the Senate) to impeach Collor 
de Mello. 
For the first time, a Brazilian president had been forced out of office not by military coup 
or military ultimatum, but by orderly vote of the Congress. Collor [de Mello] had done one 
great favour for Brazil: He had prodded the political class into proving that they could live 
up to their constitutional responsibility.575 
 
While the lack of impunity faced by the president may have raised hopes of 
the development of a culture of accountability, it was not until the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) that there was any significant movement 
on transitional justice. After his election in 1995, Cardoso set up the Special 
Commission for Political Deaths and Disappearances (1995) and the Amnesty 
Commission (2001), in part to fulfil the right to reparation and resistance for the 
politically persecuted outlined in article 8 of the Transitional Constitutional Act.576  
The first commission (mandated by Law No. 9,140/1995) was limited to 
recognising the state’s responsibility for killings and disappearances. The purpose 
of the second commission (Law No. 10.599/2002) was to offer reparations to those 
that had suffered directly from the regime’s acts of repression (torture, 
incarceration, political purges etc).  
 Reparations have become the cornerstone of Brazil’s response to 
transitional justice demands. The reparation measures began with the 1970 amnesty 
law that established the foundation for any later reparation programme. The law 
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outlined the restitution of political rights and the right to job reinstatement for 
purged civil servants and military personnel.577During the abetura, the courts 
occasionally decided in favour of the families of some victims, ordering the state to 
pay reparations.578 In 1995, the Cardoso government paid compensation to the 
families of 132 citizens who had disappeared during the authoritarian regime.579 
The same Law that established the reparations for the disappeared also outlined 
economic compensation for the families of those killed by the regime. The first 
reparations programme paid a total of R$33,456,284.87 to 280 petitioners between 
1996 and 2002.580The 2002 Amnesty Commission law was designed to offer 
compensation for victims of the regime’s other forms of repression (such as torture, 
political purges, kidnapping and forced exile).Initially limited by a mandate focused 
on financial reparations, the Amnesty Commission (AC) became “a privileged 
space of state action addressing the dictatorship’s crimes and legacy.”581Between 
2001 and 2012, 72,000 cases were filed with the commission. Of the 65,000 
petitions that were processed by 2012, 45,000 individual violations were 
recognized. Redress included either economic reparation (16,000) or moral redress 
and other rights (24,000).582 
 The election of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva marked a significant shift in the 
political landscape of the Brazilian government. A former metalworker, union 
organiser and long-time candidate583 of the Worker’s Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, PT), Lula emerged out of the Brazilian masses, a first in a political 
class dominated by the wealthy, educated elite.584 His frontrunner status was met 
with significant concern from the international financial markets,585and strong 
domestic competition from across the political spectrum. However, Lula won the 
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second-round of voting with 61.3 per cent of the vote.586 The fears of the financial 
markets proved to be unfounded, with his administration following a relatively 
conservative economic plan. Lula also deified expectations that he would 
completely abandon the “policy of forgetting”, which was still deeply entrenched 
in the Brazilian political culture. For much of his tenure, Lula maintained what his 
predecessor had already put in motion. The Amnesty Commission continued its 
work, administering over USD$1.6 billion in reparations.587Amnesty Caravans 
travelled across Brazil, offering victims a restorative justice approach that included 
recognition of their suffering as well as an apology from the Commission. 
 The maintenance of the status quo faltered towards the end of Lula’s regime, 
in part due to the activism of his Minister of Human Rights Paulo Vannuchi. 
Appointed to the role in 2005, Vannuchi launched two significant programmes of 
remembrance the Right of Memory and Truth (Direito á memória e á verdade, 
2006)588 and Revealed Memories (Memórias Reveladas, 2009).589Historian Nina 
Schneider argues that another contributing factor to the shift in transitional justice 
approach was the strength of Lula’s political favourability ratings during his second 
term.590In 2009 Lula’s approval ratings reached 84 per cent, lending his government 
a significant level of political legitimacy despite previous corruption scandals.591 
Finally, the government was aware of the impending IACHR decision against the 
amnesty law, with the regional organisation having already set a precedent on 
condemning any form of impunity for past CAH. According to federal prosecutor 
and member of Brazil’s Truth Commission, Marlon Weichert, there was a push to 
be seen as implementing changes that would mute some of the court’s impending 
criticism.592Despite the reasoning behind its introduction, the National Program of 
Human Rights 3 (Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos III – PnDH-3), with its 
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focus on the establishment of a truth commission, was met with sharp criticism 
from both the military and conservative groups. After the Minister of Defence, 
Nelson Jobim and three high-ranking military officials threatened to resign, Lula 
agreed to review PNDH, which essentially translated into retracting the policy.593 
 A former guerrilla and victim of torture, Dilma Rousseff (PT) came to 
political prominence as a protégée of Lula. In some respects, she fulfilled 
expectations for a more direct approach to transitional justice, reintroducing 
legislation for a truth commission in 2011. Approved by Congress in November 
2011, the seven-person National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da 
Verdade, CNV) began work in May 2012. The final report by the CNV was handed 
to Rousseff in December 2014.594The report named 377 perpetrators of human 
rights violations, including military officers and former presidents. Of the 377, 200 
are still alive.595 The report also identified 434 victims that were either killed or 
made to disappear. In addition to further detailing the extent of the political purges, 
the report explored the impact of the dictatorship and subsequent CAH on diverse 
segments of Brazilian society.596The members of the CNV made 29 
recommendations, including calling on the armed forces to recognise their 
responsibility for the CAH committed during the dictatorship. The CNV also 
highlighted the need for the judiciary and organs of the state to admit their role in 
the repression. As part of their conclusion and recommendations, the CNV 
disagreed with the 2010 STF argument that the amnesty law was untouchable. 
Rather, the CNV argued that Law 6,683/1979 was a barrier to fulfilling 
international commitments to investigate, process, judge and repair after CAH.597 
 A breakdown of Brazil’s transitional justice process shows the limited 
progress achieved in the last 30 decades.  
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Table 3.1 Transitional Justice Processes in Brazil 
Justice Almost non-existent. Strict application of Law 6,683.   
Reparation Mandated by the 1988 Constitution and delivered by Special 
Commission for Political Deaths and Disappearances (1995) 
and the Amnesty Commission (2001).  
 
Truth The Comissão Nacional da Verdade (CNV)delivered its 
report on Dec 10, 2014. This report was the first official truth 
commision supported by the Brazilian congress and 
executive, though there were previous non-governmental 
efforts to outline the CAH committed by the 1964-1985 
authoritarian regime. The Amnesty Commission (through the 
Ministry of Justice) and Brasil Nunca Mais (through the 
Catholic Church) were both partial truth measures. 
 
Institutional Reform Some institutional reform including changes to judiciary and 
military reform. However, amnesty law is still in force and 
there is a documented culture of impunity amongst police and 
armed services for ongoing human rights violations. 
 
 
 
 3.5.2 Opposing Views of the Transitional Justice Process  
The differing perspectives on the justice measures that developed during the 
consolidation of Brazil’s democratic institutions have been significantly influenced 
by the level of buy-in to the official policy of impunity and forgetting.598On the one 
hand the support of the amnesty law, and by extension, impunity, has been the 
dominant discourse for 37 years. On the other hand, the use of reparations as a tool 
for reconciliation has ensured documentation of the past CAH, allowing for future 
measures towards justice to be built on established facts.  
Supporters of the amnesty law and of the continuing impunity argue that the 
amnesty law benefited both sides of the conflict, allowed for the transition to 
democracy and established the foundation for the subsequent reparations 
programme.599According to the defenders of the amnesty law, such as Reinaldo 
Azevedo, a conservative commentator for magazine Veja, the calls for justice 
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See: Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental n. 153. 
	136	
ignore the fact that both sides received amnesty, the terrorists and torturers 
alike.600While for some the law has meant impunity and forgetfulness, for others 
the law also meant freedom and reparation.601 Though the bilateral nature of the 
amnesty law has been challenged, it is still one of the arguments regularly used to 
defend Brazil’s limited approach to transitional justice. The transitional justice 
measures that have been put forward are viewed by supporters of the military 
regime as a concerted effort by the media, historians and teachers to falsify history 
and openly practice vindictiveness.602 
On the opposing side of the debate, supporters of the transitional justice 
measures enacted thus far (reparations, memorialisation and truth commission) 
argue that it is politically untenable to continue with the policy of oblivion. Brazil 
has been internationally reprimanded for its continued use of the amnesty law via 
the IACHR.603 After the release of the STF decision against their 2008 petition, the 
OAB argued that “The Supreme Court understood that the Amnesty Law pardoned 
torturers, which in our view is regressive in relation to fundamental rights in the 
Constitution, and international conventions, which clearly indicate that torture is 
not a political crime, but a common crime against humanity, and, therefore, does 
not expire.”604 
 
3.5. Justice and Democracy in the Long Run 
3.5.1 The Current State of Democracy 
 More than three decades have passed since Brazil’s first civilian election in 
1984, establishing the state as a consolidated democracy by all traditional 
indicators.605However, throughout this period the quality of democracy in Brazil 
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has been undermined by corruption scandals, economic crises, ongoing violence, 
persistent racial inequality, disparity in regional institutional development as well 
as a seemingly insurmountable gulf between the rich and poor. Each of these 
challenges has had an impact on the public’s perception of the political elites, as 
well as the perception and legitimacy of the democratic system as a whole. 
According to political scientist José Maria Pereira da Nóbrega Jr, these factors mean 
that Brazil best fits what Mainwaring defines as a “semi democracy”,606 though 
Timothy Powers argues that Brazil has just been slow to consolidate, rather than 
being fundamentally flawed.607 
The most recent challenge to Brazil’s democracy has been revelations of 
far-reaching corruption. At both the national and regional level, corruption has been 
an issue for much of the democratic period, gaining prominence in the national 
discourse with the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Melo in 1992. 
Lula faced the potential demise of his own political career with the Mensalão 
scandal that threatened to engulf the PT party in 2006.608 Cleared of any direct 
connection to wrongdoing, Lula emerged from the scandal relatively unscathed. 
The same cannot be said for his successor, Rousseff, who was impeached in 
September 2016, and replaced by conservative Michel Temer.609The current wave 
of scandals centre on inflated contracts and kickbacks benefiting government-allied 
politicians connected to the state-owned oil giant Petrobrás. These scandals have 
become symptomatic of a crisis of legitimacy in the Brazilian political arena, with 
nation-wide surveys showing a general decline in citizens’ trust of political actors 
and institutions. In 2006, Brazilians named the pervasiveness of corruption as the 
single biggest issue facing the nation, while a third of respondents in a 2009 survey 
expressed the belief that “it was impossible to practice politics in Brazil without 
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engaging in some degree of corruption.”610 Importantly for discussions on 
democratic quality and consolidation, protesters in 2015 and 2016 have begun to 
call for military intervention.611The military had thus far rejected these appeals from 
the right, though they are far from avid supporters of the current administration, 
particularly after the criticism directed towards the military institution from the 
CNV.  
While the corruption is a problem, some commentators have claimed that 
the real reason for the protests is that the population seems irrevocably divided by 
class and wealth and that this should raise concern for those interested in democratic 
consolidation.612 The steel wall erected to keep opposing rallies separated outside 
Congress while the impeachment vote against Rousseff went ahead inside vividly 
illustrated the polarisation of the country, with fears that protests would become 
violent clashes.613Class division and regional prejudice have been one of the driving 
forces behind the mass mobilization and impeachment efforts. Polls examining the 
demographics of one protest in Porto Alegre show that nearly 70 per cent were 
college educated, and 40 per cent belong to the economic elites.614According to 
economist Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, “the hatred [against the PT] is a result of 
the fact that the government revealed a strong and clear preference for workers and 
the poor.”615 
A second sign of trouble in Brazil’s democratic system is the ongoing 
violence and failure of the justice system to sufficiently address public safety. 
Quality of democracy indicators such as responsiveness, accountability, law and 
equality are all undermined by the violence, which is committed by both civilians 
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and agents of the state.616Violence, regardless of the perpetrators, is viewed as a 
significant obstacle to the consolidation of democracy.617 The impact this violence 
has on the quality of Brazil’s democracy is worsened by the fact that a significant 
percentage of homicides are committed by on-duty and off-duty police officers.618 
Torture, extra-judicial killings and disappearances continue to be a feature of the 
state’s security apparatus. Worst affected by all types of violence in Brazil are the 
poor. Wealthy Brazilians have increasingly moved into fortified communities and 
have hired private security to protect them on a day-to-day basis.619 
Beyond debates around security and corruption, rampant inequality 
undermines Brazil’s quality of democracy.620Using the Palma ratio (PR)621 Brazil 
is considered unequal, with an average PR of 3.8 between 2005 and 2013.622 
Brazil’s Gini-coefficient for the same period is 52.7.623Since 2001, the rate of 
inequality in Brazil has declined, however this shift has been dependent on cash 
transfer programmes (Bolsa familia etc) and a change in the distribution of social 
security payments.624The concern is that these transfers are dependent on political 
will and economic growth. These are important caveats in the assessment of 
Brazil’s reduction in the income distribution gap, as they are entirely reversible with 
a change in government.  
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Below is a brief assessment of Brazil’s quality of democracy, based on 
Morlino’s key indicators. 
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Table 3.2 Quality of Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Brazil: An Analysis 
Dimension Brazil Evidence 
Law Limited faith in legal system, 
particularly for those in the under 
and working classes. Persistent 
violence by state agents including 
claims of torture and forced 
disappearances.  
 
Police-related violence kills six people a 
day, with the continued use of torture a 
source of significant concern. Faith in the 
judiciary lags behind many of the major 
institutions.  
Accountability Increasing demands for 
transparency and accountability 
for government corruption. 
However, corruption is still seen as 
a pervasive issue in the political 
sphere. 
 
Brazil’s CPI ranking is 78/168, with the 
perception that there is very little 
enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention (2011). 30 of the 81 senators 
and 130 of the lower house’s 513 
deputies currently have cases before the 
Supreme Court. Accountability 
institutions are hampered by political 
meddling, lack of coordination and inter-
branch rivalries.  
 
Participation Voting is compulsory in Brazil. 
Regular protest activity in response 
to government decisions and as a 
response to revelations of 
corruption. 
Despite compulsory voting, the 2014 
elections had abstention rate of 21 per 
cent. Protest activity has shown that there 
is a willingness to participate in mass 
mobilization efforts, though the 
demographics of the protests seem to 
indicate that these mobilization efforts 
are segregated by class and ethnicity. 
 
Competition High level of competition  
 
 
Presence of multiple parties in the 
electoral process. Highly competitive 
election in 2014, with current president, 
Dilma Rousseff winning the second 
round of voting by just 3 per cent. 
 
Freedoms Under the 1988 Constitution, 
Brazilians are afforded the political 
rights expected from a liberal 
democracy.  
This expression of basic rights is 
normally tolerated, though at the edges 
of Brazilian society (environmental 
protests in the Amazon, for example), the 
guarantee of these rights are less certain. 
No guarantee that the judicial arm of 
government (police/courts) will protect 
rights. 
 
Equality Universal suffrage and legal 
equality.  
Significant issues around race and class 
equality, with regions dominated by 
ethnic minorities (Afro-Brazilians), 
facing significant levels of institutional 
racism, poverty and corruption.  
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The assessment of Brazil as a semi-democracy, hampered by poverty, 
corruption and a deep racial and class divide, is appropriate. To attempt to argue 
that Brazil is a consolidated democracy ignores that, despite the cash transfer 
programmes, 7.5 per cent of the population lives in extreme poverty (on less than 
$1.30 reais a day). This has dropped significantly during the Lula and Rousseff 
administrations after the development of targeted programmes, however economic 
growth has been uneven, and Afro-Brazilians have struggled to access educational 
opportunities that could shift the status quo.625 As pointed out by the Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), “[Brazil’s] economic strength cannot withstand the 
weaknesses of social injustice and inequality without collapsing into the 
insurmountable gap between dark and light skin and between wealth and 
poverty.”626 
 
3.5.2 Justice for Human Rights Violations in Brazil 
Victims of state-sponsored CAH have faced a long wait for any significant 
movement towards justice. Unlike some of its neighbours, Brazil’s transition 
towards democracy excluded an official accounting of past. Members of the 
Catholic Church and victim’s organisations were left to establish a public record of 
the torture and other atrocities committed by the authoritarian regime.627 As 
discussed earlier, the government pursued a policy of oblivion above all else, which 
significantly impacted the efficacy of any transitional justice efforts. 
While the conditions for justice have improved during the last decade, with 
the federal prosecutors willing to present cases to the courts, the government’s focus 
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Responsiveness Government generally responsive 
though hampered by corruption, 
decentralization of services and 
entrenched class structure 
favouring the wealthy/Southern 
states. 
Cash transfer programmes as a response 
to significant abject poverty. Federal 
focus on participatory democracy, 
including support for grass-roots 
organisations. However, as exhibited by 
government response to Zika virus 
(2015), there are severe shortcomings in 
state’s response to crises.  
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has shifted to truth rather than punitive measures.628Despite recommendations from 
the CNV that perpetrators of CAH be prosecuted, 629Rousseff has argued that truth 
is sufficient. “Truth doesn't mean vengeance. Truth mustn't be the source of hatred 
or score-settling … Truth frees us all from that which went unsaid. It frees us from 
what remained hidden."630This focus on the truth above all else has been a 
consistent feature of debates around the amnesty law; with Weichert pointing out 
that there has been a tacit agreement between civilian leaders and the military 
around the permanence of the amnesty law.631The CNV challenged this status quo, 
leading to a rare visible rupture between the government and military. However, 
the essence of the pact between former foes remained intact, and there have been 
very few attempts to seek punitive action against former government agents. The 
impunity persists. 
There are exceptions to the judicial resistance to transitional justice. In 2012 
Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, described as the “master of life and 
death”632 in Sao Paolo, was found guilty of human rights violations in a civil 
lawsuit. This court decision was confirmed in 2014, despite appeals by Ustra. Ustra 
died in October 2015. In a sign of continuing tension around the legacy of the 
authoritarian regime, federal deputy Jair Bolsonaro dedicated his vote to impeach 
Dilma to the memory of Ustra.633 In January 2015, federal charges were filed 
against Lício Maciel and Sebastião Curió Rodrigues de Moura in relation to the 
deaths of the Araguaia rebels. As of April 2016, the case is still to be decided.634 
The table below examines the state of justice for CAH, using the quality of 
justice indicators established in the introduction.  
 
  
																																																						
628Jenny Barchfield, ‘Report Describes Brazil’s Crimes against Humanity, Political Killings, 
Torture (+video)’, Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 2014 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2014/1210/Report-describes-Brazil-s-
crimes-against-humanity-political-killings-torture-video> [accessed 18 April 2016]. 
629Barchfield. 
630Dilma Rousseff as quoted in Barchfield. 
631Weichert, personal interview. 
632‘Feared Brazil Ex-Army Intelligence Chief Brilhante Ustra Dies’, BBC 
News<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34546418> [accessed 20 April 2016]. 
633‘Bolsonaro Dedica Voto Ao Coronel Brilhante Ustra, Torturador Da Ditadura’, Portal Fórum, 
2016 <http://www.revistaforum.com.br/2016/04/17/bolsonaro-dedica-voto-ao-coronel-brilhante-
ustra-torturador-da-ditadura/> [accessed 20 April 2016]. 
634Matt Sandy, ‘“Sole Survivor” Recalls Jungle Conflict with Military in Brazil’, BBC 
News<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35251124> [accessed 21 April 2016]. 
	144	
Table 3.3: Quality of Transitional Justice in Contemporary Brazil 
 
One of the most significant issues facing the Brazilian justice system, both 
in relation to transitional justice as well as criminal justice in general, is the 
deteriorating legitimacy of the judicial system. Brazilians generally have low 
opinion of the courts, influenced by the perception that the law favours the 
wealthy,635and this is compounded by concerns over targeted violence committed 
by police and security forces.636According to some observers, the Brazilian police 
force was less violent under the dictatorship than they are now.637 Impunity for state 
violence persists well beyond the parameters of the amnesty law and is considered 
a contemporary justice problem as much as a transitional-justice one. 
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Characteristic Brazil Examples 
Fairness Limited Amnesty law is applied universally, though 
there are criticisms of how and why law was 
introduced and maintained.  
 
Equality of 
Application 
Equally applied Application of amnesty is applied in blanket 
manner. Some marginal cases challenging 
impunity have been successful, however in 
2010 the STF reaffirmed the validity of the 
amnesty law.  
 
Law Legal The Amnesty law is viewed as legal, and has 
been reinforced by the STF. The 1988 
Constitution was written by the civilian 
leadership, and stipulates reparations for 
victims of CAH.  
 
Legitimacy Weakening Recent surveys show around 50 per cent of 
Brazilian’s interested in revoking the 
impunity enshrined in the amnesty law, 
despite STF refusal to do so. The CNV and 
memorialization has increased awareness of 
the authoritarian regime’s crimes, and 
therefore has begun to delegitimize the 
impunity.  
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3.6 Perspectives on the tension between justice, amnesty and democracy 
After decades of muted discussion on transitional justice, Brazil’s various 
interest groups have been forced to confront their perceptions of the transition 
process and the possibility of a change to the status quo. On the one hand, the 
response by different groups has bordered on predictable, with military and 
conservative elites espousing the doctrine of national security and protection of 
Brazilian interests as justification for the coup. On the other hand, human rights 
organisations, the Church and victims’ groups have strenuously advocated for 
greater official action in the sphere of justice for past CAH. In between these two 
extremes lies a political class that adheres to both the established norm of civil-
military relations and has supported official truth gathering efforts such as the CNV. 
According to H2, amnesty becomes widely acceptable with time as the 
demographics of the population shift. The threads of discourse presented below 
illustrate that the trajectory of the Brazilian experience refutes the expectation that 
the demands for justice will fade with time. Evidence indicates that the debate 
around amnesty legislation has experienced a period of intensification in the last 10 
years peaking with the completion of the CNV in 2014. Observers are now waiting 
to see if this truth telling exercise has a lasting impact in a country currently focused 
on significant financial and political corruption scandals.638 Personal interviews, 
public statements and position documents have all informed the examination of H1 
in relation to the Brazilian case study. It’s clear from the emergence of victim’s 
rights groups in the last decade that the debate around justice in Brazil is ongoing, 
despite fluctuating levels of interest in the current contentious political climate. 
 
3.6.1 Military Perspectives 
The ability to understand the military perspective on transitional justice is 
limited by the Army Disciplinary Regulations (Regulamento Disciplinar do 
Exército, RDE), which explicitly prohibits active duty officers from commenting 
on political matters.639 I was unable to interview any active duty military officers 
while in Brazil. However, statements issued by the military institution, by the 
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retired officers organisation (the Clube Militar) and by officers going against the 
RDE as well as official interviews given to military researchers, informs the 
following section. The Brazilian military complex, including both the civil and 
military police, has maintained the view that the Brazilian coup was necessary to 
prevent the national descent into social and institutional chaos.640This so-called 
National Security doctrine is typical of both the time - the height of the Cold War, 
and place. Several Latin American military institutions offered the same reasoning 
for their intervention in the political process.641 While Brazil has been under civilian 
control for 32 years, the military’s reasoning for the coup has remained unchanged. 
The National Security doctrine remains part of the military’s reasoning for the 
“democratic revolution”, as taught at the Superior War School (Escola Superior de 
Guerra, ESG) and the date of the coup, the 31st of March, has been institutionally 
commemorated as the day that the military came to Brazil’s rescue.642Periodically, 
these celebrations are marked in a manner to garner national attention, though at 
other times the celebratory efforts are muted in deference to the national mood 
around the coup. 
In general, the armed forces have defended themselves against charges of 
CAH with two arguments. The first prong of their defence has consistently been 
that the CAH were committed by rogue officers and did not reflect an institutional 
policy towards the left.6431n 1969, for example, the military regime released a 
statement insisting that claims of torture were “promoted by international agents of 
subversion and harboured by a morbid and sensationalist sector of the foreign 
press.”644 Since then, leaders have either denied awareness of torture, or claimed 
that torture was committed by a handful of officers acting outside of official 
orders.645This defence has been weakened by the sheer weight of the evidence of 
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an institutional policy that emerged both during the dictatorship and in the years 
since.646 
The second prong of justification has been a consistent element of the 
military’s response to accusations of torture since 1964; that is, the “excesses” were 
justified as a natural response to the violence being committed by the 
subversives.647Martha Huggins’ interviews with former police and military officers 
are illustrative of the reasoning behind the use of violence during interrogations. 
Among a number of identified reasons – blaming individuals, professionalism, 
diffusing responsibility and just cause - the latter provides insight into the 
institutional justification of the torture and deaths of dissidents. As pointed out by 
one participant “We worked as if at war. We were patriots, we were defending our 
country, we were proud of that, so they were adversaries, the enemy. We were 
proud of what we did…working in DOPS…that pride of ridding the country of a 
threat, of a communist regime…”648 After pictures of a naked torture victim were 
published in 2004, the Army released a statement justifying the imprisonment and 
torture of members of the left by arguing that it was “a legitimated response to 
violence of those who refused dialogue (…) and took the initiative to arm 
themselves.”649 
Since 1984, members of the armed forces have insisted that the amnesty law 
closed the door on discussions around the crimes of the regime. This belief is clear 
in a series of interviews conducted by Celso Castro and Maria Celina D’Araujo. 
The fourteen in-depth interviews with politicians and military officers illustrate the 
discourse around the military’s role in Brazilian politics and include questions 
around the dictatorship, transition and amnesty. In one interview, Airforce General 
Mauro José Miranda Gandra argued that amnesty as a process was about 
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definitively turning a page as a nation.650 The former minister of the Navy during 
Cardoso’s administration, Mauro César Rodrigues Pereira, claimed that amnesty 
was “a way to settle what normal efforts had been unable to resolve.”651 Pereira 
articulated an oft-claimed point: that the amnesty law was two-sided, and if 
revoked, the punishment needed to be two-sided as well.  
This entrenched disdain for transitional and post-transitional justice came to 
head with Lula’s PnDH-3, and Rousseff’s subsequent push for the CNV. Lula’s 
official proposal was quickly followed by the threat of four high-profile 
resignations (the minister of defence, Nelson Jobim, and three high ranking military 
officials). The reasoning behind this threat was the belief that any move against the 
amnesty law was a direct attack against the military forces, and an act of 
revanchismo, or revenge taking.652Lula backed off, compromising on the wording 
of the controversial section of the PnDH-3. The driving force behind the proposal, 
the Special Minister of Human Rights Alexandre Leme Vannuchi, denied that there 
was vindictive intent towards the armed forces.653Rousseff faced the same 
resistance to her proposal of a Truth Commission; with the legislation moving 
through the Brazilian Congress only after the emphasis was placed on truth above 
all else, and after the military was assured that the commission would have no 
prosecutorial powers.654 
Senior military reluctantly participated in an audit of documents as part of 
the CNV process.655However, by the release of the final report by the CNV in 
December 2014, military officials had coalesced around the belief that the process 
was a political exercise in revenge taking. Unusual for Brazil, some of these attacks 
came from generals on active duty, including statements made by General Sérgio 
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Etchegoyen whose father was on the list of the 377 agents accused by the CNV of 
crimes during the dictatorship.656The Clube Militar, an organisation of retired and 
current military officers, released two statements on the CNV, the first of which 
was deleted. The second press release focused on the universality of the Amnesty 
law, and criticised the CNV for focusing solely on the crimes committed by the 
state.657 Gilberto Pimentel, the General of the Reserves and president of the Clube 
Militar, argued that the proposal by the CNV to revise the amnesty law was 
unacceptable to the military institution.658 
The Superior Military Tribunal (Superior Tribunal Militar, STM) released 
a statement disputing sections of the CNV report that were critical of the court. The 
STM called the report “false, unfair and wrong” in calling the military justice as 
“the judicial rear guard to repression” and in describing the court as being “tolerant 
or remiss with respect to allegations of serious violations of human rights.”659 
 
3.6.2 Perspectives of the Political Elites 
Brazil’s experience over the last five decades has, in many respects, been 
an exercise in the “instrumentalization and abuse of memory.”660 Political scientist 
Holly Ryan argues that political elites gave primacy to the military’s narrative.  
“Here, the military, some mainstream media and even the first civilian governments 
armed themselves with an ‘authorised’ history that undersold the violence of the 
ditadura and spoke to the interests of the armed forces.”661 While Ryan argues that 
there has been a significant shift in the Lula and Rousseff administrations, others 
are more sceptical. According to Marlon Weichert, a federal prosecutor and key 
actor in the recent legal challenges to the amnesty law, the political elites in Brazil 
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have generally continued to support the pact with the armed forces that allowed for 
the transition, that is, a general amnesty in exchange for civilian control.662 
the deal that was made during the 1980s and is always reiterated when you have a new 
government, is that civil government will not deal with the past, I mean promoting justice or any 
kind of accountability for wrong doings in the past. And, in exchange, the military will respect the 
civil government…so even Dilma, as a former leftist guerrilla involved in the former armed 
movements against the dictatorship, you can see it’s hard for her but she is respecting this deal.663 
 
A slow and steady shift toward accepting some of the most basic processes 
of transitional justice such as reparations and truth mechanisms, has emerged from 
within the political discourse. However, even the smallest shifts in the policy can 
descend into a politically charged debate over history, vengeance and the right to 
justice.664 The reactionary nature of the transitional justice discourse reflects two 
key features of Brazil’s political elite. First, the political elites are representative of 
the highly polarized nature of Brazilian society.665Those on the left and right exert 
greater control of the political sphere than the “middle” in Brazil, with each side 
pulling strongly towards their own interest groups. Second, both emerging from and 
perpetuating this polarization, the “truth” about the causes of the coup, the 
authoritarian period in general and the transition, remains heavily contested.666 
Without an official accounting of the 1964 – 1984 era, the political elites have been 
left to establish their own narrative of the authoritarian period. 
The muted response to Cardoso’s 1995 Special Commission for Political 
Deaths and Disappearances, which barely received any press coverage and was 
supported and repudiated in almost equal measure by the political elites,667was 
indicative of the willingness of elected officials and state organisations to address 
questions of state responsibility for previous CAH. The key sources of public 
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repudiation of Cardoso’s transitional justice programme were established political 
elites, the Supreme Court and military officials.668 
The first real test of political willingness to address the historic CAH 
emerged in 2001 with the proposal and establishment of the Amnesty Commission 
(AC). The purpose of the commission was to judge reparation claims, with a focus 
on Brazilians who had been, due to political persecution, inhibited from “exercising 
economic activities” between 1946 and 1988.669While lauded as the linchpin of 
Brazil’s transitional justice efforts, others have criticised the uneven reparations 
programme that reflected class inequities.670 Under the stewardship of Abrão, the 
focus of the commission expanded to include the nation-wide Amnesty caravans, 
which involved public hearings and apologies from members of the commission. 
According to Torelly, who was a member of the AC, the Minister of Human Rights 
asked Abrão to 
…reformulate the public policy that the commission was [following] in order to encompass 
a greater level of moral and symbolic redress, and analyse how the commission can 
reconnect with the political agenda of the social movements that were connected to the 
struggle for amnesty.671 
 
 The caravans were “a way to address, to get a better result in terms of moral 
and symbolic reparations. The commission started to apologise…and started 
several measures in order to address this dimension.”672While some commentators 
have questioned whether the government sanctioned these apologies,673 the effect 
of the public hearings was to raise awareness of the CAH, and to put pressure on 
political supporters of the amnesty law. For their part, political elites have pushed 
back against efforts to remove the amnesty law by arguing that the law allowed for 
reconciliation and to alter it would to lead the nation down a path of revanchismo 
or revenge taking.674 The emphasis on reconciliation has been at the forefront of 
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political discourse around both the amnesty legislation and transitional justice. 
Even with the Amnesty Commission, “the very name - ‘Amnesty’ instead of 
‘Reparations’ Commission—associates reparations payments with the conciliatory 
framework set by the 1979 amnesty.”675 
The battle over transitional justice amongst the political elites is ongoing. 
As discussed above, Lula’s proposal for the PnDH-3 was met with significant 
resistance from members of his own cabinet, including the threat of resignation by 
the then Minister of Defence, Nelson Jobim. In 2011, conservative senators rejected 
the first version of the law creating the truth commission (PLC 88/2011), arguing 
that it illegally circumvented the 1979 amnesty law.676A number of changes were 
made, including the reduction in the number of commissioners, limiting the time 
that the commission would work to two years, and extending the time that the 
commission would cover from 1964 – 1988 to 1946 to 1988. Most importantly, 
conservative senators ensured the removal of any reference to the amnesty law. The 
eventual compromise diluted the truth commission to such a point that some 
senators question the objectives of the commission. Senator Pedro Taques (PDT-
MB) argued that the changes to the legislation meant that the commission was a 
farce.677 Senator Randolfe Rodrigues (PSOL-AP) took issue with the fact that the 
primary stated purpose of the truth commission was to promote national 
reconciliation. Rodrigues argued that the commission needed to have the capacity 
to investigate crimes and seek some form of justice. “This is not a commission to 
reconcile perpetrators and victims. It is a commission to complete our process of 
democratic transition.”678 
The final report from the CNV was received with initial fanfare but was 
then quickly side-lined by the deepening political crises. According to Weichert, 
“the truth commission handed in its work in December 2014, since then we [have] 
only [been] discussing corruption and the political climate and so on. We don’t have 
time for this subject.”679 With the impeachment of Rousseff, and the ascension of 
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conservative Michel Temer as interim president in May 2016, the human rights 
agenda of the Brazilian government has been relegated to the backburner. The 
Ministry of Human Rights has been folded back into the Ministry of Justice, leaving 
observers uncertain of the path forward in terms of future political and legal 
challenges to the amnesty law.680 
 
3.6.3 The Legal Community 
The legal community in Brazil is clearly divided along institutional lines. 
The judiciary, and in particular the Supreme Court (STF), has remained steadfastly 
conservative; supportive of the narrative of the coup as a revolution, and the 
amnesty law as the key tool for national reconciliation.681 On the other hand, the 
key organisation representing lawyers, the OAB, has long been a vocal proponent 
for changes to the amnesty law, arguing for more significant measures of justice.682 
This division within the legal community has existed from the initial stages 
of the dictatorship, with the courts lending legitimacy to the authoritarian regime’s 
actions. In turn, the regime’s leaders allowed the courts a level of autonomy, leading 
to what Anthony W. Pereira calls “a high degree of civilian military consensus in 
the legal sphere.”683 Changes to the institutional structure of the judiciary by the 
regime were incremental, and in response to challenges coming from political 
opposition.684 Political dissidents and members of the opposition were tried in 
military courts, however civilians staffed these trials and defendants could 
technically appeal to the Supreme Court. In a regional comparison with Chile and 
Argentina, Pereira found that Brazil’s justice system was closest to what it had been 
prior to the coup.  
The military regime did not engage in large-scale purges of the judiciary, and political 
prosecutions took place without radical innovations or breaks with traditional military and 
judicial practice – military court jurisdiction had been merely expanded to include civilians, 
and existing national security laws modified.685 
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The institutional continuity was maintained through the transition, with the court 
structure remaining fundamentally intact during the democratisation period. 
Reforms during the 1990s and 2000s were limited and the judiciary, while 
distrusted, was able to continue without significant interference from the executive 
or groups within civil society.686During the first decade of the transition the 
composition of the Supreme Court was dominated by judges appointed during the 
dictatorship period. These authoritarian era judges were able to control the judicial 
response to petitions for transitional justice. With a series of early decisions, the 
court set the 1988 Constitution as its benchmark, making the examination of any 
earlier legislation, including the amnesty law, significantly more difficult.687 
 The Brazilian judiciary has aligned itself with the will of the executive 
around transitional justice, honouring the political pact between the military regime 
and the opposition. Significant politicisation has been a characteristic of the 
Brazilian justice system; however, the courts have resisted both domestic and 
international pressure to pursue transitional or post-transitional justice 
measures.688In fact, the absence of the courts in the discourse around transitional 
justice have been noticeable, particularly in comparison to neighbouring 
countries.689 
The clearest indicator of the court’s perspective regarding the amnesty law 
and impunity can be found in the 2010 decision to maintain the existing legislation. 
Rather than simply affirming amnesty, the 7-2 decision expanded the law to include 
historical crimes that previously stood in a grey legal area.690 The ruling, written by 
Judge Eros Grau, affirmed the role amnesty played in the transition. Grau argued 
that democratisation was a product of extensive negotiations that would not have 
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been possible without “a firm commitment to reconciliation and national 
unity.”691The court also confirmed the judicial norm established in the early 1990s 
that enshrined the 1988 Constitution as the “original rule”.692 
In response to the 2010 IACtHR decision to condemn the continued use of 
amnesty in Brazil, the president of Supreme Court, Cezar Peluso, declared that 
anyone convicted of crimes that had previously come under the 1979 amnesty law 
would be granted habeas corpus.693The refusal to revoke the amnesty law has put 
the STF on a collision course with the IACtHR. Weichart points out that the STF’s 
refusal to accept the international court’s decision creates significant legal and 
political difficulties.  
The general prosecutor is saying, look, despite the decision of 2010, we have the 
decision of the IACtHR, and we have to follow it because it is part of the 
international commitments of Brazil. The STF has to decide…It’s very 
complicated if the Supreme Court says we don’t have to follow the decision of the 
IACtHR. It would be a disaster for the entire system. They [the judges] are aware 
of the risk.694 
 
There are approximately 20 cases currently before the Supreme Court that will test 
the status quo regarding the amnesty law. While federal prosecutors were initially 
cautiously optimistic regarding the push towards challenging impunity, the current 
political climate and shift towards conservatism has quashed some of this early 
optimism.695 
 Two organisations representing the legal community have provided 
consistent legal agitation against the amnesty legislation. Members of the Federal 
Public Ministry (Ministério Público Federal, or MPF) and the Federal Bar 
Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, or OAB) have been vocal opponents 
to the blanket impunity offered by amnesty, targeting both the law itself as well as 
particular elements of the law.696 These groups have added visibility to the 
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transitional justice agenda, often in the face of the reconciliation narrative presented 
by the political elites and judiciary.  
The MPF, previously accountable to the executive, became an independent 
institution under the 1988 Constitution.697 Over the last three decades, the MPF, 
and its regional subsidiaries, have cultivated the public perception as the voice of 
institutional accountability. Indeed, Weichert argues that the MPF, along with the 
Amnesty Commission and the OAB, was key in removing the shroud of silence 
around the crimes of the dictatorship and transitional justice.  
 
In 2007 we here in the MPF and the Amnesty Commission in Brazil started 
addressing all of these subjects. It was the first time civil society was open to all 
these subjects, or not open but it was listening [to] different voices, and not only 
[to] victim’s voices. [They could claim that] the victims were prejudiced because 
they lost. But when society in general hear from public institutions, public services, 
the amnesty commission and the human rights commission that was just founded 
a few years before [the public and civil society] can see that they are some official 
voices, they spoke with some authority. For the first time…we unblocked the 
discussion, we opened the box for the first time.698 
 
According to the traditional processes of transitional justice, Brazil was a late 
starter. Weichert reasons that this was because Brazil was “a very successful case 
of a dictatorship and a controlled transition ensuring oblivion and impunity.”699The 
STF’s refusal to revise the amnesty legislation has not finished the legal debate 
around impunity and justice. The MPF has continued to send cases challenging the 
MPF through the court system, with the hope for a shift in juridical approach to 
transitional justice.700 
The OAB’s resistance to the amnesty law began with reluctant acceptance 
before moving to active resistance. In 1979, outgoing OAB president Raymundo 
Faoro encouraged victims’ families to accept the law as the best possible outcome. 
He told them “there was no real prospect for punishing torturers.”701However, 
Faoro’s successor, Seabra Fagundes, reversed this approach. He sought 
accountability for torturers and failing that, the right to pursue civil suits.702Since 
then, the OAB has played a role in providing opposition to the pervasive culture of 
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impunity.  In 2008, the OAB spearheaded the legal challenge to Law 6,683/1979, 
asking the STF to assess the validity of amnesty for CAH. The decision to reject 
this position has not changed the long-term goal of the OAB, with continued efforts 
by the organisation to challenge the law through the courts.703 
Weichert describes the political silence around the crimes of authoritarian 
regime and by extension, amnesty, as a block to any real discussion on transitional 
justice from within academia or even organisations in the civil society. He argues 
that the early reparations programmes were disconnected from the framework of 
transitional justice.  
The subject was so blocked, even in academia. Since 2008, there has been an 
explosion…and it’s very important to see that in 2008, 2009 Data Fohla conducted 
a poll asking civil society if they knew that we had an amnesty law and if they were 
in favour of removing [it]. The answer was, look, we don’t know what the amnesty 
law is, and we’re not in favour of prosecuting the perpetrators. And, in 2014, the 
Data Fohla conducted a second poll during the 50th anniversary of the coup, and 
the answer was just the opposite. Civil Society was aware of the amnesty and, of 
those that were aware, more than 50 per cent were in favour of accountability. It’s 
about information and giving information to civil society in the process of the truth 
commission.704 
 
Weichert argues that the decade’s silence around transitional justice was 
shattered by the legal efforts of the OAB and MPF as well as the awareness raised 
by the Amnesty Commission caravans. “In my opinion, the truth commission in 
Brazil is a process [begun] in 2007. It’s a process but [one that is] an outcome of 
civil society engagement with truth commission and not a decision of the 
government.”705The legal progress, however, is dependent on the political climate, 
with Brazil’s turn towards the right raising serious concern regarding the potential 
judicial outcomes.706 
With the explosion of interest in transitional justice issues, Weichert has 
begun to reflect on the role amnesty has had in terms of Brazil’s current issues with 
democratic structure. Impunity, according to Weichert, is part of Brazil’s political 
landscape, reflected in the widespread and tolerated corruption. This is an extension 
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of the deal made between government and the military, he argued. “[it’s a matter 
of] you don’t hit me and we won’t hit you.”707 Democracy, he pointed out, can only 
tolerate so much unanswered illegal activity. 
Yes, it is possible to have a democracy [with amnesty]. But the question is: what 
kind of democracy? I think a democracy cannot survive impunity for human rights 
abuse. Even if you believe that criminal law and criminal accountability should be 
for only very specific cases, human rights cases should be the very first place. [We 
need to consider] how it effects the equality principal, how it effects the idea 
officials being subject to control, all these essential values of a democracy. So, a 
formal, political democracy is possible, but not a substantive, complete democracy. 
A strong democracy without truth and without accountability for all the HRV, I 
think it’s not possible.708 
 
 
3.6.4 Perspectives of Organisations in Civil Society 
 During the first two decades after the transition, organisations emerging 
from within civil society were generally muted compared to those in neighbouring 
states. The initial impact of the secret publication of Nunca Mais,709 the secret report 
on state sponsored torture published in 1985 by the Archdiocese of Saõ Paulo, failed 
to significantly propel the transitional justice debate forward, despite becoming a 
bestseller across the country.710In part, this muted response is tied to the nature of 
the slow, controlled transition with a narrative dominated by the government-
sanctioned silence and the lack of moral imperative expressed by the government 
and society at large.711Many organisations within civil society were fragmented and 
focused on the democratisation process. Any real transitional justice effort was left 
to families of victims and to groups within the labour movements.712 
Brazilian researcher and academic Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga disagrees with 
Weichert’s assessment of transitional justice and argues that, despite the efforts by 
the Amnesty Commission and other organisations to raise awareness, 
People in Brazil generally don’t care about what happened, many don’t know what 
happened. The process, the transition process can explain why it’s like that. We 
took a different route; it took 10 years and led by the military – slow, gradual and 
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secure. The truth is that a big part of the population has a positive memory of the 
dictatorship, that it helped the country avoid the communist threat.713 
 
Torelly suggests that a profound distrust in the criminal justice system has 
influenced the behaviour of organisations from within civil society, and their 
reluctance to pursue transitional justice through the courts.  
 
The civil society in Brazil never decided to use justice, they didn’t trust the justice 
system…because the justice system strongly supported military rule, implemented 
what Anthony Pieria called authoritarian legality and hasn’t been reformed after 
military rule. The last judge appointed by the military retired in 2003. So this is 
key to understand why the victims didn’t trust [the system]. It’s possible to say that 
the movement for the dead and disappeared made mistakes in not accessing justice 
earlier, but it’s also true to say that there are reasons not to believe that the justice 
system was an alternative.714 
 
Regardless of this reluctance to engage with the institutional structure of democratic 
Brazil, organisations emerging from civil society have become increasingly vocal 
regarding the state of Brazil’s transitional justice process. This has emerged parallel 
to government transition justice efforts, and has been helped by some government 
ministries, particularly the MPF.715 The Torture Never More Group (Grupo Tortura 
Nunca Mais, GTNM), has publically advocated for access to archives documenting 
the crimes of the authoritarian regime, as well as seeking expanded health and 
psychological care for torture victims.716 In an article marking the 50th anniversary 
of the coup, advocate Cecilia Maria Bouças Coimbra wrote that  
We continue the resistance, because the crimes committed by state terrorism remain little 
known and the documents proving these atrocities remain secret, as well as the testimonies 
of those who have committed such crimes. The silence around the dictatorship continues 
...717 
 
The focus on information about the CAH committed by the authoritarian 
regime above other measures of justice is indicative of the options available to 
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organisations from within civil society, and a reflection of the pace of transitional 
justice in Brazil. In Chile and South Africa, the narrative around the dictatorship 
was established early, with truth commissions taking place within five years of the 
transition. While these narratives may be contested, the truth commissions 
established an official account of the past. In Brazil, this official accounting of the 
authoritarian regime began over 25 years after the transition. This has meant that 
much of the focus for transitional justice has been on access to the truth.  
The table below outlines the opinions regarding the justice process 
expressed in personal interviews with politicians, human rights lawyers and 
victims’ groups, and public statements made by members of the above groups, as 
well as by the military and judiciary. 
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Table 3.4: Long-term opinions regarding justice, amnesty and democracy 
Accountability 
Actors 
Justice Amnesty Democracy 
Military Not necessary. 
Crimes limited to 
rogue officers and 
legitimate action 
against communist 
threat. General 
refusal to fully 
cooperate with CNV.  
 
Fundamental 
element of the 
transition. Benefits 
both sides, non-
negotiable and 
originally fought for 
by the left, therefore 
mandated by 
populace.  
Shaped by military 
prerogatives. 
Military no longer 
poses direct threat to 
institutional 
structure with 
widespread 
professionalization.  
Political Elites Generally resistant to 
domestic and 
international pushes 
for justice. Not 
considered part of the 
current political 
agenda, despite 
findings and 
recommendations of 
the CNV. 
Government 
initiatives have 
included some 
memorialization of 
victims, reparations 
and truth gathering.  
Amnesty viewed as a 
fundamental element 
of democratization 
process and 
therefore is 
entrenched in the 
system. No 
significant moves to 
review or revoke 
amnesty law.  
Institutional 
structure of 
democracy currently 
challenged by 
significant 
corruption scandals 
including the 
impeachment of 
President Dilma 
Rousseff.  
Judiciary 
(lawyers) 
Possibly the most 
active in pursuing 
traditional 
transitional justice 
measures. Via the 
MPF, OAB as well as 
the efforts of 
individual lawyers, 
the legality of 
impunity has been 
challenged in court in 
an effort to create a 
pathway for justice. 
Have challenged 
legality of amnesty 
via petition to STF 
and individual court 
cases. View amnesty 
law as illegal in 
accordance with 
national and 
international legal 
norms.  
Supportive of 
democratic 
institutions.   
Judiciary 
(Courts) 
Have aligned with 
executive in terms of 
resisting transitional 
justice measures. 
Top court rejected 
challenges to the 
amnesty law and also 
declined to act on the 
inter-American court 
recommendations  
Have maintained 
amnesty legislation, 
arguing that it is a 
cornerstone 
legislation that made 
democracy possible.  
Politicized, however 
supportive of 
democratic 
institutions.   
Victims 
Groups/HROs 
Believe that even the 
minimal standard of 
Initially supportive 
of amnesty for 
Argue that 
democracy is failing 
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The delayed truth commission has had a significant impact on the course of 
transitional justice in Brazil. Without an official narrative of the events immediately 
after the authoritarian regime, civil society have been left to first try and establish 
‘truth’ before being able to gain justice. While the legal community has driven the 
process forward, the military, judiciary and political elites have limited progress by 
refusing to change the amnesty law, and by limiting access to evidence of past 
events. 
 
3.7 Conclusion: Examining Brazil in Relation to Hypotheses 
Brazil’s attempts at ignoring the past in favour of developing a new democratic 
institutional structure are instructive in illustrating what an enshrined amnesty 
legislation can mean to a democracy three decades after a transition. Between 1964 
and 1985 there was, overall, a limited awareness of the violence committed by the 
dictatorship. The lives of many Brazilians continued, and even flourished, 
regardless of the authoritarian leadership of the country. A semblance of democratic 
machinery occasionally emerged from within the political apparatus however, it 
was eventually clear that a full democratic transition was inevitable. The military 
took control of the process, ensuring the continuation of military prerogatives long 
after the reestablishment of democracy. The amnesty legislation, first advocated for 
by victims and their families, eventually included measures of impunity for CAH 
committed by the state. Despite the advent of democratic institutions and culture, 
political elites held firm on the pact that allowed the process of democratization to 
begin. Time and time again, Brazil’s presidents have refused to engage with groups 
demanding justice beyond the constitutionally mandated reparations. The Ministry 
of Justice’s Amnesty Commission and subsequent Amnesty Caravans were able to 
raise some awareness, though the apologies given by members of the travelling 
commission fell short of any official government repentance and were critiqued for 
transitional justice – 
truth – has not been 
met.  
dissidents however 
opposed the 
expansion of law to 
include military and 
government 
operatives. Have 
since been part of the 
coalition calling for 
the law’s removal.  
victims with a 
continued 
institutional amnesty 
for government-
sponsored violence 
(both during 
authoritarian regime 
and the democratic 
period).  
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being too political.  Until 2012, there was no official narrative on the crimes 
committed by the former authoritarian regime and even the report delivered by the 
government-sponsored truth commission in 2014 received only the minimum level 
of acceptance from some quarters. Despite recommendations by the truth 
commission to repeal the amnesty law, the government returned to the political 
status quo and continued to support amnesty and the bargain that was struck in 
1979. Any developing discourse around transitional justice has since been muted 
by a series of corruption scandals, one of which led to the impeachment of Brazil’s 
first female president, Dilma Rousseff. The national political focus has firmly 
moved beyond the truth commission’s findings, leaving Brazil’s transitional justice 
process in a state of flux. 
What then, does this current state of affairs mean for the three hypotheses that form 
the foundation of this research? 
H0 presents the argument that amnesty legislation is compatible with the 
expectations and norms of an entrenched liberal democracy. In the case of Brazil, 
the sustainability of the amnesty law has benefited from a general lack of official 
discourse around the military regime’s violent crimes. Oblivion has allowed 
amnesty to continue, however this has not necessarily helped the development of 
an entrenched democratic structure. The maintenance of military prerogatives 
without significant question, ongoing impunity for crimes committed by police and 
military members during the democratic era, and persistent concerns over 
corruption have all undermined the perception and reality of Brazil’s democracy. 
As pointed out by Koerner, the amnesty law has become “a blank card for police, 
even today. There is a continued tolerance of the sorts of crimes that had been 
amnestied.”718Many of the quality of democracy indicators used to assess the depth 
of a state’s democratic development show a faltering democratic system when 
applied to Brazil.719Weichert argues that while it is possible to have both democracy 
and amnesty, the latter has had a significant detrimental impact on the depth of 
Brazil’s institutions.720 
																																																						
718Koerner, Personal Interview. 
719Leonardo Morlino, ‘Qualities of Democracy: How to Analyze Them’ (Istituto Italiano di 
Scienze Umane, Florence, 2009); Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, Assessing the Quality of 
Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
720Weichert, Personal Interview. 
	164	
While it would be impossible to argue that all of the concerns over Brazil’s 
democratic institutions are a direct result of the 1979 amnesty legislation, it is clear 
that a culture of impunity has developed since the 1985 transition, one that 
continues to this day despite a number of high-profile corruption 
cases.721According to recent studies those “Latin American countries that 
successfully prosecuted past human rights abusers have drastically diminished the 
incidence of torture and mass violations during their post-transition periods,”722 
giving credence to the idea that a culture of impunity can cross over from 
authoritarian regimes into democratising states and those believed to have 
consolidated democratic norms. 
The 2001 Amnesty Commission and eventual Amnesty Caravans were able 
to raise some public awareness regarding the dictatorship’s CAH, particularly with 
the testimony of high profile victims;723 however the impact of these efforts on the 
general political discourse has been limited. Victims’ groups have failed to coalesce 
around a single goal for transitional justice. Even the 2014 report produced by the 
CNV and delivered with some fanfare, failed to push transitional justice concerns 
to the necessary tipping point of public concern to trigger pressure on the political 
elites and judiciary.724The evidence seems to show sustained support for amnesty 
legislation in a political environment that is not yet fully democratic.  
While efforts for justice have been muted, there are some who have 
continued to agitate for accountability. The OAB, individual lawyers and some 
victim’s groups have ensured that some debate over transitional justice continues. 
These efforts have yet to become as vocal, or intergenerational, as in other states, 
however they have continued despite widespread apathy, reluctance and even 
outright resistance from the government, military and judiciary.725 
From a legal standpoint, the reasoning behind maintaining the status quo 
around the amnesty law confirms, in some respects, the argument put forward by 
H0, that amnesty (and the trading of justice for democracy) is agreed to in good 
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faith. Unlike in Chile, citizens in Brazil advocated for the 1979 amnesty law, 
seeking some form of legal reprieve for political prisoners and exiles.726 The 
inclusion of state officials for political crimes moved the amnesty law beyond what 
was originally intended and led to last minute resistance from victims and their 
families.727 Despite concern, the amnesty law was passed by congress and became 
an integral part of Brazil’s slow transition towards democracy. Political elites have 
steadfastly maintained the pact between the military and successive 
administrations. Considering the political taboo around amnesty, there was little 
challenge to the amnesty law before the OAB petitioned the Supreme Court in 
2010.728The Supreme Court rejected the petition, in part defending the sanctity of 
the bargain that established democracy in Brazil.729 The 2014 CNV report 
recommended, among other measures, the dismantling of the amnesty legislation 
and prosecutions against the former regime’s worst offenders. This was firmly 
rejected at each level of government, with then-president Rousseff arguing that the 
stability of democracy was more important than prosecutions for past CAH.730Since 
Rousseff’s impeachment and Brazil’s shift right, it is even less likely that the law 
will be effectively challenged. Illustrating the new government’s approach to 
historical justice issues, in September 2016 President Michel Temer appointed a 
former military officer and defender of the dictatorship to the Amnesty 
Commission.731There is now even less willingness from political elites to challenge 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning that amnesty was established in good faith and 
therefore should remain as part of Brazil’s legal system. 
H2) hypothesises that amnesty becomes acceptable with time in a given 
democracy as population demographics shift.  
Observing the increase of activity in the field of transitional justice in the 
late 2000s seems to directly contradict the idea that impunity has become more 
acceptable overtime. There has been a growing awareness in academia and civil 
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society of both the crimes of the dictatorship and impact of the amnesty 
law.732According to Weichert, this delayed interest is directly tied to the delayed 
transitional justice process. “We may say that our transition following the 
traditional values of transitional justice process started only in 2007, over 20 years 
after the end of the dictatorship. It’s a successful case of a dictatorship and a 
controlled transition ensuring oblivion and impunity.”733 
In the last decade Brazilian “society has become aware”,734 with a recent 
survey in 2014 showing that 46 per cent of Brazilians asked supported a repeal of 
the amnesty law; 37 were against a repeal and 17 per cent said they were 
unsure.735In the same survey, 46 per cent of those interviewed were in favour of 
punishing those found guilty of torture.736 The director of Datafolha, Maurio 
Paulino, argued that the results of the survey showed a highly divided society. 
Paulino believed that the increase in political discourse and available information 
on transitional justice had had a positive impact, however he also argued that 
experience, education and class divided respondents; those with a higher education 
and greater access to information aligned with victims in seeking change.737 The 
survey confirms a point made by a number of interviewees: transitional justice and 
a significant political discussion on the validity of amnesty legislation is viewed as 
important, however it is generally perceived as less important than other issues 
directly related to democratic stability such as corruption, state violence and 
rampant inequality.738 Therefore, it is not a case of amnesty legislation becoming 
more acceptable, rather that there are more pressing justice issues for the citizens 
of Brazil at this time. 
The Brazilian government’s active refusal to address the past for so long as 
well as an ingrained culture of amnesia has, in many respects, been very effective 
in muting any real debate on transitional justice.739 The absence of a legitimised 
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collective memory influenced the reception of the CNV.740Even today, the debate 
is limited. Victims’ rights organisations persist, as do memorialisation efforts led 
by a number of groups from within civil society.741 Federal prosecutors continue to 
push the limits of the 2010 STF decision.742However, there is no national outrage, 
nor have there been the widespread protests marking coup-related anniversaries 
similar to those seen in Chile. The military were able to essentially opt-out of 
providing significant information to the CNV, claiming that relevant records had 
been destroyed.743 While Datafolha survey results show a growing number of 
Brazilian’s open to some measures of accountability for dictatorship-era CAH, 
public opinion does not seem to be driving any shift in the decision making of the 
judicial or political elites. While the truth commission has been described as the 
epilogue of the transitional justice process in Brazil,744 it is hard to identify all of 
the key transitional justice indicators required for a complete process.745 
The overarching question of this thesis is whether justice can be sacrificed 
in the long run for democracy. In Brazil, institutional silence has not eliminated the 
demands for justice, nor has it ensured the establishment of a robust democracy as 
compensation for blanket impunity. Interview subjects outlined the individual 
efforts towards greater accountability particularly amongst the legal community, 
however as feared by Weichert, corruption scandals and the impeachment of 
President Rousseff have overshadowed questions of justice for historic 
crimes.746An opposition that was divided during the transition747 has remained so, 
failing to create a collective movement for justice.748 The recommendations of the 
truth commission to prosecute military officers have failed to make a significant 
impact on the political discourse and it is unlikely that the new Temer government 
will make any significant changes to the status quo. That said, in the last three 
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decades the military has been subjugated to civilian rule, with few political 
outbursts and in 2014, the CNV was able to establish Brazil’s first official record 
of the crimes committed by the authoritarian regime, a significant measure of 
progress in a country that had embraced amnesia above all else. 
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Chapter Four 
South Africa 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Apartheid, the governing system of South Africa for almost five decades, 
mandated a brutal segregation based on the division of the White community from 
the rest of the country. The non-White community - Blacks, Coloureds and 
Indians749 - were subject to oft-times inhumane treatment at the hands of a 
government that claimed to be ruling with paternalistic interest for all.750 However, 
at its heart, apartheid was about a single group maintaining political power, despite 
its minority status. It couldn’t last. In 1994, after almost a decade of negotiations, 
and a decade of violent civil unrest, the first democratically elected president rose 
to the podium to give his inaugural address. Nelson Mandela told the crowd of 
dignitaries and the millions listening on TV and radio “Out of the experience of an 
extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long must be born a society of which 
all humanity will be proud.”751 Unfortunately, after all the promise of the negotiated 
transition, the hope of Mandela was ill rewarded.  
 During the 1990 – 1994 period, the African National Congress (ANC) and 
the National Party (NP) negotiated the latter out of power.752 A cornerstone of the 
transition to democracy was the agreement for particularized amnesty – amnesty 
for truth. Lauded as the new way forward for transitioning states, negotiators hoped 
that this limited amnesty, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that 
granted it, would provide a bridge to reconciliation. However, as soon as the process 
began it was beset by controversy, accusations of bias and the refusal by key groups 
to participate. Over time, South Africa’s vaunted particularized amnesty has 
become an ad hoc blanket amnesty. The result is a population dissatisfied with the 
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750 Christi van der van der Westhuizen, White Power and Rise and Fall of the National Party 
(Cape Town: Struik Publishers, 2008). 
751 Martin Meredith, Mandela (Jeppestown: PublicAffairs, 2010), p. 515. 
752 Although other parties were involved in the negotiations, the ANC and NP were the dominant 
negotiating partners.  
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transitional justice mechanisms and frustrated with the failures of the ANC 
government.  
 The research here outlines the path South Africa took into and then, 50 years 
later, out of, apartheid. Through first person interviews, archival and secondary 
sources, this research explores perceptions of the authoritarian regime, the 
transition and subsequent efforts to manage demands for justice, amnesty and 
democracy.  Importantly, this chapter highlights growing domestic scepticism of 
the TRC process, with interview subjects expressing concern that, rather than 
uniting the country, the last 20 years has created a fractured society that is moving 
further and further away from the liberal democratic ideals set out in its 1996 
Constitution. These interviews include participants of the 1990 – 1994 negotiations, 
members of the TRC, South Africa’s legal community and activists from civil 
society organizations. The research and perspectives outlined here aim to inform 
the fundamental question of this research: can justice be sacrificed for democracy? 
More specifically, can particularized amnesty be effectively used during a transition 
without either suffering a reversal, or having a significantly adverse impact on the 
quality of democracy that emerges afterwards? 
In 1993, amnesty was presented as the only option for a democratic future, 
however, according to Mpotseng Kgokong, General Secretary of the Azanian 
People’s Organisation (AZAPO), law and justice were sacrificed for political 
expediency. “In our view, our country was no different to other countries where 
there had been crimes against humanity. We believe the people who committed 
these heinous crimes should be held responsible. The people involved should have 
been held to book.”753 AZAPO led an early legal challenge against the amnesty 
provision of the transition, arguing that it violated rights guaranteed by the 1996 
Constitution. Since then, the battle in South Africa in relation to transitional justice 
has not been directed at removing amnesty all together. Instead, it has been about 
fulfilment of a legal obligation by the political elites, and what it means when the 
government ignores or impedes the law.  
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4.2 Historical Background 
 4.2.1 Before Apartheid 
 The origins of the development of apartheid can be traced to the fracturing 
between the British, Afrikaners and indigenous tribes during the country’s colonial 
period.754 The historical grievances between the two White cultures were a key 
factor in the development of the distinct Afrikaner identity and the political system 
many Afrikaners deemed necessary to maintain it.755 While apartheid created a 
clear framework of racism, the structural violence against the indigenous and 
“Coloured” (mixed race) communities in South Africa began long before that.756 
From the time the British took control of the Cape Colony in 1806 until the legal 
implementation of apartheid in 1948, 171 race-based laws were passed to control 
where non-White communities could live, work and own land.757 While in 1948 
apartheid became an international symbol of institutionalized racism “…by the time 
the Native Lands Act of 1913 was enacted, South Africa was already moving in the 
direction of spatial segregation through land dispossession.”758 Apartheid was the 
systematic entrenchment of colonial norms that had existed in one form or another 
for centuries.759  
After taking control of South Africa from the Dutch settlers in 1806, the 
British dominated the industrial and political sphere while the Afrikaners 
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government in the South African political discourse. John L. Comaroff, ‘Images of Empire, 
Contests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa’, American Ethnologist, 
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established agricultural strength. Non-White populations were considered a poorly 
paid labour force, with many working as slaves or in slave-like conditions.760  
The Afrikaner and African nationalist movements became the key forces in 
the debate over apartheid, with the subsequent violence building as the groups 
fought to achieve their opposing goals. Injustice at the hands of the British, both 
real and imagined, a growing underclass of Afrikaners competing for 
manufacturing jobs against an established cheap labour source (Blacks), and the 
nationalistic rhetoric of Afrikaner elites all contributed to the eventual civil war 
between the two White ethnic groups.761 The Boer War (1899 – 1902) had a 
significant impact on the development of Afrikaner identity.762 Journalist Christi 
van der Westhuizen best articulated this argument when she wrote: 
…it is undeniable that the experiences of the Boers – the extreme methods of the 
British (the scorched-earth policy and concentration camps in which 27,000 
women and children died) and [Cape Colony Governor] Milner’s subsequent 
Anglicization policies – reinforced and radicalized a self-aware Afrikaner cultural 
elite.763  
 
The Afrikaner nationalist movement coalesced around the National Party, 
founded by Boer War General J.B.M Hertzog on 2 July 1915. The party was built 
on a particular “…brand of anti-imperialist, racist nationalism [that] resonated with 
White workers’ interests…”764 The two main thrusts of the party were to lift the 
Afrikaner people into positions of leadership, displacing the uitlanders (foreigners, 
a term used to describe British South Africans) and the suppression of the Black 
population by means of ‘retribalisation’.765   
 The African nationalist movement also gained momentum in the early 
Twentieth Century. Between 1652 and 1879 the Xhosa, Khoikhoi, San, Sotho and 
Zulu all led sporadic armed campaigns against the widespread land dispossession 
caused by the moving colonial boundaries.766 However, by the end of the Anglo-
Zulu War (1879) the tribal military resistance had all but ended. Through economic, 
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legislative and physical coercion, blacks became subjugated to the will of the 
minority White population.767 Colonization changed the social structure of the 
indigenous communities, and, while still present, tribal identification began to 
decrease in importance as black males from across the country migrated towards 
the diamond and gold mining centres of Kimberly and Witwatersrand.768   
The British were generally ambivalent regarding rights for the non-White 
population, despite promises to the contrary, and preferred to foster positive 
relations with the rising Afrikaner nationalist leaders. As pointed out by Afrikaner 
historian Hermann Giliomee, “Black and coloured people were on their own in their 
fight to prevent South Africa from becoming a ‘White man’s land.”769  
The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed on 
January 8, 1912 and was renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923. 
The founders sought citizenship for the African population, including political 
franchise and equal rights. The organization attempted to place pressure on the 
British and South African governments through national petitions, delegations to 
London and via the use of passive resistance inspired by Mahatma Gandhi.770 In 
1919 non-violent SANNC-led protests against pass laws771 led to the arrest of 
thousands. However, the South African government was able to divide support for 
the protests by putting pressure on tribal chiefs in their employ.772  
Originally dominated by educated, middle-class elites, support for the ANC 
had shifted by 1927 with the emergence of communist members. Under the 
leadership of Josiah Tshangana Gumede, the ANC adopted a more revolutionary 
and distinctly communist rhetoric, aligning itself closer to the Pan African 
movements across the continent as well as ideas coming out of the Soviet Union.773 
This shift left was not universally supported in the ANC, causing the existing 
factions between conservatives and revolutionaries to deepen. When commenting 
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on the centenary celebrations of the ANC, historian Philip Bonner argued that 
factions, and the attempt to unite them to a common cause, were a dominating 
characteristic of the ANC.  
From its foundation, the ANC sought to appeal to and, more infrequently, to 
mobilise a number of distinct and potentially conflictual constituencies. These 
were, first, the traditional leaders of South Africa – its kings and its chiefs; second, 
South Africa’s Christian educated elite – its doctors, lawyers, journalists, 
clergymen and teachers; third, its urban masses and fourth its rural populace.774 
 
The ANC Youth League (ANCYL) was formed in 1942-43. The ANCYL 
became a “pressure group for the younger, more militant elements within ANC 
ranks.”775 Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu were early leaders of the ANCYL, 
and would go on to dominate the legacy of the organization as a whole.  
Prior to the implementation of apartheid, the South African polity had two 
tiers, one basically democratic, the other authoritarian in nature. Whites in South 
Africa enjoyed political rights similar to those seen in other British dominions at 
the time.776 Elections were regular, competitive and involved peaceful transfers of 
power between the South African Party (SAP), the United Party (UP) and the 
National Party (NP). The government was responsive and accountable to the needs 
of the White population. Democratically empowered populist sentiment and mass 
hysteria regarding unemployment and the “swart gevaar”777 allowed for the rise of 
the NP with its increasingly nationalistic agenda.778 However, the democratic 
government of White South Africa was an authoritarian regime for non-White 
communities, who were unable to participate in the electoral process, had 
limitations placed on where they could live and work, were subject to increased 
police activity and were not considered full citizens.779 Unlike Brazil and Chile, 
there was no clear rupture of the democratic state. South Africa’s apartheid era 
began as a dual system with a quasi-democracy that was, over time, tainted by the 
authoritarian system that supported it.   
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4.2.2 Justice prior to the advent of apartheid  
 The 1909 Constitution that created the Union of South Africa was 
“flagrantly discriminatory”780 against non-White communities and established the 
framework for a series of race-based laws that significantly impacted on the rights 
and freedoms of Blacks, Coloureds and Indians.781 Pieced together from the four 
constitutions of the existing colonies, the constitution limited electoral participation 
to the White population across South Africa, with the exception of the Cape. The 
Cape Qualified Franchise, though limited by property and educational 
qualifications, remained in the Constitution.782 However, this changed with the 
Representation of Natives Act (1936). All black voters in the Cape were moved 
from the general electoral roll and placed on a special native role that allowed them 
to only vote for designated White representatives at different levels of 
government.783  
 Parliamentary supremacy was established in early amendments to the 1909 
Constitution.784 The judiciary was subordinate to the will of the legislature, and as 
such, provided little challenge to the rising separatist politics.785 Non-White South 
Africans had limited judicial recourse as they became increasingly marginalized 
within the separatist system.786 In the first two decades after the Union was 
established a number of prominent judges, including the country’s second Chief 
Justice, Sir James Rose-Innes, expressed liberal opinions regarding race.787 
However, these extra-curial opinions failed to make a significant difference to the 
delivery of justice. According to jurist Albie Sachs,  
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Innes stressed that the courts would come to the aid of any person, whether high 
or low, who was injured other than by due process of law; but where the jurisdiction 
of the courts was excluded, either by clear terms of a statute or by the operation of 
martial law, he accepted such limitations though not without expressing 
disapproval.788 
 
Prior to the institutionalization of the scattered race-based laws, the judiciary was 
guided by the doctrine of “separate but not substantially unequal”, though this was 
not without debate and dissension.789   
If fairness, equality in application, legitimacy and legality are considered 
necessary for the perception of justice, as this research proposes, then it is 
reasonable to argue that prior to apartheid, there was already a lack of available 
justice measures for the non-White population. The separatism of the 1910 – 1948 
period created significant social exclusion for non-Whites, with colour bars placed 
on most facets of everyday life. Though technically required to be separate but 
equal (or not substantially unequal), most facilities failed to provide equal services. 
The Native Lands Act (1913) led to land alienation, with just 7 per cent of 
agricultural land set aside for Blacks, despite the fact that 67 per cent of South 
Africa’s population was classed as Black.790 The impact of this was dehumanizing. 
Sol Plaatje, one of the founders of the ANC, wrote in his 1916 book Native Life in 
South Africa “awaking on Friday morning, June 20th, 1913, the South African 
Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth".791   
 
4.2.3 Apartheid in all but name 
During the interwar years, power shifted between the British-leaning liberal 
internationalist Jan Smuts (in power between 1919 – 1924 and 1939 – 1948) and 
conservative Afrikaner Barry Hertzog (1924 – 1939). The two leaders presented 
conflicting views on South Africa’s relationship with Britain, particularly in the 
lead up to WWII, and were oppositional regarding Afrikaner parity in language and 
education.792 However, the ideological differences between these two were less 
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significant in relation to the “native question”.793 Segregation was expanded under 
both the Smuts and Hertzog administrations, with the African population pushed 
further out of the White designated areas without significant expansion in the land 
allocated for the reserves.794 Coloureds and Indian’s fared little better. New laws 
were passed that placed restriction on land ownership, employment and other basic 
rights for all non-White populations. Particularly egregious was the introduction of 
the job colour bar in 1926, restricting semi-skilled and skilled labour positions to 
Whites only.795 The colour bar, and the requirement of Afrikaans as qualification 
for employment in the public service,796 was aimed at alleviating widespread 
Afrikaner poverty during the difficult economic climate of the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Hertzog also hoped to appease the strengthening Afrikaner nationalism that 
found support in the lower class White population.797   
Divisions over South Africa’s participation in WWII contributed to the split 
of the NP and the rise of the Afrikaner nationalists lead by dominee (clergyman) 
Daniel François Malan.798  More than Smuts or Hertzog before him, D.F Malan 
sought not just parity with the English-speaking Whites, but dominance over them. 
However, unlike previous leaders, he viewed conflict between the two populations 
as relatively insignificant when compared to the issue of what to do with the African 
population. According to Malan “the contradiction between black and White went 
beyond difference in civilization or language or history or general lifestyle.”799 He 
also argued that Whites had the responsibility for oversight of the African 
population, who should be encouraged to “develop in accordance with their own 
nature”.800 Malan first used the term “apartheid” in parliament in 1944, arguing that 
the overarching goal of the NP was “to ensure the safety of the White race and of 
Christian civilization by the honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and 
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guardianship.”801 Malan was elected to the premiership in 1948 with a razor thin 
majority that depended on smaller Afrikaner-rights parties for support. Though the 
term apartheid had become part of the political discourse, few knew what it really 
meant. Over time it became clear that “rather than being a blueprint, apartheid was 
a set of policies that were continuously adapted to serve the NP’s ultimate goal: 
staying in power.”802  
The rise to power of the political apparatus of the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement coincided with the strengthening of the ANC. The influence of the ANC 
waxed and waned during the interwar years.803 The ANC failed to provide 
significant resistance to the legislative measures of Smuts and Hertzog, despite 
some industrial action. With the so-called Hertzog Bills,804 the African population 
was pushed further to the edges of South African society. However, by 1945 a new 
generation of activists was beginning to emerge from within the ANC under the 
leadership of American-trained physician A.B Xuma.  
In an analysis of African protest in South Africa, academic Tom Lodge 
argued that the 1940s were  
…a period in which a massive expansion of the black urban labour force, its 
increasing deployment in manufacturing industry, the revival of trade unionism 
and the stimulation of class consciousness, all had a radicalizing effect on political 
organisations…In an environment of developing popular militancy manifested by 
industrial action and informal community protest, the frustrated aspirations of an 
African middle class assumed fresh significance within the contest of formal 
political movements.805 
 
The founding of the ANCYL as well as the development of intellectual 
debate around the goals of the ANC laid the foundation for the subsequent mass 
mobilization that took place in the 1950s and 1960s.806 
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4.3 The Apartheid Years 
Giliomee describes apartheid as a “flexible operational ideology for 
Afrikaner nationalism, attracting both those wanting to keep down all those who 
were not White and those who wanted to rehabilitate them and recognize their 
dignity…”807 At its heart, apartheid was about the separation of races to the benefit 
of the White population. Between 1948 and 1994, the White political elite 
employed all methods possible, including violence and assassinations, to maintain 
their precarious position at the top. The principles of apartheid seeped into every 
aspect of life for non-White South Africans and left a lasting scar on the nation’s 
collective memory.  
Malan’s electoral victory on 26 May 1948 marked a significant shift in 
South Africa’s political landscape. He quickly attempted to reassure the political 
opposition that the NP policy, though detailed regarding non-Whites, would not 
involve oppression. Rather, apartheid would involve “a large measure of 
independence with the growth of self-reliance, self-respect and at the same time the 
creation of opportunities for free development in conformity with their own 
character and capacity.”808 However, as pointed out by van der Westhuizen, it 
would be left to the White population to make decisions on the “character and 
capacity” of the blacks.809 NP politicians cultivated this concept of trusteeship as 
reasoning for apartheid, arguing that the different ethnicities would eventually 
become good neighbours, each with distinct territory of their own.810  
 Within the NP itself, leaders struggled to reconcile the desire of the most 
ardent supporters for total segregation and the economic realities of modern South 
Africa.811 Mining, manufacturing and agriculture relied on the underpaid, docile 
and migratory African workforce. Even with job reservation legislation, labour 
shortages forced employers to open semi-skilled positions for non-Whites, 
contravening official government policy.812Ultimately, economic integration while 
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simultaneously attempting to implement geographic segregation was a point of 
cognitive dissonance.813   
 During the apartheid era there were two breeds of legislation passed by NP 
leaders: petty apartheid and grand apartheid. Petty apartheid referred to the laws 
covering segregation of everyday life, including laws separating public facilities.814 
Grand apartheid, on the other hand, referred to the ideologically driven laws that 
created the framework of the system for over 40 years. Arguably, grand apartheid 
was built around four key pieces of legislation: the Population Registration Act 
(1950), which classified all South Africans as either White, Coloured, Asian or 
Black, 815 the Group Areas Act (1950), which created racially segregated zones 
where members of “one specific race alone could live and work”,816 and the 
Immorality Amendment Act (1950), which outlawed sexual relations between 
Whites and non-Whites.817 A fourth law, the Bantu Education Act (1953), had 
possibly the most destructive and long lasting impact on the African population 
beyond the time limits of apartheid. The 1953 law “…barred Africans from 
acquiring skills or knowledge that could not be used in the native reserves or in the 
service of the Whites in White areas.”818 Subsequent apartheid laws were passed, 
162 in total, however these three laws formed the foundation of the apartheid state. 
 Apartheid went through three distinct phases before ending in 1994.819 
Considered the “classical” period of White supremacy in South Africa, the first 
phase of apartheid (1948-1959) was focused on the construction of the system 
through legislation.820 The second phase, from 1960 and the declaration of South 
Africa as a republic through to the early 1970s, was considered the pinnacle of 
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apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism, and, at the same time, the resistance to it 
shifted from non-violent to violent measures.821 The final period saw the beginning 
of the end of the apartheid system, with implementation and failure of the “total 
strategy”, which “argued for the mobilization of all available resources…to defend 
and advance the interests of the apartheid state, both internally and regionally.”822 
During this time, rights were eventually granted to Indians and Coloureds in the 
hope that these groups could be co-opted to support White interests.823 The end of 
this period was marked by secret and then public negotiations with the ANC, the 
release of Mandela and a period of significant civil unrest once the transition 
towards democracy had begun.  
 African resistance, particularly through the ANC, also experienced several 
somewhat distinct phases of development. The first, from the development of the 
ANCYL in 1944 to the end of the Defiance campaign in 1952, was dominated by 
theories of non-violence and legal resistance to the growing apartheid system. In 
1949, members of the Youth League presented the Programme of Action, urging 
the use of mass mobilization techniques including boycotts, strikes, and civil 
disobedience in their fight against the apartheid regime.824 The Programme of 
Action eventually became the Defiance Campaign. For six months members of the 
ANC broke many of the rules of petty apartheid, using public services designated 
as “Whites only”, refusing to carry passbooks and employing other methods of civil 
disobedience.825 The government responded by reducing the capacity of Africans 
to meet and with widespread arrests. By the time the campaign wound down after 
instances of mob violence, 8,326 people had been arrested and convicted of an 
offence.826 The government passed the Public Safety Bill (1953), which expanded 
its powers to declare a state of emergency, and the Crime Law Amendment Bill 
(1953), which increased the punishment for breaches of the peace or incitement to 
violence.827  
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The principal development of the second phase of resistance to apartheid 
(1953 to 1960) was the signing of the Freedom Charter in 1955 by the Congress of 
the People.828 The charter was controversial both within the organisations that 
signed it, and to the government that viewed the document as a direct threat to the 
goals of the apartheid state.829 However, it marked a key moment of clarity and 
cooperation for the anti-apartheid movement, before the Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC) formed in the late 1950s, and the complete banning of the ANC in 1960.830  
The third phase of resistance began with the banning of the ANC and PAC 
following the massacre at Sharpeville on the 21 March 1960.831 The incident was 
significant for two reasons. First, it focused international attention on South 
Africa’s race laws, giving momentum to the global anti-apartheid movement that 
would last until 1994. Second, it sparked a level of anger in the African population 
that had rarely been seen by the apartheid government.832 Though banned, the ANC 
established the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, or MK) in 1961. Led by 
Mandela and others, the underground MK was a militant organization that carried 
out hundreds of acts of sabotage on government infrastructure and installations. 
Eventually, the government captured and put on trial the key leaders of MK, and in 
1964 eight of the ten were given life sentences for terrorist activities.833 Regardless, 
MK continued its acts of sabotage. The ANC moved many leaders overseas, with 
prominent political émigrés based in London and Dar es Salam.834  
The final distinct phase of resistance (1976 – 1994) began with the student 
uprisings in Soweto in 1976 and was marked by rolling states of emergency as 
townships across the country became increasingly unstable.835 As one journalist 
commented at the time, the young Black population were not as scared of the police 
as their parents had been, forcing the apartheid security apparatus to change how it 
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responded to the increasing challenges to the status quo.836 However, by 
implementing the “total strategy” and engaging with the students on a war footing, 
the apartheid government failed to recognize that it was losing. Images of young 
children shot in the back, the arrests of 10 year olds and the townships in flames 
challenged the legitimacy of the regime, both internationally and domestically. In 
1978 NP leader P.W Botha described apartheid as “a recipe for permanent 
conflict.”837 He was not wrong. Periodic violence in the townships coincided with 
almost crippling industrial strikes and the formation of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), a distinctly socialist organization that pulled support from all races and 
classes, and rejected completely the institutional structures of apartheid.838 
Alternative structures of governance, including informal committees, developed, 
layered on top of spreading mob violence, and the government militarization of the 
crises.  
 
4.4. The Violence of Apartheid 
 Due to the very nature of apartheid, state-sponsored violence in South 
Africa permeated through every aspect of the lives of non-Whites. The legislative 
means by which the minority White government maintained control were violent in 
of themselves. Forced classification, segregation and relocation were all methods 
of implementation of apartheid. This sort of violence destroyed the family and 
cultural structures, creating a series of social issues that persist to this day.839 
However, the security apparatus that developed to defend White interests were 
perpetrators of significant CAH in the traditional sense; both domestically and 
across regional borders.840  
Early state-sponsored violence was limited to detention and torture by 
security police.841 The emergence of secret counter-insurgency units in the late 
early 1960s led to an increasing number of abductions and killings as government 
forces focused on shutting down the armed wings of the ANC and PAC (MK and 
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Poqo respectively). Deaths in captivity were often listed as suicides or accidents, 
despite clear evidence to the contrary.842 The establishment of the Bureau of State 
Security (BOSS) in 1968, attached to the Department of the Prime Minister, created 
a super security structure that included security and military police.843 Despite 
opposition in parliament and in the liberal press, BOSS went on to have a significant 
role in the defence of apartheid, moving the security-related structures from the 
fringes of the state to its very centre.844 
The security apparatus in South Africa viewed itself as at war against anti-
apartheid forces. The death of Steve Bantu Biko, a leader within the PAC 
movement, on 12 September 1977, illustrated the brutality of the repression. Biko 
sustained significant head injuries during an interrogation in Port Elizabeth. The 
police then placed him naked in the back of a police ute and transported him 941 
kilometres to Pretoria, where he subsequently died. After first implying that Biko 
had died from a hunger strike, security forces then claimed that the activist had 
become violent during an interrogation and sustained the injuries after hitting his 
head against the wall.845  As described by the TRC report: 
The security forces used both overt and clandestine methods to suppress resistance 
and counter armed actions by opponents of apartheid. Overt methods included 
bannings and banishment, detention without trial, judicial executions and public 
order policing. More clandestine and covert forms of control included torture, 
extra-judicial killings and support for surrogate forces.846 
 
South African regional counter-insurgency efforts included military action 
in Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola. The South African Defence 
Force (SADF) was tasked with hunting down MK, Poqo and other guerrilla training 
camps.847 The violence committed by South African soldiers in pursuit of enemies 
of the state was brutal. According to testimony given to the TRC, while hunting the 
South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Angola and South West 
Africa (now Namibia) the SADF forces abandoned all pretence of following the 
Geneva Conventions. 
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The Security Forces stop at nothing to force information out of people. They break 
into homes, beat up residents, shoot people, steal and kill cattle and often pillage 
stores and tearooms. When the tracks of SWAPO guerrillas are discovered by the 
Security Forces, the local people are in danger. Harsh measures are intensified. 
People are blindfolded, taken from their homes and left beaten up and even dead 
by the roadside. Women are often raped  ...There is no redress because reporting 
irregularities or atrocities to commanders is considered a dangerous or fruitless 
exercise.848 
 
According to evidence given to the TRC, members of the cross-border counter-
insurgency units were encouraged to kill opponents rather than keep detainees.849  
  There is no way to enumerate exactly the number of people killed or 
tortured by the apartheid regime. However, while the strength of the security 
apparatus fluctuated, the evidence presented to the TRC proves that violence was a 
key characteristic of the apartheid state from 1960 through to the 1994 democratic 
elections. 
 
4.5 Perceptions of the Authoritarian Regime 
 As the nature and consequences of apartheid became clear, the discourse 
around the system became increasingly bi-modal. Proponents touted apartheid as 
the only logical institutional structure for South Africa. The South African Bureau 
of Race Relations “…argued that apartheid was the only possible way to guarantee 
peace and safety for both Blacks and Whites.”850 While publicly positioning the 
White population as protectors of the “inferior” Black communities, privately, the 
political elites acknowledged that apartheid was the only way to maintain control. 
During correspondence with his predecessor, JG Strijdom wrote “…by allowing 
urbanization and education of Black people they would ‘necessarily’ become more 
‘civilised’, which would make the colour bar impossible to impose and lead to 
equality.”851 Just prior to becoming prime minister in 1954, Strijdom seemed to 
acknowledge that there was no superiority between the races, but rather that 
apartheid was about power structures. He admitted  
that the White man would not be able to maintain his superiority by merit alone 
and owed his dominant position to the fact that he had the vote. It was part of the 
essence of apartheid, therefore, that the Bantu [African populations] should never 
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have the vote in White areas, but greater rights in their own reserves under White 
supervision.852 
 
Throughout the apartheid period race was invoked to reinforce hierarchy.853 
The NP were able to maintain broad spectrum support by presenting apartheid as 
the solution that would allow Whites to survive as distinct communities while also 
technically permitting non-White peoples to govern themselves in separate 
locations.854 By and large, the White community accepted the government’s 
justifications for apartheid. Exceptions to this White support were found in the 
South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD) and the Liberal Party (LP). The 
SACOD partnered with the ANC and the SAIC in their extra-parliamentary efforts 
to gain full and immediate equality.  The LP, on the other hand, sought the gradual 
evolution of the South African democracy to allow for a non-racial meritocracy.855 
The communist party, with membership open to all, was a third source of multi-
racial opposition, with party leaders supporting ANC efforts. White opposition was 
generally viewed as treasonous, with the government actively pursuing White anti-
apartheid activists.856  
 Opposition groups, both domestically and in exile, described the apartheid 
regime as fundamentally evil. Anti-apartheid leaders such as Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, were confident that the inherent moral judgment against the system would, 
eventually, cause the regime to fall. According to Tutu 
[he] never doubted that apartheid - because it was of itself fundamentally, 
intrinsically evil - was going to bite the dust eventually… It wasn't a question of 
'if', it was just that one wondered about the 'when', because this is essentially a 
moral universe. And it's part of the make-up, the structure of this universe, that evil 
will not ultimately prevail.857 
   
 Psychologist Peter Lambley, living in exile after fleeing South Africa in 
1978, described apartheid as essentially a “psychological phenomenon” and South 
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Africa as a “mentally deranged society.”858 This derangement, caused in part by the 
paradox of a system that was both extremely powerful economically and extremely 
vulnerable due to its dependence on black labour, made it susceptible to the internal 
and external pressures of protest.859  
 After the volatility of the transition, support for apartheid remained. During 
a 2012 interview, F.W de Klerk, the last president of the apartheid regime, refused 
to repudiate the system on moral grounds. He argued that no apology was needed 
for the original goal “of seeking to bring justice to all South Africans through the 
concept of nation states”.860 Apartheid failed in South Africa, according to de Klerk, 
“because the Whites wanted to keep too much land for themselves. It failed because 
we (Whites and blacks) became economically integrated, and it failed because the 
majority of blacks said that is not how [they] want [their] rights.”861 He argued that 
the ideology of the system, however, was not a problem.  
 The tension between opponents of apartheid and those who supported the 
regime has persisted. Race continues to be an issue. However, a recent survey found 
that the debate over race is considered less important than those around 
unemployment, crime and poor service delivery, and the failures of democracy to 
provide economic stability.862  
 
4.5 Amnesty in South Africa 
Amnesty for the crimes committed during the apartheid regime began in all 
but name with the Indemnity Act of 1961.863 Passed to protect police officials from 
being held accountable for the Sharpeville massacre the previous year, the 
indemnity acts granted a sweeping indemnification for government officials and 
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agents of the state.864 A second law granting indemnity for officers of the 
government was passed in 1977, while amendments made in 1977 and 1980 to the 
Defence Act (1957) granted blanket indemnity to the SADF, significantly limiting 
any repercussions for violence committed by agents of the state.865 As pointed out 
by Howard Varney, Senior Programme Advisor of the International Centre of 
Transitional Justice, “these types of crimes would not have been committed had 
those who committed them not believed that they would be given immunity.”866 In 
1990 and then again in 1992, de Klerk passed further Indemnity Acts, essentially 
creating “an ad hoc equivalent of a blanket amnesty for apartheid’s loyalists.”867  
 Adam Sitze, a legal researcher and academic, argued in The Impossible 
Machine that the prior indemnity acts were closer to the blanket amnesties of Latin 
America than many TRC advocates would like to admit.  
Indeed, one of the reasons that the TRC “itself” did not have to engage in a blanket 
amnesty is that a blanket indemnity was already in effect prior to the inaugural 
hearing of the TRC’s Amnesty Committee. It is perhaps even the case, in fact, that 
this categorical indemnity is one of the conditions that enabled the TRC itself to 
come into being in the first place: it is doubtful that, in the absence of a blanket 
indemnity, the SADF would have consented to any sort of political transition at 
all.868  
 
 The terms amnesty and indemnity were used interchangeably through much 
of the negotiations between 1990 and 1994. However, according to jurisprudence 
tradition, the goal of amnesty is to end conflict, while indemnity aims to cover state 
actions during legitimate governance.869 The NP sought to simply expand 
indemnity coverage, however the ANC and PAC delegates argued that this would 
open their side to litigation, as indemnity would position the violent acts committed 
by the opposition as “…nothing more than crimes, violations of an otherwise 
legitimate law, and not acts committed in the course of a just war against an 
essentially and thoroughly criminal and illegitimate occupation.”870  
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Eventually, South Africa’s process became defined by the term “amnesty”; 
a peace pact that allowed for the possibility of democratization. Amnesty in South 
Africa was built around the following post-amble of the 1993 Interim Constitution.  
In order to advance…reconciliation  and  reconstruction,  amnesty  shall  be  
granted in  respect  of  acts,  omissions  and offences  associated  with  political  
objectives  and committed  in  the  course of  the conflicts  of  the past.  To this 
end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm  cut-
off date, which shall  be a date  after  8  October  1990  and  before  6  December  
1993,  and  providing  for  the mechanisms,  criteria  and  procedures,  including  
tribunals,  if  any,  through  which such amnesty  shall  be dealt with  at any time 
after  the law has been passed. 
 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 1995 (PNR), 
signed after South Africa’s historic democratic elections in 1994, established the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the goal of investigating the 
human rights violations committed during the apartheid era, to grant amnesty to 
those who made full disclosures of any politically motivated crimes that they may 
have been involved in, and to consider reparations for the victims.871 While 
members of the NP sought a blanket amnesty to cover the 1960 – 1994 period, the 
ANC argued for the necessity of investigations into the gross violations of the 
apartheid regime. Prior to the transition, the military believed that they would 
receive full amnesty in return for not threatening the transition.872 Conditional, or 
particularized amnesty was the hard fought for compromise between the opposing 
groups. With the PNR, three committees were established, each addressing one of 
the legislated goals of the TRC.873  
 The TRC’s Amnesty Committee (AC) was set up to “facilitate and promote 
the granting of amnesty in respect of acts associated with political objectives by 
receiving from persons desiring to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts 
relations of such actions.”874 Those who received amnesty would be exempt from 
both criminal and civil action. Applicants had to meet specific conditions to be 
considered for amnesty; the crime being amnestied had to fall within the established 
time frame (though this was later extended to include the violence committed 
during the transition period), the violations had to have political objectives, the 
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applicant had to provide full disclosure of the violation, and the violation had to be 
proportional to the political objective.875  
 The amnesty provisions of the TRC were challenged in courts, most notably 
in Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa (1996).876 In a case that went straight to the Constitutional Court, 
the applicants argued that the amnesty provisions of the PNR directly contravened 
rights established by the interim constitution, in particular their rights as outlined 
in section 22 of the constitution that guaranteed “every person shall have the right 
to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial forum.”877 The court found that violations of rights were 
permissible if sanctioned by the constitution or justified in terms of certain sections 
of the constitution.878 The unanimous decision was that the post amble to the 
constitution that established the TRC process also allowed for the limitation on the 
right to access judicial processes. Judge Ismail Mahomed wrote that the amnesty 
law was key to the negotiated process, without which it was unlikely the apartheid 
regime would have relinquished power.879 The judgment established the argument 
that the greater good of the nation allowed for the limitation of some constitutional 
rights. From the first, the AC faced an avalanche of litigation, both macro as in the 
AZAPO case and smaller disputes over perceived bias, among other complaints.880 
While the political elites were committed to the amnesty law, each side was dogged 
in protecting their perceived interests in the process. 
 Of the 7116 applications submitted for amnesty, nearly two thirds were 
rejected for not meeting the above criteria. Many of the applicants claimed to be 
ANC or PAC operatives.881 There was little buy-in from the SADF into the whole 
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TRC process, and even less into the AC.882 Only 885 members of the security forces 
applied for amnesty, 80 per cent of whom applied for amnesty for gross human 
rights violations.883 Covered by earlier indemnity laws, there was no reason for 
ranking members of the armed forces to admit what they had done during the 
apartheid regime.884  There were even fewer applications from political elites, with 
notable exceptions such as Roelf Meyer and long-time Minister of Police Adriaan 
Volk. Political parties on all sides actively discouraged participation in the process, 
significantly reducing the number of applicants.885 De Klerk, for example, refused 
to apply for amnesty on the grounds that he had committed no crime, while Botha 
flat out refused to participate in any of the TRC processes.886 In the end, 1312 
applications were either partially or fully approved.  
 An important element of the amnesty process in South Africa was reliance 
on the criminal justice system to threaten prosecutions for those that did not apply 
for amnesty. As pointed out by Varney, 
Ironically successful conditional amnesty is based on successful prosecution. As 
we saw here, without credible prosecutions, few come forward. Without credible 
prosecutions, it demeans the whole process for victims. Perpetrators don’t come 
forward, and even if they do, the system failed – there are no consequences. 
Victims are justified in asking: “What was the point?”887 
 
Architects of the legislation hoped this carrot and stick approach would 
motivate individuals to apply for amnesty and do so truthfully, however, the two 
institutions came to stand in competition with each other, rather than cooperation.888 
The TRC process in general, and the amnesty process in particular, have 
been long vaunted as an ideal path for future transitional justice processes.889 
However, even as the PNR passed, there were some misgivings at the highest level 
of the new ANC government. Then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, had 
misgivings regarding what the TRC could achieve. “It’s the best balance that we 
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could achieve in the tension between justice and reconciliation. I do not think we 
should pretend that the [PNR] Act makes provision for complete justice.”890 
H1 sets forth the proposition that amnesty is agreed to in good faith. The 
fraught negotiation process that led to the PNR and the creation of the TRC, 
discussed further below, meant that the opposing views of amnesty were thoroughly 
debated. All sides ended up compromising to allow for the development of the TRC 
and the particularized amnesty process. The process was agreed to and put forward 
to the public in good faith. However, participation in the amnesty process by the 
very people who agreed to its conception was limited, indicating that, while still 
maintained and defended, particularized amnesty has been sacrificed for ad hoc 
blanket coverage.  
 
4.6 The Transition  
 4.6.1 Violence and Rebirth 
 Negotiations between government officials and members of the ANC began 
in the midst of South Africa’s worst state of emergency (1986 – 1988), and long 
before the wider public was aware of any change. With the “Trek to Lusaka”, White 
business leaders met with ANC leaders in exile.891 The tacit official support for this 
meeting in the Zambian capital and the 75 that followed892 showed that the higher 
echelons of the regime realized that the end of rigid apartheid was near. The first 
talks between Nelson Mandela and the then Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee took 
place in 1987.893 President P.W Botha disapproved of significant change, however 
he was aware of the undercurrents of transformation within his own party. 
According to Botha, “reform apartheid” would maintain White dominance while 
opening the door to a single South African citizenship, universal franchise and some 
restricted avenues of black participation in government.894 The limits of these 
changes were soon seen when black leaders and their Indian counterparts refused 
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to participate in the restricted institutions available to them until apartheid was 
dismantled all together.895  
 While Botha attempted to navigate the external demands of non-White 
South Africans and the internal pressures of conservative elements in Parliament, 
violent resistance within the townships increased. From the mid-1980s, the South 
African townships saw an “explosion of a highly re-politicized and angry 
society.”896 This palatable anger was expressed most clearly in a series of youth and 
student led uprisings that began in 1976 in Soweto and Sharpeville. The initial 
uprisings were quickly controlled, however they left a simmering tension that 
exploded in 1984 and were legitimized by the ANC in 1985 in its declaration of a 
“People’s War”.897 The ANC’s stated goal was to make South Africa ungovernable, 
forcing either a revolution or, at the very least, serious negotiations.898 ANC’s goals 
of disruption were aided by the development of new political groups, such as the 
increasingly militant UDF. By the mid-1980s members of the UDF, the ANC and 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were fighting each other, as well as the 
government. An estimated 20,500 people were killed during the “People’s War”, a 
period that began in 1984 and ended with the 1994 democratic election.899  
Against the backdrop of extreme violence and increasingly ineffective 
armed operations to quell the uprisings in the townships, Botha won the 1987 
elections. However, the NP won with its smallest victory since 1948.900 Pre-
negotiation talks took place between increasingly senior levels of government and 
the ANC, and in particular, with Mandela. The substance of these negotiations was 
wide ranging, including the question of how to adjust South Africa’s “violent 
equilibrium”.901 The track-two diplomatic efforts of the Dakar encounter in 1987 
and a conference in Lusaka in 1989 proved to be the most significant political 
gatherings during the early transition period.  
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De Klerk took over the leadership of the NP in August 1989. Considered a 
party conservative, de Klerk was also a pragmatist. His negotiations with the ANC 
reflected the total stalemate facing the country.902  “Neither side could defeat each 
other, but each could prevent the other from ruling alone.”903 On Feb 2 1990, de 
Klerk lifted the bans on the ANC, the SACP and the PAC, released some 
restrictions on the press and announced that he would release Mandela from 
prison.904 The release of Mandela on February 11, 1990 produced a watershed 
moment for the South African government. Long considered a dangerous terrorist, 
Mandela was now the NP’s negotiating partner for the future of South Africa.  
However, both sides had diametrically opposed proposals for the structure 
of South Africa’s new government. The NP sought to develop a “conscociational 
democracy”, a permanent power sharing arrangement that would afford the NP a 
veto of ANC policy, while the ANC sought a simple majority rule.905 It was only 
with the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) that negotiations 
moved forward. The popular narrative on both CODESA I and II (which took place 
in 1992) is that the multi-party talks failed to make any significant progress towards 
a democratic South Africa. However, the multi-party talks were “a first, and 
necessary, stab at negotiations.”906 The collapse of CODESA was followed by calls 
for mass action by the ANC and its ideological partners, which resulted in bursts of 
violence and accusations of a government-sponsored third force.907 Conflict 
between supporters of the ANC, the IFP, and the UDF, led to the most serious 
waves of violence, with several massacres in the mining sector hostels.908   
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The stalemate and the spreading violence prompted the ANC and NP 
negotiators to begin bi-lateral negotiations. On 26 September 1992 Mandela and de 
Klerk agreed to the Record of Understanding, which established the structure and 
role of the interim government. Once this milestone was reached, multi-party 
negotiations resumed. During the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) in 
1993, an interim constitution was developed, and the date for the 1994 election was 
set. On one of the last nights of the MPNP, the post amble was written and attached 
to the interim constitution, establishing the TRC and outlining the basic parameters 
of amnesty.909 In closing the MPNP, Mandela optimistically laid out the future of 
South Africa. 
We emerge from a conflict-ridden society; a society in which colour, class and 
ethnicity were manipulated to sow hatred and division. We emerge from a society 
which was structured on violence and which raised the spectre of a nation in danger 
of never being able to live at peace with itself.910 
 
Amidst violence, threats, jubilation and hope, South Africa held its first 
truly democratic election on the 27 April 1994. According to the Independent 
Electoral Commission and international observers, the election was free and fair, 
with 19,726,579 votes cast out of an eligible electorate of 21.7 million.911 
Archbishop Tutu described the election result, and the surprising lack of violence 
on that election-day, as nothing short of a miracle.  
It was as if someone had a massive magic wand and they had waved it over us, and 
in the twinkling of an eye, that we had all undergone a strange metamorphosis. To 
have a White man who had been boss for so long, standing with a black worker 
and chatting as if they'd just suddenly discovered this major, major, major scientific 
discovery, you know, these people are human! And they were talking about the 
kinds of things that you would be chatting about - the weather and then talking 
about children, and I think discovering that they had much the same kinds of 
aspirations, you want a decent job, you want a good home, you want your children 
to be able to have a good education. So most commentators would say, even those 
who would claim to be very secularised, find that they have to use the strange 
language of religion: that it was a miracle.912 
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 4.6.2 Justice in transition: The TRC  
 The inauguration of Nelson Mandela on May 10, 1994 marked a significant 
shift in the direction of the South African state. However, debates around key 
issues, including the question of justice, continued. The TRC was made up of three 
committees to address the stipulations of the PNR, discussed above. The Human 
Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) was tasked with investigating the abuses of 
the apartheid regime. The goal of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee was 
to restore the dignity of victims and make recommendations for reparations. As 
victims were prohibited from pursuing civil cases, the recommendations made by 
the Reparations Committee represented the only way victims would receive 
compensation. Finally, the AC, as discussed above, was tasked with hearing and 
considering amnesty applications.913 Each committee worked independently, with 
a final report to be presented to President Mandela at a specified time.914 The 
president chose Archbishop Tutu to lead the TRC. In justifying the structure of the 
TRC, Minister Omar argued that a traditional amnesty law would ignore the rights 
and needs of victims.  
We recognised that we could not forgive perpetrators unless we attempt also to 
restore the honour and dignity of the victims and give effect to reparation…The 
question of amnesty must be located in a broader context and the wounds of our 
people must be recognised. I do not distinguish between ANC wounds, PAC 
wounds and other wounds - many people are in need of healing, and we need to 
heal our country if we are to build a nation which will guarantee peace and stability. 
 
The TRC was both a direct response to the outcomes of Latin American 
transitional justice processes and a significant departure from them.915 Unlike Chile, 
the commission’s processes were to be public, not just the final report. Victims were 
to be central to the process, with a focus on restorative rather than punitive 
practices. Formal hearings of the TRC began on 15 of April 1996. Tutu set the 
process in motion by telling the crowds in East London that  
We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past; to lay the ghosts of that 
past so that they will not return to haunt us. And that we will thereby contribute to 
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the healing of a traumatised and wounded people – for all of us in South Africa are 
wounded people – and in this manner promote national unity and reconciliation.916 
 
Tutu argued that the TRC process rested on the idea of Ubuntu: recognizing 
the humanity in everyone, including our enemies.917 During a personal interview 
Pieter G. J. Meiring, one of the TRC commissioners, argued that, despite criticisms 
the TRC was justice, not retributive but restorative justice. We were looking 
for a way to heal. Reconciliation is a process, not just an event. The South 
African TRC was not an ideal solution. It was a compromised between the 
needs of the victims and the fears of the perpetrators. [However] it was by 
no means a perfect commission. That we should be there for the victims was 
utmost on our minds, to make the process easier to try and achieve some 
healing, We viewed the truth as a pathway to healing.918 
 
The approach of the HRVC in particular, with its focus on restoration 
through storytelling and the validation of individual experiences of people who had 
been victimised and silenced by apartheid drew both praise and significant criticism 
from groups and individuals.919 The AZAPO case, discussed above, challenged the 
constitutionality of amnesty, and by extension, the TRC process as a whole. Others 
objected to the religious nature of the process,920 while some victims argued that 
forgiveness was a personal act and impossible for the government to mandate.921 
Some argued that the expectation of reconciliation was oppressive in of itself.922 
Marius Schoon, whose wife and daughter were killed by a letter bomb sent by the 
South African Police, argued against enforced forgiveness. Coinciding with the 
launch of the TRC, Schoon wrote to a number of newspapers. “Tutu has no right to 
use his position of power to call for victims to forgive. I am a victim of heinous 
abuse. There is no feeling of forgiveness in my heart.”923  
 The impact of the TRC as an act of restorative justice is undeniable. The 
TRC received testimony from approximately 21,000 victims; 2000 were heard at 
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public hearings.924 It provided a venue for discussion of the past and a forum for 
the dissemination of information regarding the gross human rights violations of the 
past. It established a narrative for future generations, fulfilling some of the 
requirements of traditional transitional justice paradigms.925 During a personal 
interview, Professor Francois Venter, who was involved in the negotiation process 
as a legal advisor, and who also contributed to writing the Interim Constitution 
(1993) argued that the structure of TRC was designed to foster social cohesion. 
The whole process was one that can’t be explained in legal terms. It was an extra 
legal process. With Tutu in control, it couldn’t be a legal process. It was more 
emotional. He sometimes cried, showed compassion. It was run as almost a social 
catharsis. The AZAPO judgement carried that forward.926  
 
However, dissatisfaction emerged early. Victims faced emotionally intense 
hearings that, while possibly cathartic, had little tangible impact on the day-to-day 
inequalities that remained.927 Additionally, South Africa’s White population felt 
targeted by the implicit blame that emerged from the TRC. In writing that South 
Africa needed a mutually agreed history to work from before progress could be 
made, former apartheid era civil servant Dave Steward argued that 
The TRC also stamped Whites with an almost indelible mark of guilt and created 
the perception of moral inferiority. Even loyal White ANC supporters like Carl 
Niehaus have said that they will accept that their grandchildren will have to go to 
the end of the queue in South Africa. 
The assumption of blanket White historical guilt and the unwillingness of most 
Whites to acknowledge it is the wedge that continues to create a chasm between 
us. It explains why Archbishop Tutu still feels so strongly that Whites have not 
given proper recognition to the generosity of blacks for “not wanting to knock their 
blocks off.” 
Characterising racial groups with negative moral labels is a very dangerous 
business. When married to self-interest or the search for scapegoats, it can be a 
recipe for dehumanisation and catastrophe…928  
 
Major parties, including the ANC and NP, rejected elements of the final 
report, with many in the opposition arguing that there was a false moral equivalency 
created by treating crimes committed by the ANC during its resistance as the same 
as those committed by the apartheid regime.929 Fears of bias, regularly expressed 
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during the process were minimized by the fact that, at one time or another, all 
political sides were antagonistic to the TRC.930  
Complicating the legacy of the TRC is the uneven efforts of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to prosecute apartheid era operatives. The authority 
has pursued only a handful of the cases forwarded to them by the TRC, despite the 
presence of evidence and testimony.931 The most iconic prosecution was that of 
Eugene de Kock, head of the infamous Vlakplaas unit, for six murders that were 
found to have no direct political motive.932 The overall reluctance by the criminal 
justice system to pursue the retributive requirements of the TRC process has been 
blamed, in part, on the unwillingness of the ANC government to open itself up to 
prosecutions in light of their very limited participation in the AC.933  
For a number of reasons, the recommendations made by the TRC have 
largely been ignored, and sometimes directly circumvented. In 2003 Thabo Mbeki, 
Mandela’s successor as President and head of the ANC, granted amnesty to 33 ANC 
and PAC convicts that had been denied amnesty through the TRC process.934 
President Jacob Zuma has considered doing the same. Financial reparations have 
been slow coming, with only piecemeal efforts made by the South African 
government to fulfil this component of the transition process, despite the TRC 
recommending that R3 billion be put aside for victims. The slow action on 
reparations has been in stark contrast with the relatively instant amnesty offered to 
those who applied, and the ad hoc general amnesty that has since emerged by the 
NPA’s lack of action.   
 Using Arthur’s basic indicators of transitional justice, the South African 
process can be assessed as being partially complete.   
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Table 4.1: Transitional Justice Process in South Africa 
Justice Traditional mechanisms of justice, such as criminal or 
civil litigation, largely unavailable to victims due to the 
legal parameters of the PNR. Some victims have 
pursued legal recourse, arguing that the perpetrators 
failed to meet the requirements of the TRC. This has 
found limited success, with an ad hoc blanket amnesty 
emerging despite obligations of legislation.  
 
Reparations Recommended by the TRC. Limited payments 
received, significantly less than recommended. 
   
Truth  Comprehensive truth commission with a focus on the 
experiences of victims during the apartheid regime. 
 
Institutional Reform Widespread institutional and legal reform dismantling 
the apartheid system. Economic inequalities, as a result 
of decades of poor investment in non-White 
communities remain. 
 
H0 presents the argument that amnesty legislation is compatible with 
expectations and norms of an entrenched liberal democracy. Initially, South 
Africa’s use of particularized amnesty was seen as a solution catering to some of 
the concerns of blanket amnesty, while still allowing for the democratization 
process. Phillip Dexter, former ANC cadre argues “that for a moment, South Africa 
had something profound but it has got lost along the way.”935 A number of issues 
have arisen from the TRC process, bringing into question both the long-term impact 
of the use of amnesty law and the culture of impunity that has been maintained. 
Some of these issues are tied to the failure of the government to follow key 
expectations of the TRC. Other issues are tied to the nature of the apartheid, and 
the failure of the TRC to tackle the depth of the apartheid structure in South Africa. 
South Africa differs from Brazil and Chile, in that the replaced regime (apartheid) 
was long standing and all encompassing. By focusing its work at the individual 
level, i.e. the perpetrator and victim, the TRC failed to address the systematic 
oppression of apartheid, and the lasting devastating impact this has had on the 
country and its institutional structure.  
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 4.6.3 Opposing views of the Transitional Justice Process 
The post-transitional justice period has revealed a complicated political and 
public relationship with the TRC and transitional justice process as a whole. While 
Mandela supported the process, subsequent leaders of the ANC have been less 
enthusiastic. There were a number of criticisms, although the primary issue rested 
on the Commission’s decision to treat the violence of the opposition as the same as 
that committed by the apartheid regime.936 Successive ANC governments have 
resisted addressing the recommendations of the TRC regarding reparations, a 
wealth-tax to address the persistent economic inequality and the prosecution of 
those who refused to participate in the amnesty process.  
The White population has, as Steward argued, emerged from the transitional 
justice process with the sense of being morally judged for legitimizing the system 
of apartheid.937 The resentment at being held accountable for the systematic 
violence of the apartheid regime has created the chasm Steward warned against, 
with a palpable sense of self-pity evident amongst the conservative Afrikaner 
community.938 After fifty some years as the arbitrator of the apartheid system, the 
NP has had to at once negotiate its history while at the same time navigating a 
political presence. In discussing the persistent fears that the commission was biased 
against the White population, de Klerk has argued that he should have handled the 
TRC process differently, with a greater insistence on a model closer to that used in 
Chile, distinguished by being conducted behind closed doors and with an emphasis 
on the victims over naming perpetrators.939 
The broader public perception of the TRC and its legacy has shifted. In 1998 
opinion on the TRC indicated a general lack of support for the process, with an 
Afrobarometer survey finding that two thirds of those surveyed believed that race 
relations were worse off.940 By 2000, public perception of the process was markedly 
different, with two thirds viewing the TRC as integral to race relations in South 
Africa. However, by 2003, three-quarters of respondents argued that it was time to 
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move on.941  Surveys have now begun to include members of South African society 
who were born after the end of apartheid (called born-frees). Their concerns have 
expanded beyond demands for justice, with unemployment and economic hardship 
dominating. However, many of these concerns have roots in the systematic 
inequalities of the apartheid regime that remained despite the transition, and 
therefore are related to the justice process, even if not directly connected to the 
TRC.942 According to Meiring,  
The attention of the people has shifted [from justice for apartheid era crimes]. We 
live in a totally unjust country. There is an inability of police to deal with crime. 
Another cry that is developing is for justice in our structures. The ANC have been 
in power for 18 years and little has changed. The feeling is that there is no justice 
in the system, especially in education. The feeling is that the state is run really 
badly. The strange thing is that people still vote for the ANC.943 
 
4.7 Justice and Democracy in the long run: Can amnesty and democracy 
coexist? 
4.7.1 The current state of democracy 
 Democracy in South Africa is in crisis.944 What the Economist labelled a 
“hollow state”945 has also become a violent and unstable one. There is a growing 
frustration amongst the public over government failures, corruption and persistent 
cronyism.946 Over the last decade, protesters have become more militant and 
violent, targeting foreigners as scapegoats for the current state of affairs.947 The 
police, in response, have become increasingly oppressive, returning to 
organizational norms more akin to those of the apartheid era than the early 
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democratic one.948 Under the leadership of Mbeki and then Zuma the ANC has 
eroded the lines between the ruling party and the government itself, calling into 
question the health of the democratic institutions.949 Of particular concern is the 
sway Zuma has had on supposedly independent organisations such as the NPA. In 
2009 Zuma faced 783 charges of fraud, racketeering and corruption relating to a 
major government arms deal in the late 1990s.950 The NPA decided to drop all 
charges just weeks prior to voting, allowing for his election. The President is now 
facing a potentially negative decision from the country’s Supreme Court of 
Appeal.951 While in office, Zuma used $USD23 million of state funds to refurbish 
his private residence. The president was forced to repay $USD600 000 of this, 
although questions have been raised regarding where this payment came from.952 
Immediately prior to his presidency, Zuma also faced accusations of rape but was 
acquitted of charges in May 2006.953 
 In November 2016, a report on the capture of the South African state by 
private interests was released.  Produced by public protector Thuli Madonsela, the 
report investigated the role a wealthy immigrant family, the Guptas, had in 
influencing decisions at the highest level of government.954 The Guptas are close 
personal friends of Zuma, with the report showing a number of lines of political and 
economic contact between the president, his family and the businessmen.955 
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 Despite the visible controversy surrounding the ANC, the party has 
maintained majority support since 1994. However, in the 2014 elections, the first 
in which born-frees were able to participate, the ANC won 62 percent of the vote, 
its lowest national result since 1994.956 The local elections of 2016 reflected the 
deepening crisis over service delivery and government responsiveness, with ANC 
holding only 54 per cent of the vote which is the first time the party had dropped 
below 60 per cent since the end of apartheid.957 An Ipsos South Africa survey found 
that an increasing number of South Africans felt that the country was going in the 
wrong direction, while 57 per cent believed that the ANC had lost their moral 
compass.958 Survey data from 2015 found that “majority of citizens would be 
willing to give up elections in favour of a non-elected government that would 
provide basic services.”959 
 The drop-in support for democracy has not been helped by an ever-widening 
gap of inequality. South Africa has consistently had a Gini-coefficient of 66.00 to 
69.6, with limited prospect of positive change.960 Unemployment in South Africa 
has risen above 27 per cent, or five million, with 3.5 million under the age of 35.961 
The rise of the Economic Freedom Fighters, a left wing political party taking their 
cues from the policies of the likes of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez reflects the growing 
dissatisfaction with the current economic direction.  
																																																						
956 ‘2014 National and Provincial Elections: National Results’, Electoral Commisson of South 
Africa <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Results/2014-National-and-Provincial-
Elections--National-results/> [accessed 13 March 2017]. 
957 Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘South Africa’s Latest Elections Show Mandela’s Legacy Can’t Protect the 
ANC from Its Own Incompetence’, Quartz, 2016 <https://qz.com/751858/south-africa-latest-
elections-show-mandelas-legacy-cant-protect-the-anc-from-its-own-incompetence-any-more/> 
[accessed 13 March 2017]. 
958 Ipsos, ‘Ipsos South Africa - Election Outlook_Poll of Polls’, Ipsos South Africa, 2016 
<http://www.ipsos.co.za/SitePages/Election%20Outlook_Poll%20of%20polls.aspx> [accessed 13 
March 2017]. 
959 Rorisang Lekalake, ‘AD71: Support for Democracy in South Africa Declines amid Rising 
Discontent with Implementation’, Afrobarometer, 2016 
<http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad71-south-africa-perceptions-of-democracy> [accessed 13 
March 2017]. 
960 World Bank, ‘GINI Index | Data | Table’ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> 
[accessed 24 May 2014]; Haroon Bhorat, ‘Is South Africa the Most Unequal Society in the 
World?’, Mail and Guardian (Cape Town, South Africa, 30 September 2015), Online edition 
<https://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-30-is-south-africa-the-most-unequal-society-in-the-world/> 
[accessed 13 March 2017]. 
961 Nomsa Maseko, ‘South Africa’s Unemployment Crisis: Begging for Jobs’, BBC News, 25 May 
2016, section Africa <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36367703> [accessed 13 March 
2017]. 
	 205	
 According to Kgokong, the voting public in South Africa is still swayed by 
loyalty to the ANC resistance. However, he believes that it will change.  
We are convinced people won’t follow manifestos, they follow sentiments. It will 
change. Unemployment is bad, people are struggling… Ways and means have to 
be sought to bring equality to our nation. There is a huge gap. There is an opulence 
on one side and abject poverty on the other side. Its not just White anymore. We 
want to improve life of our South Africans. We’re not saying South Africans 
should be rich but people ought to live decently regardless of colour.962 
 
 Unemployment, poor service delivery, impunity for the rampant corruption, 
increasing inequality and a fundamental leadership deficit have all contributed to 
the volatile state of affairs in South Africa. Over the last decade there have been 
waves of xenophobic attacks, leading to the death or harassment of tens of 
thousands of foreigners.963  
 
Table 4.2: Quality of Democracy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: An Analysis 
Dimension South Africa Commentary 
Law Broad liberal legal structure 
in place, based on the 1997 
Constitution.  
Prosecutorial independence 
undermined by scandals 
involving the President and the 
NPA. President has ignored 
orders issued by the courts, 
undermining the judiciary. Rise 
in police violence, including 
torture while in detention, and 
heavy-handed responses to 
protest action.  
 
Accountability Traditional democratic 
accountability present, 
however undermined by 
corruption.  
 
Elections deemed free and fair, 
though partisan violence present 
in recent election cycles. Uneven 
response by government to 
unfavourable court decisions. 
  
Participation Universal franchise Fairly high participation rates, 
with 77 per cent of the voting 
age population registered to 
vote, and 73 per cent of 
registered voters making it to the 
voting booth. 
 
Competition Widespread competition. Despite fears of South Africa 
becoming a one-party state, 
opposition parties have been 
fairly robust, with active 
challenges to ANC dominance 
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in certain regions. Some 
concerns expressed over tribal 
allegiance to the dominant party, 
with limits on individual voting 
choices in rural areas.  
 
Freedoms Constitutionally established 
rights widespread 
Personal freedom relatively 
widespread, including religious 
freedom and economic freedom. 
Press freedom listed by Freedom 
House as ‘partly free’ and is 
facing increasing government 
restrictions, including the use of 
the apartheid-era National Key 
Points Act to restrict reporting 
on locations deemed to have 
national security importance, 
including Zuma’s controversial 
Nkandla residence. 
 
Equality Procedural democratic 
equality, including gender 
equality. Significant 
economic disparities 
maintained between races, 
despite the dismantling of 
the apartheid institutional 
sector.  
Gini Index of 69 (2009), 
indicating a highly unequal 
society (0 is perfectly equal, 100 
is perfectly unequal). 21.7 per 
cent of the population live in 
extreme poverty, while 39 per 
cent live in relative poverty.  
 
Responsiveness Limited government 
responsiveness, hampered 
by corruption and ineptitude. 
Frequent, and often violent 
protests over basic service 
delivery, corruption, and the 
redirection of resources and 
alignment of government 
prerogatives. 
 
 
Democracy in South Africa has suffered for a number of reasons, not least 
of all the leadership deficit that has developed within the ANC and the failure of 
opposition parties to effectively challenge the dominant party. While claims that 
South Africa had become a one-party state are premature, there is little doubt that 
the ANC dominates the country’s political discourse, to the detriment of democracy 
overall.964 The claims of state capture, increasingly widespread protests, significant 
economic inequality, persistent violence and overall lack of security all undermine 
democratic quality, leaving South Africa in a precarious position and, at best, a 
semi-democracy.  
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4.7.2 Justice for Human Rights Violations in South Africa 
The discussion on justice for HRVs in South Africa inevitably needs to be 
divided into two separate discourses.  The first is the continuing debate around 
justice for apartheid-era crimes, both punitive and in the form of reparations. The 
second discourse pivots on the pervasive impunity for crimes committed by agents 
of the state in the post-apartheid era. The two are inextricably linked, with 
researchers from the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) arguing that 
“the failure by the [NPA] to prosecute apartheid-era perpetrators of rights violations 
following the [TRC] set a particular benchmark that left victims frustrated and, 
more importantly, a prosecutorial approach tolerant of rights violations.”965 
Victims’ organisations, along with other groups from within civil society, 
have continued to battle the South African government and the NPA over 
prosecutions for those who abstained from the amnesty process.966 The Khulumani 
Support Group has developed into one of the primary victims’ lobbying 
organisations, influencing both policy and jurisprudence.967  In her book, Bodies of 
Truth Rita Kesselring describes victim-government interactions during the post-
apartheid period as distinctively legal. 
In other words, although South Africa is still widely known for choosing a 
reconciliatory path to deal with past atrocities, apartheid matters took a judicial 
turn post TRC. Despite the TRC’s explicitly non-retributive approach, South 
African citizens have pursued questions of victimhood and truth through legal 
avenues.968 
 
 While Khulumani has spearheaded several legal challenges to the TRC 
process, it has also called on the government to increase the reparations paid out to 
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victims as well as questioned the use of the TRC “closed list” as the guide for 
reparation payments.969 The efficacy of these efforts is limited, at least in a purely 
legal sense. The 2016 trial of four apartheid era guards in the death of MK operative 
Nokuthula Simelane was the first of its kind in over a decade. According to several 
affidavits, the family had to approach the high court before the head public 
prosecutor would deliver the indictment to the four accused.970 Lawyers acting on 
behalf of the victim’s family have subsequently petitioned the government to pay 
the legal fees of the accused so that the trail could go forward.971  
 HRVs continue to be committed by agents of the state, albeit on a much 
smaller scale. In the best light possible, it can be argued that, faced with high crime 
rates and limited resources, the South African Police Service (SAPS) have reverted 
to authoritarian style policing.972 However, it could also be argued that those 
impulses never left. Senior apartheid-era police officers of what was then the South 
African Police (SAP) were guaranteed job security as part of the negotiation 
process. SAPS also became a “dumping ground of unwanted men with guns”,973 as 
well as the thousands of kitskonstabels (instant constables) who were given 
township policing jobs in the final days of the apartheid with little training or 
support.974 Violent action committed by police has been an ongoing issue975 and 
successful prosecutions are rare. According to Professor Peter Jordi, from the Wits 
Law Clinic, “Torture was carried out at local police stations before and it continued 
today. The police torture people all the time, in their homes, in police cells, in cars 
– torture is standard police investigation practice. The policemen are serial 
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criminals.”976 One unintended legacy of the apartheid era amnesty “is that it created 
a high threshold of tolerance for human rights violations. What should have been a 
hallmark for justice for apartheid-era victims, became the benchmark for 
impunity.”977 
  
Table 4.3: Quality of Transitional Justice in Contemporary South Africa  
Characteristic South Africa Commentary 
Fairness Very limited Amnesty legislation 
fulfilled as decided during 
the negotiations. 
Particularized amnesty has 
become an ad hoc blanket 
amnesty. Limited 
opportunity for victims to 
seek redress.  
 
Equality of Application Poor Limits on amnesty have 
been inconstant, including 
time limits, amnesty for 
previously denied 
applicants and prosecution 
of those who refused to 
participate in the amnesty 
process. 
 
Law Legal Particularized amnesty is 
enshrined in the PNR Act 
(19995). Viewed as legal.  
 
Legitimacy Somewhat legitimate 
 
The PNR Act, passed after 
South Africa’s first 
democratic election, is 
considered legitimate. 
However, the justice 
process as has developed 
over the last 20 years has 
been questioned, 
particularly as the 
government has resisted 
further prosecutions.  
 
 The pervasive impunity that has been maintained well beyond the purview 
of the TRC process has had a significant impact on how people view the process, 
and how people view the justice system as a whole. South Africans have lost faith 
in the judicial process, with 54 per cent of respondents in a 2015 Afrobarometer 
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survey saying that they didn’t trust the police at all and 41 per cent say that they 
didn’t trust the courts of law.978 Over 22 years after South Africa’s first democratic 
elections 54 per cent of respondents to the Afrobarometer survey also said that they 
believed the courts treated people differently based on race.979 As pointed out by 
Dexter, if you go to court, the people who were hanging judges (members of the 
judiciary during the apartheid period) were now responsible for dispensing 
justice.980 The institutions set up to protect the people are being perceived as 
dangerous and unequal, undermining the legitimacy of the entire system.  
 
4.8 Perspectives on the tension between justice, amnesty and democracy 
South Africa’s democratic transition had all the potential for success. The 
negotiation process brought almost all of the country’s political elements together 
to decide on the interim constitution. Despite threats of violence, non-participation 
by certain groups, and long queues, the first democratic election took place without 
a significant loss of life and, in quick order, the PNR was passed to ensure the 
country dealt with the legacy of the past and the TRC was created. Seemingly, 
South Africa had managed to negotiate some of the key issues of transitional justice 
and democratization, creating a global example. However, 20 years on the success 
of the process is up for debate. The public has lost faith in the political institutions 
created to support the consolidation of democracy, in the TRC and in the party that 
triggered the dismantling of apartheid. South Africa is currently considered one of 
the most unequal societies in the world, corruption levels are very high and the 
majority of South Africans would support the return to authoritarian rule if it would 
ensure basic service delivery. All this bodes ill for the future of South Africa’s 
democracy.  
H2 proposes that amnesty becomes widely acceptable with time as 
population demographics shift. Over 36 per cent of the population is under the age 
of 35, with the largest percentage in the zero to nine age group.981 The number of 
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born frees will soon outnumber the number of people who remember what it was 
like to live under apartheid. The population’s experience with apartheid is 
becoming increasingly secondary, there is a significant gap between how the 
political elites view the transition process and the views of the wider public. 
According to Professor Pierre du Toit, this generational change works against the 
claims for traditional forms of justice. 
The TRC gave answers to questions on specific crimes. For the next generations, 
the goal must change. The target of retribution has moved on. But the desire for 
blame may be displaced onto a particular community, or broadened out to wider 
blame. The desire for retribution can end up being displaced into xenophobia, for 
example.982 
 
Maintaining the TRC as is has the potential to significantly disrupt the 
political system. This is not to say that people want to go back to redo the TRC. 
Rather, there is ongoing frustration that the whole process was flawed, giving too 
much to the outgoing forces for too little return.983  
Many of the participants of the negotiation process however, remain 
committed to the path taken, as flawed as it may be. The following sections are the 
outcome of interviews conducted with several members of the transition team, 
opposition groups, human rights activists and journalists who witnessed the 
transition first hand; as well as additional research. The threads of discourse 
presented, while no means canvassing all views, offer a clearer understanding of 
the dominant elite perspectives in South Africa as they relate to amnesty, justice 
and democracy. 
 
4.8.1 Military Perspectives 
South Africa was not a military dictatorship of the type seen in Brazil and 
Chile, however, the security apparatus held a central role in the apartheid regime. 
They propped up the regime, quelling resistance and hunting external threats during 
cross border conflicts. The transition shook the security institutions, pushing some 
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career soldiers and police officers to question the mandate they had been given by 
their own government.984 The majority, however, prescribed to the idea that the 
organisations were “above politics”985 and were “serving the government of the 
day. In other words, the SADF regarded itself as preserving South African national 
security rather than White privilege and power.”986  As a consequence of this 
official narrative, members of the SADF were actively discouraged from making 
applications to the TRC. Most high-ranking officials of the armed forces also 
refused to attend a TRC hearing on conscripts, arguing that their presence there 
would validate the process. General Magnus Malan did testify at the TRC, claiming 
to represent the entire SADF. He was followed by General Georg Meiring and 
General Constand Viljoen. Malan did not apply for amnesty. Rather he was there 
because he felt  
…that there is a total lack of military expertise in the Truth Commission when it 
comes to assessing the past actions of the South African Defence Force…Blatant, 
untrue and unfair accusations are being made against the former SADF in an 
apparent vendetta…I am not prepared to permit these incorrect perceptions to go 
unchallenged.987 
 
 Malan’s refusal to acknowledge a policy of systematic HRVs was 
reinforced by SADF spokesperson Deon Mortimer, who argued that “the theme of 
forgiveness appears to be essentially incompatible with the military self-
understanding of their place in history.”988 The SADF became the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1994. Much like the political elites, the 
SANDF actively ignored the recommendations of the TRC, refusing to 
acknowledge any blame for the HRVs committed during the apartheid period.989 
Members of the military elite have continued to seek blanket amnesty from leaders 
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of the ANC, with former Gen. Viljoen petitioning Mbeki in 2002 for an expanded 
amnesty for former members of the SADF.990  
 While there is a growing body of literature by conscripts exploring 
individual and institutional culpability for the crimes committed during the 
apartheid regime, the leaders of the SADF have maintained the “pact of 
forgetting”.991 According to researcher Gary Baines,  
…SADF veterans were complicit in a self-imposed and consensual silence about 
human rights abuses following the country’s democratisation. This was partly 
enabled by a ‘pact of forgetting’ struck by the political elites and leaderships of the 
statutory and non-statutory forces. Finally, SADF veterans have employed silence 
as a strategy of control; they have invoked their experiential knowledge of the 
‘Border War’ to assert their authority to tell the ‘truth’, thereby constructing a 
narrative that remains largely unchallenged in the public domain.992 
 
 The South African Police played a key role in the country’s internal war. 
During apartheid the government “wielded the police like a club, using them to 
keep black South Africans in check and brutally extinguish any dissent.”993 At its 
core the SAP was the security branch. Much like the opinions expressed by the 
heads of the SADF, members of the SAP testified at the TRC arguing that their role 
in apartheid was to uphold national security. According to one-time head of the 
security branch, General Johann van der Merwe 
From the viewpoint of the SAP and the special branch the government was - the 
aim was to ensure law and order and to ensure the security of the civilian 
population. This was so closely allied with the activities of the police that the police 
regarded itself as an ally of the government inevitably. Since 1948 an intimate 
relationship developed between the police and the Cabinet and this was influenced 
by many factors - the attitude of the Afrikaans churches and other organisations. 
The National Party was the natural home of most Afrikaners and the top echelons 
of the SAP agreed fully with the policies of the National Party.994  
 
 However, the difference between the SADF and the SAP was that the latter 
participated to a greater extent in the whole TRC process. SAP applications to the 
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amnesty committee made up 90 per cent of the applications coming from the 
security forces.995 After the intense coverage of the TRC process, some felt that the 
revelations tarnished the new SAPS, formed in 1995 out of the SAP and territorial 
police units.996 The TRC made some recommendations for police reform, however 
these were limited and, as discussed above, the culture of impunity has been 
maintained.  
The SAPS has provided limited commentary on the long-term impact of the 
TRC, with many former police officers remaining silent in an environment that 
judges them for their past actions. The generals and the perpetrators have steadfastly 
maintained the idea that the crimes identified by the TRC were committed in the 
name of national security. While the institutions have been reformed, little has 
changed in terms of the perspectives held by the former operatives. 
 
4.8.2 Perspectives from the Political Elites 
The security apparatus of South Africa may have been at the core of the 
apartheid state, however the political elites were its driving force. Apartheid was 
born out of the political victory of Afrikaner nationalists, and crumbled when the 
political elites no longer saw the system as a viable option. Since the transition the 
discourse around amnesty and the TRC has been fairly consistent amongst political 
elites. The miracle so often described by the international press was, in fact, the 
product of a significant and tumultuous negotiation period. Bargains were made, 
inevitably leading to compromise. What is also important to note, and has been 
discussed briefly above, is that while dominated by the NP and the ANC, other 
parties and interests were present during the negotiations. 
The propaganda of hope, change and reconciliation aside, recent discussions 
on the process have included considerations on the shortcomings of the negotiation 
process and the failures of the ruling party to fulfil the mandate of the TRC. 
Resistance stalwarts Tutu and Mandela maintained their original position regarding 
the TRC, with continued public defence for the process. However, these same 
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leaders have been critical of the failure of the ruling party to complete the work.997 
Subsequent leaders of the ANC have been generally unsupportive of the process, 
pushing for something closer to  a blanket amnesty.998 A broad assessment of the 
different discourses that have emerged from the political elites finds that they tend 
to fall within two themes. The first group of discourses reflects the “pact of 
forgetting”, with elites partnering with the security apparatus to ignore demands to 
fulfil the expectations of the PNR and the recommendations that came out of the 
TRC. The second group of discourses is reflected in the work of the politicians who 
are continuing to push for the government to be held accountable to the laws that 
made democracy possible. This discourse tends to be expressed by members of the 
smaller political parties. 
 During a personal interview Kgokong spoke of his early concern surround 
the MPNP. “We felt that the way things were organised, that it would only bring 
misery.”999 That misery, according to Kgokong, began with the amnesty legislation 
and has continued since. AZAPO was the lead plaintiff in the Constitutional Court 
case against the TRC process in 1996. The Court decided in favour of the 
government, arguing that amnesty was necessary to the transition. However, 
Kgokong argued that 
In our view, our country was not different to other countries where there have been 
crimes against humanity. We believe the people who committed those heinous acts 
should be held responsible. A lot was done in the name of apartheid. Those people 
that were involved should have been held to book. Some people say, “but you also 
killed”. It was our only recourse. We decided the system had to be challenged on 
that basis – they had to be brought to book. The Government felt otherwise.1000We 
went to the constitutional court because we believed some action had to be taken 
against those who were guilty of crimes against humanity. That didn’t 
happen…We were disappointed it went that way. They must have discussed [the 
case] and given it political consideration.1001 
 
The common argument during the early stages of the new democracy was 
one of political expediency at the price of justice. Kgokong believes that there was 
not sufficient consultation with the public, nor was there enough participation from 
those who were most culpable for the horrors of the apartheid regime. “Yes, I think 
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people got off scot-free – particularly the big shots got away with murder. The 
smaller men who had been thoroughly brainwashed are the ones that had to go 
begging for forgiveness in the TRC. The bigshots remained back.”1002 
Now, argues Kgokong, the country is left with no justice and barely any 
democracy.  
I don’t think that the TRC helped. I still see people in need…These social issues 
are the urgent problems of the people that need to be addressed to avoid the return 
to a call for justice. People are not just calling for justice. They want to lynch those 
in government for agreeing and going along with all of this. Democracy should 
have been better for South Africa. But I think it is also because of the corruption 
that has taken hold. It’s a dog eat dog situation. By the time you get the right person 
and bribed all the people, there are hardly any funds to do the project. Corruption 
is endemic. I think people expected more from democracy. Just raising the flag and 
singing the anthem isn’t enough.1003 
 
.  Dexter, a former ANC courier, victim of the regime and current member of 
the ANC, acknowledged that the process was not what you would traditionally call 
“justice”, though he is more positive about the process than Kgokong.   
The end product of the period was something amazing, but there are flaws. The 
strength of the process is that it helped us get over huge issues – a real leveller. But 
there are some flaws…People with resources and power were able to slip through 
the nets. Everyone knows who was the torturer but the generals who ordered it get 
off scot-free. The system has this weakness – there are people who got off scot-
free.1004  
 
However, according to Dexter, justice is a principle that is rarely applied evenly, 
even in the best of democracies. 
In other countries the question of impunity drives the quest for justice. In the South 
African case there is a measure of justice in the process of disclosure. But there 
was also no reckoning of economic justice and that is a huge fault of the process. 
There was no accounting by the big businesses that profited. A police officer who 
beat someone up is held accountable but what about the businesses that profited 
from apartheid? That is a systematic injustice.1005 
 
Dexter describes the decision to suspend the armed struggle as 
psychologically taxing. However, he argues that the ANC membership realised that 
it would be the only way to bring both sides to the negotiating table. 
The historical discourse in the ANC was to bring down the system. You were 
fighting the system, not the people, which means you could reach across the table. 
If we didn’t offer amnesty, how could we have convinced the military to lay down 
arms if they then thought that they would be held accountable?1006  
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Ultimately, Dexter argued that South Africa experienced some justice, 
though possibly not as much as others may wish.  
I think this will be with us for generations but I don’t think seeking [traditional] 
justice is of any benefit. Where would that take us as a country, particularly for 
those of us who did suffer? But that is only valid as long as we don’t stifle 
debate.1007  
 
Dexter was adamant that he would never forgive the men who tortured him. 
Dexter and Kgokong reflect the divisions that have remained among the 
political elites. Both identify a society that is currently broken, however they place 
different levels of value on the TRC process. Dexter continues to support the goals 
of TRC, arguing that it allowed for South Africa to begin to move forward. 
Kgokong, on the other hand, argues that the transitional justice process was 
fundamentally flawed, failing to take into account the needs of victims to see some 
retributive action against their perpetrators. These flaws of the past, according to 
Kgokong, undermine South Africa’s present.  
 
4.8.3 Perspectives from the Legal Community 
The judiciary in South Africa were called on to enforce the laws of 
apartheid, and for the most part did so.1008 Despite the moral repugnance of 
apartheid, the law was clear. “In  their  view,  the  moral  responsibility  for  the  
law  rested  with  the parliament  that  made  the  law  and  not  with  the  judge  
who  applied  it.”1009 In a submission to the TRC, Chief Justice of South Africa 
Michael Corbett rejected calls for all pre-1994 judges to be held accountable, 
arguing that judicial independence required that judges be exempt from political 
judgement on their actions.1010 There was, nevertheless, a TRC hearing on the 
judiciary. Judges, for the most part, refused to participate.1011 In 1998, Judge John 
Freeman, then president of the Judicial Officers Association of South Africa in the 
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Western Cape apologised for the profession’s complicity in apartheid.1012 Since the 
TRC, the make-up of the judiciary and legal profession has markedly changed, 
however there is still the sense for many that race counts in the courts.1013  
Jurist and victim of the apartheid regime, Albie Sachs, declined to 
participate in this research. However, he directed the author to a particular chapter 
in his book, The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law, which explored his role in the 
commission as well as his feelings on what the TRC and the constitutional court 
achieved. The idea of tying amnesty to truth telling came from Sachs.1014 In his 
book, he reiterated that the TRC was by no means a traditional court setting. Rather, 
it was an “intensely human and personalised body.”1015 While Sachs acknowledged 
that there were few moments of real reconciliation, the foundations for national 
reconciliation were created.  In justifying the process, Sachs wrote 
For a successfully negotiated transition, the terms of the transition required not 
only the agreement of those victimized by the abuse but also those threatened by 
the transition to a ‘democratic society based on freedom and equality’. If the 
Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous retaliation and revenge, the 
agreement of those threatened by its implementation might never have been 
forthcoming, and if it had, the bridge itself would have remained wobbly and 
insecure, threatened by fear from some and anger from others. It was for this reason 
that those who negotiated the Constitution made a deliberate choice, preferring 
understanding over vengeance, reparation over retaliation, ubuntu over 
victimisation.1016   
 
Lawyers did, however, have a significant role in the negotiation process and 
in supporting victims and amnesty applicants in the TRC. Professor Venter saw the 
negotiation process first hand. During the first and second CODESA, Venter was a 
legal advisor to the government’s delegation. During the MPNP he was convenor 
of the technical committee on Constitutional Matters. Much like other participants 
of the transition and negotiating process, Venter recognised that traditional justice 
was sacrificed for something else. However, considering the duel necessities of 
social peace and restoration, traditional justice was never really an option.  
If the TRC were determined on purely legal terms the outcome would have been 
very different. So, when it comes to justice, well, would it be justice if all the 
perpetrators were brought to justice? That would be legal justice, yes. But would 
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it have fostered social peace? Probably not. It would have been socially 
destructive.1017 
 
 However, Venter argued that justice is more than a matter of law. 
I think the pain of the injustices will take a century to subside. But some people 
will make it their quest to keep the memories alive on both sides…I think that is a 
major problem in the black communities now. The thinking in the poorer part of 
communities is becoming very agitated that there is a rich layer emerging. This is 
potentially a time bomb. There’s a huge difference between the rich and poor. It is 
[now] about social justice.1018  
 
 The transition, according to Venter, was unique in its own right. None of 
the participants of the negotiations had any real experience with liberalism and 
democracy. Throughout the negotiations, each group was focused on protecting 
their own interests. The ANC knew they would be in power, they were negotiating 
the type of structure the ensuing government would take. “The NP was negotiating 
away their power. They were trying to ensure some form of protection.”1019  
 The question of justice in the long run, or rather the impact of justice denial 
is one that emerges in a number of political discussions. From a legal perspective, 
Ventor was keenly aware of what was bargained away.  
Can justice be bargained with? Well, social memory tends to become genetic 
memory, which dilutes the demands for individual justice. For example, in the 
Afrikaner community the injustices perpetuated by the British in concentration 
camps [during the Boer war] is still very alive. But hounding individuals had 
become irrelevant. There is a parallel in the black community. Its 20 years since 
the transition. Many of the individuals are no longer around, or no longer 
identifiable. There’s a communal demand for justice but not an individual one. 
That translates very easily into political demands and that is a dangerous area.1020 
 
  Venter’s assessment of democracy in South Africa is that it is hampered by 
the emotional ties to ANC that linger within the black community, mirroring 
concerns expressed by TRC commissioner Meiring. 
In my opinion, 60 per cent have no inkling of democracy. There’s an emotional 
response in the voting booth. People are still voting along racial lines. ANC is seen 
as a black party while the DA not so much. Its difficult for the black community to 
shift support.1021  
 
While proud of the work he contributed to CODESA and MPNP, Venter is keenly 
aware that there were no guarantees for South Africa’s progress.  
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In constitutional law and politics, ensuring results and guarantees aren’t possible. 
There aren’t certainties. The Constitution is as good as the people who are here to 
ensure it works, that it is enforced…Currently, various aspects of the Constitution 
are being put under pressure. The current government is trying to reign in control 
of the judiciary, for example. There is the danger of a steady decline into a morass 
of non-constitutionality. But it depends on who is in charge. If you look at the 
history of humanity, its put together by a history of war, murder and corruption. 
1022 
 
 Lawyer and author Peter Harris, who was also involved in the negotiating 
process and led the  Monitoring Directorate of the IEC during the 1994 elections, 
agrees with Venter that the TRC/amnesty solution may not have been justice in the 
traditional sense. But it was necessary.  
In the end it depends on how you view justice. The fact that a murderer walked 
free, no, that’s not justice…its an arrangement that will assist a society to get from 
one type of society to another. You do what you have to do. But it sticks in your 
throat. Its not justice, but it’s what you do sometimes. It’s the price. There are 
dangers of letting murderers off the hook, so I am not saying that this is a recipe 
that all nations should follow. It depends on the circumstances. However, this was 
the price of our deal.1023  
 
 Harris, who has written about the threats that faced the transition during the 
1990 – 1994 period rejected criticisms of the TRC. The country was so close to 
significant bloodshed and the TRC was one mechanism in preventing civil war.  
The TRC was never going to be a panacea that healed the nation. It was a 
mechanism that assisted the process. Other mechanisms were the transfer to the 
power of the majority of the people. Majority rules. This has enabled the country 
to build on its foundations. That said, the TRC played an important role. South 
Africans came forward and said “I’m sorry”. It was cathartic…the fact that there 
are some walking about who didn’t apply, that’s a problem. There must be charges. 
But, its an ANC decision.1024 
 
 In line with other research participants, Harris believed that the failure to 
complete the process is a problem, one that can cause very real issues for the 
democracy of South Africa. Amnesty, justice and race have remained a political 
issue.  
Amnesty and race get flung around with gay abandon – quite dangerously. If the 
ANC had delivered on its promises, this would have been a lot less of an issue. But 
when you give space – when there are massive inequalities you provide space for 
organisations to point at those that got amnesty and trigger discontent. The greater 
the inequalities, the easier it is to walk through that door. But it doesn’t detract 
from the original decision at the time.1025 
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 Having taken part of the transition process, both Harris and Venter 
acknowledge its imperfections. However, both lawyers are wary of revisionist 
histories that may weaken the value of the fundamental agreement.  For both, and 
others, it is in the fulfilment of the promise of the TRC that the real issues lie. 
 
 4.8.4 Civil Society 
 The most persistent challenges to the TRC process, amnesty legislation, and 
the “pact of forgetting”, has come from organisations within civil society. The 
Khulumani Support group, the Foundation for Human Rights, and the International 
Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), among others, have all played a role in 
pushing for the fulfilment of the TRC mandate, pursuing reparations, supporting 
victims and holding politicians and even private companies accountable. Some 
members of these groups were involved in the TRC process, while others have been 
victims who rejected the bargain that eliminated traditional retributive justice 
measures. Dr Hanif Vally, former chief legal advisor to the TRC and current deputy 
director of the Foundation for Human Rights SA, recognised that amnesty is an 
exception during exceptional times.  
Amnesty is an exception and not a matter of course. A matter of course is justice. 
The whole notion of justice is that people who commit harm are held accountable. 
The fact that people have committed crimes and have not been held accountable is 
a case of justice denied.1026   
 
 Vally, who had interactions with both victims and perpetrators while 
working with the TRC, acknowledges that there is still some resentment over the 
whole process. “People found that gross human rights violations couldn’t be 
forgiven through amnesty. People had misgivings.”1027 They still do. However, 
there was a point to the process, one that is being lost by the perception that the 
TRC was an end point, rather than the beginning of the reconciliation process.  
Amnesty and the TRC was used for the society to move forward, so there has to be 
a common narrative. But I have learned that this narrative has to be fought for. 
Activists feel that those that didn’t apply for amnesty have got away for murder. 
But it’s just the activists who are fighting. I wish it were more.1028  
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Vally doubts that amnesty will be challenged again, however there are continued 
efforts to pursue those who were referred to the NPA to be prosecuted, and who 
instead have been given de-facto amnesty.  
If people applied for amnesty and were refused, then, according to the law, they 
had to be charged. The Constitution was quite specific. The government has been 
particularly poor at prosecuting those that were refused amnesty or going after 
those that refused to apply…We are pushing for prosecution and not getting very 
far. We argue that yes, not pursuing convictions do and did undermine the whole 
process.1029 
 
Howard Varney, senior programme advisor at ICTJ, shares Vally’s 
concerns regarding the lack or prosecutions.  
On paper, the amnesty legislation was meant to secure the transition, meant to 
provide leniency. But it was not meant to stop prosecutions of those that spawned 
the process – but it has. The only justification is that it has helped prevent the slide 
back into conflict. But truth and justice have been sacrificed.1030 
 
Victims, Varney argues, have been short-changed by the process. There is 
also the question of the victims who didn’t present their case before the TRC. The 
perpetrators were granted back-door amnesty. “Our conditional amnesty has turned 
into a blanket amnesty.”1031 The ICTJ has been active in trying to push for 
prosecutions, despite ANC resistance. “The SA model was supposed to be 
everything – both amnesty and an avenue for prosecution…On paper, it was a 
model that many prescribed to.”1032 Varney, who has been involved in transition 
processes around the world, argued that amnesty should be used with caution.  
Amnesty should not be used in negotiations except in the most aggrieved, 
exceptional circumstances. Those circumstances are when there is no prospect of 
reaching peace without amnesty, when there is the prospect of significant violence 
– Sierra Leone for example.  In a situation like that, when there is no way out, it 
can be justified. But these days, that is less the case. There would be a way out, 
there wouldn’t be a need for amnesties – there are other ways out. Amnesty can be 
justified, but only in the narrowest of circumstances.1033 
 
Meiring, a TRC commissioner and a minister, argued that the restorative 
justice approach was helpful in moving the country forward, it was a way to deal 
with fears and practicalities. “Many people disagreed with the process. They were 
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looking for punishment. Admittedly the promised justice has been deferred by the 
lack of any real reparations, by taking so long.”1034 
He cautioned those who saw the TRC as an end point in the reconciliation 
process.  
Reconciliation is a process, not just an event. The TRC was a place in the middle. 
The South African TRC was not an ideal solution, it was a compromise between 
the needs of the victims and the fears of the perpetrators. The TRC was by no 
means a perfect commission but we aimed for symbolic reparation as well as 
financial reparation.1035 
 
 Civil society organisations have continued to rally for victims, particularly 
in relation to prosecutions and on the question of increased reparations. The main 
theme in the discourses that have emerged from these civil society organisations is 
one of frustration, and a commitment to pushing the government to stay true to the 
letter of the PNR. There is a wariness over what amnesty in South Africa has 
become, and what this means for the victims of apartheid. Victims’ groups have 
also pushed for education initiatives to maintain a cohesive narrative around the 
gross HRVs of the apartheid regime.  
 
Table 4.4: Long-term opinions regarding justice, amnesty and democracy 
 
Accountability 
Actors 
Justice Amnesty  Democracy 
Military Not necessary. 
Military acted in the 
interest of national 
security and 
therefore did nothing 
wrong.  
Expected full 
amnesty. For the 
most part, the SADF 
refused to take part 
in the TRC process 
and have since faced 
few prosecutions.  
Safeguarded the 
transition with the 
expectation of full 
amnesty. Has since 
assumed traditional 
democratic role in 
the state.  
 
Political Elites Initially supported 
the TRC as a 
necessary part of the 
transition. Has since 
assumed a passive 
role to the point of 
blocking victim-led 
prosecutions. 
Reparations have 
been very limited, 
with political elites 
reticent towards 
Particularised 
amnesty has become 
an ad hoc blanket 
amnesty. Apartheid 
era political elites 
refused to 
participate in 
amnesty process, 
with only one 
minister, Adrian 
Vlok, facing the 
amnesty 
Democracy is 
contested however 
hampered by 
significant 
corruption. Reports 
of state capture by 
private, well placed 
families.  
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fulfilling 
recommendations of 
the TRC. 
commission. F.W de 
Klerk claims to not 
have known about 
the HRVs 
committed by the 
security apparatus.  
Judiciary 
(Lawyers) 
View current state of 
affairs as a failure to 
fulfil the 
expectations, and 
law, of the TRC. Not 
justice, particularly 
in relation to 
reparations and lack 
of prosecutions.  
Not ideal, however 
the result of difficult 
negotiations and, 
possibly, necessary 
for the transition to 
democracy.  
Questionable, 
particularly with 
high level of 
corruption.  
Judiciary (Courts) View their role as 
apolitical and 
required to follow 
the law. Have 
generally fallen in 
line with the NPA, 
acquitting the 
majority of those 
cases that have come 
before the courts, 
though this is judge-
dependent. 
Constitutional Court 
upheld the validity 
of the amnesty law, 
supporting the 
argument that the 
PNR/TRC was the 
bridge to 
reconciliation.  
N/A 
Victims’ 
Groups/HROs 
The system has 
failed victims by not 
pursuing 
recommended 
measures of social 
research and by 
resisting 
prosecutions as 
recommended by the 
TRC.  
While many 
victims’ groups 
recognise the role of 
the amnesty law, 
they reject the ad 
hoc blanket amnesty 
that has emerged. 
Some victims’ 
families rejected 
amnesty altogether, 
arguing that it 
contradicts the 
rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution.  
Democracy is in 
crisis, being 
undermined by 
corruption, culture 
of impunity.  
 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion: Examining South Africa in relation to the hypotheses 
 The path South Africa took towards democracy was a long, negotiated 
process. By the mid-1980s there was no clear winner in the conflict between the 
apartheid government and the ANC revolutionary fighters. Neither side could win, 
however, either one could have made the country ungovernable. The negotiations 
that began with second track diplomatic efforts in Lusaka in 1985, and ended with 
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the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 were highly contested, with each side 
attempting to place themselves in a better position. More than once, negotiations 
collapsed under the weight of expectations, demands and external violence. 
Particularised amnesty was a product of compromise, one that promised to provide 
a bridge between the conflict of the past and the hope for a democratic ‘rainbow 
nation’.1036 Reconciliation, however, has proved to be beyond the scope of the TRC 
process alone.  The TRC heard from over 21,000 victims, and processed over 7000 
amnesty applications. The final report established a single narrative of the apartheid 
period, revealing the lengths the government took to maintain White dominance. 
However, the officials who made apartheid possible and the SADF generals who 
implemented the most brutal parts of the system refused to take part in the process. 
Victims have continued to argue that these leaders have gotten off “scot-free”.1037 
Since the retirement of Mandela in 1999, the ANC has moved steadily away from 
the requirements of the PNR, and from the recommendations of the final TRC 
report. The NPA has resisted pursuing prosecutions and both Mbeki and Zuma have 
discussed blanket amnesties for sections of society. A culture of impunity has 
emerged, with significant corruption at all levels of government. The people of 
South Africa have begun to despair for the future of their country, with a distinct 
preference for an authoritarian regime with consistent service delivery over the 
current tainted democratic system.1038 The biggest issue of the post-TRC 
government is the failure to implement effective social justice measures, including 
reparations for the victims of gross human rights violations identified by the TRC 
and a wealth tax to foster greater economic equality. Political commentators have 
begun to talk of a “state capture”, with decisions being made by private families 
and companies rather than the democratically elected government. Amongst all of 
this, xenophobic attacks are on the rise, reflecting a dangerous frustration amongst 
the third of South Africans who are unemployed.  
Despite the fact that many agree that South Africa is in crisis, there are 
points of hope. There are a number of victims’ rights groups who persist in pushing 
the government to fulfil its responsibilities under the PNR. Groups such as the 
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Khulumani Support Group have sought justice in both domestic and international 
courts.  There have been a handful of successful prosecutions, with more currently 
before the courts. A clear narrative about the past has been established, informing 
discourse and providing future generations an accounting of the apartheid regime.  
What then of the three hypotheses that form the key underpinning of this 
research? The first hypothesis addressed whether justice can be sacrificed for 
democracy in the long run. This hypothesis is stated in the following: 
H0) Amnesty legislation is compatible with expectations and norms of a 
liberal democracy.  
There is little doubt that particularised amnesty in South Africa was what 
made democracy possible. However, it is also clear that each side went into the 
negotiation process with different expectations. The government sought blanket 
amnesty, as is typical of an outgoing regime, while the ANC sought a truth 
commission that focused on the crimes of the apartheid system.1039 The outcome 
was a compromise that offered amnesty for truth for HRVs committed on both 
sides. It is difficult to assess what public and elite perceptions would have been had 
the promise of the TRC been fulfilled, with greater participation and prosecutions 
for those who refused. However, this was not the case. Public and elite perceptions 
of amnesty as it exists in South Africa are tainted by the failure of the whole process, 
and the public sense of betrayal by political elites. Additionally, the culture of 
impunity that has developed amongst the SAPS and government officials as well 
as the fears of state capture, have contributed to the belief that South Africa’s 
democracy is in crisis. The norms and institutions of a liberal democracy have failed 
to deepen in South Africa and the lines between the governing party and 
government institutions have been blurred. Theoretically, the particularized 
amnesty that was promised, along with the fulfilment of the TRC’s 
recommendations may have sufficiently satisfied demands for justice to support 
democratic development. However, the reality and the growing dissatisfaction that 
has emerged with it, indicates that the status quo regarding the lack of justice for 
past crimes directly undermines South Africa’s democracy. 
There is little doubt that both sides initially agreed to the stipulations of the 
PNR, with the expectation of adherence. This supports the argument put forward 
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by H1), that amnesty (and the trading of justice for democracy) is agreed to in good 
faith. However, de Klerk has subsequently said that he gave too much in the 
negotiations,1040 indicating an element of “buyer’s remorse”. Also, the almost 
complete lack of participation by the leadership of both sides of the conflict points 
to a reversal of this good faith less than four years after the agreement was made. 
The ANC is no less guilty in terms of back peddling from the amnesty process, 
supporting their reluctance to fully participate with the claim that the TRC 
promoted a false equivalency between the crimes committed on both sides.  The 
ANC government is now in the driver’s seat regarding subsequent prosecutions, 
which so far have been minimal. What good faith allowed the country to move 
forward through negotiations and into democracy has since disappeared.  
 The final hypothesis (H2) proposes that amnesty becomes acceptable with 
time in a given democracy as population demographics shift. There are two 
considerations that need to be made in relation to this hypothesis. Recent surveys 
indicate support for the argument that a shift in demographics has reduced demands 
for apartheid era justice.1041 South Africans have said that they are more concerned 
with service delivery, unemployment, inequality and crime.1042 However, a deeper 
examination of these issues shows that many of these concerns are connected to 
failures of the transition. Poor service delivery in South Africa can be tied directly 
to the rampant corruption.1043 Unemployment and inequality have ties to the lack 
of social and economic justice, promised with the PNR, the TRC recommendations 
and the 1996 Constitution. The crime rate in South Africa is tied to the culture of 
impunity that has emerged since 1994, and the widespread lack of faith in the 
SAPS.1044 It is also important to take into account the threads of discourse that 
emerged during several interviews. The interviewees expressed concern that while 
in time people may no longer demand individual justice, the demands for justice by 
the born frees have continued, and have been redirected and found new targets, 
including education protests and xenophobic attacks. As highlighted by du Toit, 
“the fault lines in South Africa are different [from Brazil and Chile], due to our 
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elongated peace process. If it is going to unravel, it will crumble. The state will lose 
its ability to govern and society will become weaker.”1045 
 At its most basic, the situation in South Africa is the result of best intentions, 
and poor follow-through. The origins of this failure can be found in the early days 
of TRC, an elite-led compromise in which the very same elites then refused to 
participate. The ANC has shown itself less committed to the fundamentals of 
democracy than to the trappings of power. Ultimately, the consequences of viewing 
the TRC as an end point, as opposed to the beginning of a decades long process 
towards reconciliation, has left South Africa open to misdirected anger, resentment 
and mob violence.1046 Even one of the most ardent supporters of the TRC, Tutu, is 
angered by the failure of the government to fulfil the promise of reconciliation. 
“Our soul remains profoundly troubled…By choosing not to follow through on the 
commission’s recommendations, [the] government not only compromised the 
commission’s contribution to the process, but the very process itself.”1047 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
 Amnesty laws aim to facilitate the transition to democracy. However, justice 
is a key element of democracy, and is generally absent from amnesty laws. While 
amnesty is the outcome of negotiations during exceptional times, these laws can 
have consequences that extend generations after the transition. The question arises 
as to whether amnesty is sustainable in a liberal democracy. Is it possible to 
maintain both democracy and amnesty without undermining elements of one or the 
other? Throughout this research, this question has driven the data collection and 
analysis. Can justice be sacrificed for democracy? This question can be distilled 
even further: can amnesty be sustained in a liberal democracy? While there is 
almost a feeling of inevitability in the use of amnesty legislation as part of the 
negotiating process, it is worth asking whether all parties understand the 
implications of this decision, particularly whether all parties understand that the 
consequences of amnesty go far beyond the transitional period. The evidence from 
the case studies is that amnesty legislation correlates with a continuing culture of 
impunity and corruption, as well as the development of collective memories around 
victimhood and injustice. The incompatibility of amnesty and liberal democracies 
can also be understood through disaggregation of the political systems that emerged 
after the transitions. In all three cases, there is a clear emergence of a culture of 
impunity, the continuance of dictatorship practices in the democratic context and a 
general acceptance of corruption at the political elite level.  
There are a number of reasons why this is an important question to ask. 
Amnesty as a tool to aid the negotiation process is still used. In 2014, a new 
constitution was passed in Fiji as part of its move from military regime to a semi-
democracy. This constitution included sections that granted immunity to officers of 
the state accused of torture between 2006 and 2014, and made it possible for 
impunity to continue unchecked.1048 The Constitution was a requirement in 
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exchange for democratic elections. Considering the legacy of torture that exists in 
Fiji, and the ongoing issues with police brutality, amnesty directly undermines 
principles of democratic development in a country considered “partly free” by 
Freedom House.1049 
Existing amnesty laws have been challenged in a global context. In 2011, 
Uruguay’s Congress voted to overturn the amnesty law covering the 1975-1983 
military regime, despite public support for the status quo.1050  In 2012, two of the 
surviving generals of Turkey’s 1980 coup went to trial, after the constitutional 
clause that granted amnesty was stripped by a referendum held in 2010.1051  In 2016, 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in El Salvador ruled that the 
country’s 1993 Amnesty law was unconstitutional, and had to be struck down.1052  
Also in 2016, in a rare instance of public consultation on the negotiation process, 
voters in Colombia rejected a government peace deal with FARC rebels that would 
have granted amnesty for crimes committed during the decades-long civil 
conflict.1053 Voters argued that there should be accountability for the CAH that 
destroyed whole communities, forcing the government to return to negotiations 
with the rebel groups.1054 Amnesty laws are a significant part of the discourse 
around current transitions and historical grievances, making it important to fully 
understand what this sort of impunity means.  
At the same time, it is important to establish the norms and expectations of 
a liberal democracy in an age where the terms illiberal democracy, semi-democracy 
and limited democracy are becoming more prevalent.1055 Although the values 
identified by Morlino as being fundamental to a liberal democracy currently seem 
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beyond the reach of traditional liberal democratic states such as the U.S.A, however 
these values still play a role in public understandings of the system. Anything less 
can lead to the slow erosion of public faith in government.  The past, present and 
future of democracy appears to pivot on the public perception of the system. Is 
everyone treated equally, fairly and according to laws that are considered 
legitimate? A lack of justice in the past can directly challenge current system 
legitimacy through collective memory, mass mobilization and the development of 
a parallel narrative that clashes with that of the governing majority.  
As a whole, Brazil, Chile and South Africa present a complicated picture of 
the relationship between amnesty, justice and democracy. At once viewed as both 
a short-term necessity and a long-term poison pill, amnesty is a significant part of 
the recent histories of these three states. However, the approach of each state is 
markedly different, with varying commitments to truth telling, reparations, 
punishment and the question of repeal. The democratization experiences of Brazil, 
Chile and South Africa are also markedly different, though there are indications 
that all three countries are moving to a similar point where amnesty and democracy 
are incompatible. Each state offered an informative case for the use of amnesty. 
Collectively, the case studies indicate fundamental weaknesses in the use of 
amnesty laws during state transition, supporting the observation made by Howard 
Varney that, despite its widespread usage, amnesty is only effective in a very 
limited number of cases.1056 
This conclusion is a blend of summation and analysis, uniting the theory 
presented in the Introduction with the evidence put forward in the three case studies. 
The importance of the key theories will be documented below, followed by a 
detailed examination of each of the hypotheses in relation to the case studies. 
Finally, the normative and empirical approaches employed in this research will be 
united in an examination of the core question of this research, pointing to the 
potential paths for handling questions of justice for states on the precipice of 
democratization.  
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5.2 Theoretical Framework in context 
Theories of justice, democracy and amnesty intersect in this research, 
providing the framework for the three case studies. Each theory provides an 
important baseline from which to answer the fundamental questions at hand. A 
number of decisions have been made regarding the theories, particularly in relation 
to justice and democracy. For example, after sifting through the different definitions 
of democracy, this research settles on a maximalist definition of the institutional 
system over the more basic procedural approach. In terms of justice, the majority 
of definitions rely heavily on philosophical debate. For this research, it became 
important to explore public perceptions of justice, and establish a clear framework 
to assess this in each case study. The decisions made regarding the theoretical 
framework have given this research focus by establishing theories that aid the 
investigation and response to the hypotheses and, ultimately, to this work’s core 
question.  
Before examining the theoretical framework in relation to the hypotheses 
and case studies, it is important to touch on the role of legitimacy in political 
structures. As highlighted in Chapter One, legitimacy requires a sense of legality; 
the belief that the government is acting in the interest of the wider public.1057 
Legitimacy is both a characteristic of a good democracy and the ideal that underpins 
the system. The legitimacy of a state is built on public perception, which in turn is 
built on both individual experience and collective memory. In those states where 
victimhood has become more central to the national identity, such as in South 
Africa, the discourse around the past is more prominent than in states like Brazil, 
where victimhood has a smaller role to play in the political discourse.  
A transition can be defined as the dismantling of the authoritarian structure 
in favour of an institutional alternative. It does not always lead to democracy; 
however democratic governance is usually the articulated goal. Transitions face a 
number of variables, some of which can significantly undermine the subsequent 
democratic institutional structures if not addressed. For example, pre-transition 
power structures can influence how institutional structures, decision-making 
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processes and political norms are formed.1058 Nothing about the transition is certain, 
though by the time a country reaches the habitation phase outlined by Rustow, the 
direction of institutional development appears to be more stable.1059 The transitions 
of Brazil, Chile and South Africa were each unique, while sharing some key 
characteristics. The transition process in all three states was driven by an awareness 
of the ruling elites that democratization was inevitable. In all three, it was clear that 
neither the existing leadership nor the opposition could rule without the 
acquiescence of the other side. In South Africa, this realization came after the ANC 
threatened to make the country ungovernable. In Brazil and Chile, the military 
regimes began to see a deficit in domestic and international legitimacy. All three 
states experienced some level of political struggle, the first step identified by a 
number of transitologists.1060 The negotiations that came to dominate the transitions 
of Chile and South Africa fit within the expectation that transitions require 
decisions to institutionalize some aspect of democratic procedure, while Brazil’s 
military leadership chose to pursue this without significant negotiations with the 
opposition. The final phase of the transition is consolidation. It is difficult to 
identify a single point where the states moved from transition to consolidation, 
though it follows that successful electoral processes and transfers of power marks 
the beginning of the consolidation of democracy.  
As established in Chapter One, a maximalist definition of democracy is used 
in this research. In particular, the three case studies are assessed along the lines of 
Morlino’s “quality of democracy” indicators.1061 A robust democracy fulfils the 
definition of quality in procedure, content and result.1062 Morlino assesses 
democracies by examining the law, accountability, participation, competition, 
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freedoms, equality and responsiveness of the democratic process. He argues that 
these qualities illustrate the engagement between the public and the institutional 
structure of the state, providing evidence of the level of depth of democratic norms. 
This maximalist approach to understanding democracy contrasts directly with the 
basic expectations of proceduralist approaches, which focus on the act of voting as 
a key indicator of the system.1063 The maximalist approach to democracy 
establishes a number of expectations of the system. The institutional depth 
identified by characteristics such as responsiveness and accountability takes time 
to establish, requiring investment in anti-corruption measures, regular and fair 
elections and institutions to respond to the needs of the public. The seven measures 
identified by Morlino all take time to develop and fit within the expectations of a 
consolidated democracy as opposed to one in the midst of a transition. Each of the 
case studies is considered to have moved out of the transition/democratization 
period, giving ample opportunity to observe the country’s level of democratic 
consolidation. 
On the other hand, by disaggregating elements of the state, particular 
challenges to the consolidation of a liberal democracy can be identified. Throughout 
the case studies, these elements such as cultures of impunity, dictatorship-like 
practices and an acceptance of corruption, have been identified. Each of these 
elements indicate the ongoing impact of amnesty in the era of democratic 
consolidation. 
An analysis of Chile’s quality of democracy is generally positive, with some 
concerns. Broadly legalistic, Chile has re-established its democratic institutional 
structure through the transition and consolidation period. Out of the three case 
studies, Chile is the most democratically stable, with mass mobilization limited to 
narrow flashpoints (education, indigenous rights). The elections since the transition 
have yielded peaceful transfers of power and in 2010 Chileans elected a member of 
the right-wing party to the presidency, a first since the transition. Freedoms are 
constitutionally protected, as are measures of equality. However, inequality is a 
significant issue. Several authoritarian era laws regarding national security continue 
to be used by the military and armed forces against the indigenous Mapuche.  
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Brazil, on the other hand has struggled to entrench democracy in the same 
manner as Chile. Impunity for crimes committed by state agents continues to be a 
significant issue, as is the lack of security overall. Corruption is pervasive. Over a 
third of the country’s senators and a quarter of the country’s lower-house deputies 
have cases pending before the Supreme Court. Former president Rousseff was 
impeached for corruption, though a number of commentators have described the 
rise of current President Temer to be a legislative coup.1064 Inequality is a 
significant issue, though previous administrations were able to reduce levels of 
absolute poverty through cash-transfer programs.  
Out of the three case studies, the democracy of South Africa is possibly the 
least stable in terms of its democratic norms.1065 With one of the most progressive 
constitutions for its time, legislatively speaking citizens enjoy a number of 
freedoms and protections. However, corruption continues to be a very significant 
issue, with claims of state capture by private interests. Public perception of state-
run institutions is poor, with the police one of the least trusted organisations in the 
country. South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, and 
government responsiveness to the basic needs of the population is poor. The ruling 
party periodically threatens the media and apartheid era laws restricting media 
coverage of certain areas continue to be used.  
A fundamental part of a consolidated democracy is the presence of justice 
and equality. These elements are some of the most basic expectations of democracy, 
and are often enshrined within democratic constitutions. An important question, 
then, is: what is justice? Or, more precisely in the context of the political realm, 
what is perceived as justice? Transitional justice measures are discussed in the 
context of the transition period and prior democratic consolidation. According to 
Arthur, these measures include justice, reparations, truth and institutional 
reform.1066 Chile’s transitional justice measures met the requirements of truth and 
some reparations, although justice and institutional reform were generally absent. 
Brazil included none of these measures during the transition period. The South 
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African transition period included measures of truth and institutional reform, with 
the expectation that justice and reparations would follow. These expectations were 
only partially fulfilled. In terms of post-transitional justice, a number of court cases 
have moved forward in Chile, directly undermining the country’s amnesty law 
while in Brazil, a truth commission submitted its report on the CAH 30 years after 
the initial transition. In South Africa, the expectations for justice measures have 
been disappointed with limited progress made during the democratic era.  
It is clear that the perception of justice is important.  In Chapter One, four 
key elements of justice were identified as important to public perception of justice. 
Fairness is considered key, as is the equality of application. A law needs to be part 
of legislative structure and needs to be viewed as legitimate. In the three case studies 
the perceptions of the transitional justice measures are neither static nor wholly 
tangible, however a number of threads of discourses can be identified. In South 
Africa and Brazil, the legal systems in general face challenges to their legitimacy 
and there is a broad perception that the judiciary favours the elites. These crises of 
faith filter into perceptions of the transitional justice process and have had limited 
impact or have favoured the outgoing regime. The amnesty laws in all three 
countries have been publically debated, with varying and shifting degrees of 
support. There has also been a noticeable variance in how the amnesty laws have 
been applied, though Brazil has managed to adhere to the letter of the law more 
effectively than Chile and South Africa.  
Amnesty laws are not all created equal, nor do they all have the same effect. 
Broad variants of amnesty laws include blanket amnesties and particularized 
amnesties, and these can either be self-granted decrees, negotiated or in some rare 
cases, imposed. The amnesty legislation in Brazil falls on the one extreme of 
blanket amnesties, applied in such a way as to preclude any truth commission or 
public discussion on the CAH committed during the 1964 – 1984 period. While 
Chile’s amnesty decree was written in a similar vein, the political elites, and the 
incoming democratic president in particular, were able to ensure some truth telling 
measures. However, the Chilean truth commission maintained the spirit of the 
amnesty decree, identifying crimes without naming specific perpetrators. In South 
Africa, the particularized amnesty model – amnesty for truth telling on an individual 
basis – was presented as the way forward for transitional justice. The PNR (1995) 
established the possibility of a blended model of amnesty, one that allowed for the 
	 237	
benefits of amnesty (the release of power by the authoritarian regime) as well as 
some punitive measures (shame, prosecution for those who refused to apply). The 
reality, however, has fallen short, raising the question whether the particularized 
model was doomed to fail under the weight of political realities.  
The three case studies have first been assessed in the context of the 
theoretical framework established in Chapter One. Transition theory, democracy 
theory, justice theory and amnesty theory all provide clear markers to better 
understand the socio-political experiences of each case study. These theories also 
provide a base from which to examine and assess the three hypotheses that drive 
this research. 
 
5.3. The Hypotheses and the Case Studies 
5.3.1 The Compatibility of Amnesty Legislation and Democracy 
H0 posits the argument that amnesty legislation is compatible with 
expectations and norms of an entrenched liberal democracy. This hypothesis is built 
on a premise that liberal democracies have identifiable characteristics that can be 
assessed and that the requirements of amnesty, in whatever form, are compatible 
with the characteristics. The counter argument is that the key components of liberal 
democracies stand in direct opposition to the expectations of amnesty laws, creating 
a zero-sum conflict where one or the other will weaken and ultimately become 
unsupportable. The parameters of this hypothesis include some specific frames of 
reference. First, democracy here is defined along the lines of the maximalist 
approach, discussed above. There are a number of reasons for this. As discussed in 
Chapter One and in the subsequent case studies, regime types can blend, with 
authoritarian dictators seeking to establish legitimacy through limited participatory 
measures. Assessing a democracy against the characteristics established by 
Morlino, among others, removes these hybrid systems of governance from the 
equation.1067 Morlino’s framework for assessment allows academics to establish 
whether or not a so-called democratic state is, in fact a democracy. A second 
parameter is one of time. By referencing the concept of a liberal democracy, H0 is 
being placed in context of a consolidated democracy, as opposed to one that is in a 
state of transition. This is an important parameter of this hypothesis, hinting to the 
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idea that what can be sustained in a transition, may not be possible in an entrenched 
democracy.  
H0 is tested by examining the status of each state’s amnesty law, the depth 
of the country’s democratic entrenchment according to the quality of democracy 
indicators, and identifying any negative consequences from the use of amnesty 
measures such as ongoing impunity, violence and corruption.  While establishing a 
causal relationship between the use of amnesty and the ascendency or decline of a 
democracy is difficult, there are certainly some correlative elements to indicate that 
amnesty laws can have a detrimental impact on the consolidation of democracy. On 
the other hand, the establishment of a strong democratic culture can result in the 
reverse, the undermining of the amnesty law in favour of clear measures of justice. 
Collectively, the case studies point to an incompatibility of democratic norms and 
amnesty laws. Rather, one of two possible outcomes emerges.  
The most positive outcome in terms of democratic consolidation is found in 
the Chilean case study. Built on an existing culture of legalism, democracy in Chile 
has emerged fairly robust after the Pinochet regime. As discussed above, while 
there are some concerns around the maintenance of authoritarian-era legislation, the 
general democratic norms are well established. At the same time, the 1979 amnesty 
decree has been effectively challenged or bypassed and military impunity has been 
undermined. Pinochet faced serious judicial challenges prior to his death and his 
legacy was irreparably tarnished. A number of former officials have been charged 
for crimes committed during the former regime, and the current administration has 
talked of repealing the amnesty decree altogether. It is likely that the maturation of 
democracy, as described by Collins, has allowed the victims and advocates the 
space to challenge the impunity.1068 Mass mobilization has taken place in Chile 
without widespread fear of significant reprisals from the military apparatus. This is 
not to say that there has been a full accounting of the past, however the amnesty 
decree that enshrined blanket impunity has been seriously undermined while 
democracy has been strengthened.  
Democracy in South Africa is clearly in crisis. Poor leadership, an ailing 
economy and the threat of state capture are undermining democratic institutions. 
However, the democratic development of South Africa has been seriously limited 
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by the culture of impunity that has been supported by the country’s approach to 
amnesty. Corruption is rampant and, even when uncovered and debated, there are 
few consequences faced by the accused. The survival of President Zuma thus far, 
despite ongoing accusations, is evidence of the culture of impunity that persists in 
all levels of government in South Africa. There is a lack of faith in state institutions, 
particularly those expected to protect citizens such as the police and judiciary. There 
is also the overwhelming perception that justice in all forms is lacking. Limited 
accountability, as put forth by the particularized amnesty model, could have 
provided some measure of justice while at the same time ensuring the necessary 
amnesty required as part of the negotiated settlement. This is not what has 
happened. As it stands, the issues that arise from the use of amnesty, such as a 
culture of impunity, continuing demands for justice and the mutation of justice 
demands into a collective identity are all visible in South Africa’s socio-political 
environment. The concern is that while amnesty remains, and along with it the 
culture of impunity and the ongoing demands for justice as a direct challenge to 
governability, South Africa’s democracy will continue to struggle.  
In some respects, Brazil’s use of amnesty was successful right up until the 
point that it wasn’t. For decades, amnesty legislation was sustained without 
significant debate, benefiting from a persistent refusal by political elites to discuss 
the past. Democracy in Brazil appeared to enter the consolidation period without 
too many concerns. However, an undercurrent of impunity persisted in Brazil, with 
security forces experiencing few consequences for the use of torture and extra-
judicial killings. Much like South Africa, the culture of corruption in Brazil is 
widespread, stemming from what some describe as a carte blanche granted by the 
amnesty law. Brazil’s recent truth commission, which completed its work in 2014, 
was one of the first official challenges to the narrative of silence maintained during 
the previous decades. In 2009, the OAB directly challenged the legality of the 
amnesty law, requesting its repeal through the Supreme Court. Though denied, this 
shifted the general acceptance of the amnesty law and, according to commentators, 
triggered a flurry of academic and mainstream research into the subject of the 
crimes of the authoritarian regime and the amnesty law that protects them.  
The three case studies present a somewhat consistent picture of the 
sustainability of amnesty laws in consolidated liberal democracies. There appears 
to be two options for states to manage the coexistence of amnesty and democracy 
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after a state transition. In an environment where there is a commitment to the ideals 
and norms of liberal democracy, amnesty laws are less sustainable, as demands for 
post-transitional justice are given legitimacy within the political discourse. 
Government commitments to principles of democracy, such as equality and the 
right to legal hearing, clash with the limits placed on these by amnesty laws. At the 
same time, in a consolidated democracy the military presents less of a threat to the 
political order. Although met with disdain from the military elites, the judicial 
efforts to address past crimes in Chile have faced little resistance. The political 
elites can debate the question of repealing amnesty without reference to the 
potential of regime reversal. The alternative is an environment where, despite 
elements of democratic consolidation, negative consequences of the amnesty law 
persist to undermine the country’s quality of democracy. For example, it is clear 
from the experiences of Brazil and South Africa that the use of amnesty has fostered 
a culture of impunity amongst security and political elites. The use of torture has 
continued in both countries and corruption with few consequences is rampant. 
Corruption can also have a significant impact on inequality, with government funds 
failing to meet the intended recipients. The continued use of torture, widespread 
corruption and significant inequality all undermine the quality of democracy in 
Brazil and South Africa.  
There are a number of factors that contribute to the difference of outcomes 
between Chile, Brazil and South Africa. Chile emerged from the authoritarian 
regime with a relatively robust political opposition that had significant democratic 
experience prior to the Pinochet-led coup. Additionally, the legalistic culture 
remained during the Pinochet regime, explaining the dictator’s need to seek 
legitimacy through constitutional developments and plebiscites. Despite a general 
commitment to the vía Chileña, the collective memory around victimhood 
developed sufficiently after the transition to allow multiple court challenges to the 
amnesty law. An official narrative was quickly established in 1991 and, though the 
divisions in the country were split almost evenly between Pinochetistas and those 
seeking democracy at the time of the transition, the supporters of the regime resisted 
calls for further military intervention in the face of challenges to the amnesty law. 
Brazil, on the other hand, had a legacy of military influenced populism prior to the 
rise of the authoritarian regime. Democratic institutions were less robust than those 
in Chile, with a tendency in Brazil towards populist rhetoric. The first civilian 
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presidency, that of José Sarney, was closely linked to the leadership of the military 
and indeed, the whole transition process was dictated by military prerogatives.1069 
The commitment to institutional silence has limited the progress made groups 
seeking justice, however the demands persist. The military continue to hold some 
sway in debates on transitional justice, with the threat of several high-level 
resignations derailing Lula’s initial attempt to create a truth commission in 2009. 
Another consideration, highlighted by Sallum, is that while the number of 
Brazilians tortured remains uncertain, only 500 citizens were killed during the 
military regime.1070 The impact of the CAH was limited to particular sectors of 
society, as were the individual demands for justice. When challenges to amnesty 
began over two decades after the transition, the first difficulty was a widespread 
ignorance about what actually happened during the authoritarian period. The 
fundamental difference in South Africa in relation to the other case studies is race. 
The racial divide was the context within which the authoritarian regime developed, 
and a complicating factor in how South Africa can be understood. The semi-
democracy established in 1910 by the unification of South Africa allowed for a very 
narrow understanding of franchise, excluding large swathes of the population from 
any form of political participation. These restrictions based on race hardened with 
the rise of apartheid, undermining any pretence to the term “democracy”. 
Authoritarianism in South Africa followed a different model to that of Brazil and 
Chile, as there was some space for political discourse, elections were held and the 
White population was allowed to vote. However, for the non-White population, 
apartheid was an oppressive authoritarian regime in every regard. Another key 
difference is the length of time the apartheid regime held office - 42 years; and the 
pervasiveness of the apartheid state that undermined fundamental institutions for 
the non-White community, including education and the judiciary. These institutions 
have struggled to recover legitimacy in the post-apartheid period. Additionally, 
significant income inequality has contributed to South Africa’s instability. The 
failure of particularized amnesty to achieve the promise articulated by the transition 
leadership feeds into a narrative of government failures that contribute to a growing 
sense of government illegitimacy.  
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While there are a number of contributing factors to the strength or weakness 
of a particular democracy, the unchallenged presence of an amnesty law introduces 
issues that can undermine the legitimacy of the political structure. On the other 
hand, a robust democracy is one that allows for challenges to the amnesty law, 
recognizing victims’ rights to seek justice. In regard to H0, it appears that amnesty 
laws are incompatible with the norms of an entrenched liberal democracy.  
   
5.3.2 The Agreement Made in Good Faith 
H1 posits that amnesty agreements are agreed to in good faith. This principle 
of good faith is the idea that, at the time of negotiations around amnesty, both sides 
commit to the principle of amnesty, without any plans for revoking or undermining 
the law at some later date. There are a number of reasons why good faith during 
negotiations is important. At its most basic level, “negotiating in good faith means 
negotiating in a way that is likely to yield an agreement. Bad faith means just going 
through the motions for the sake of appearance, or even making moves to spoil the 
process.”1071 The perception that one side or the other is acting in bad faith while 
negotiating amnesty would likely lead to the unravelling of the transition process, 
or at least trigger a higher level of instability. The outgoing authoritarian regime 
would feel a greater level of threat if it believed that the agreement would be 
revoked once the transition process was completed. Good faith can be measured in 
the level of commitment to negotiations from all sides, and in the commitment to 
maintain amnesty after the transition. From the political elite perspective, there are 
a number of arguments for maintaining amnesty long into the consolidation period. 
This includes the belief that amnesty was the price paid for democracy and therefore 
cannot be revoked (Brazil), that the government has no place in the discourse 
around justice (Chile) and that revoking amnesty would negatively impact those 
currently in government, triggering significant instability (South Africa). 
In all three case studies, good faith was exhibited during the negotiations. 
In Brazil and Chile, this good faith extended decades after the transition. Aylwin 
actively protected the amnesty law against early congressional attempts to revoke 
it. He and his colleagues felt that all political responsibility to address the crimes of 
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the Pinochet regime ended with the delivery of the Rettig Report.1072 By pushing 
the responsibility of the regime into the judicial sphere, Aylwin could claim that he 
did what was necessary without wasting his limited political capital.1073 In Brazil, 
the pact of forgetting has ensured that there has been almost no political debate 
regarding revoking amnesty. The Supreme Court decision in 2010 to reject the 
OAB challenge to the law bolstered the claim that it was central to preserving 
Brazilian democracy. Even with the conclusion of the CNV in 2014, and its 
recommendation that amnesty should be repealed, members of the political elite 
have steadfastly held to the commitment made regarding the law. South Africa 
presents a more complicated picture that involves good faith in terms of the 
commitment to amnesty, not, however, to the process. The lapse in good faith 
measures emerged through the failure to follow the commitments of the PNR – the 
carrot and stick approach that required prosecution for those that refused to 
participate in the process. A commitment to the de-facto blanket amnesty that 
developed after the transition process has remained.  
The challenge of good faith is that, while securing a more stable transition, 
it can also create in implacable resistance to future transitional justice measures. 
Aylwin was unmovable on the question of the government’s role in transitional 
justice measures.1074 For him, the society needed to move beyond the authoritarian 
regime. Within the Brazilian political elites, there has been almost no willingness 
to address the violence of the military regime. In South Africa, the questions of 
culpability for CAH on both sides significantly reduce any chance of a repeal of the 
amnesty law. Victims’ rights organisations face significant political resistance in 
all three countries, meaning that while the good faith remains victims are 
challenging both the crimes of the past and the political will of the present.  
 
5.3.3 Questions of Justice Will Fade into the Past 
The hypothesis put forward by H2 is that amnesty becomes acceptable with 
time in a democracy as population demographics shift. Specifically, this hypothesis 
posits that generational changes will reduce the need for justice. The generational 
consideration is important as it hints to the possibility that amnesty can be sustained 
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indefinitely if it can be sustained through the initial transition period and 
generational shift.  There is logic to this argument, particularly as the official 
narrative moves beyond the transition period and towards other more immediate 
issues. However, collective memory also begins to play a role in the debate over 
justice and becomes a consideration in responding to H2. Collective memory can 
involve the retelling of histories of victimhood, a collective sense of injustice or a 
multi-generational commitment to mass mobilization. Collective memory over 
questions of justice and victimhood can be problematic for a number of reasons, 
including the shift from identifiable and living victims and perpetrators to a more 
nebulous understanding of culpability and justice. As demographics change, it 
becomes harder to address single instances of injustice. From a definitional 
standpoint, generational change refers to the point when those born after the end of 
the regime turn 18 and have the potential to become politically active. When the 
born-frees, as they are described in South Africa, are able to influence political 
imperatives, it becomes possible to assess the impact of collective memory, justice 
demands and the sustainability of amnesty laws.  On the other hand, the options 
available to the political elites to manage justice expectations become increasingly 
limited with the generational shift. Perpetrators and victims die, limiting the 
efficacy of repealing the amnesty and instigating a full-scale judicial approach. 
Other options include memorialization efforts and reparations to communities, both 
of which are also complicated in terms of reach and impact.   
There are a number of ways to assess both the shift in demographics and the 
views the younger generations have regarding the past regimes. Mass mobilization 
focused on questions of justice is the one marker, while the second is the expansion 
of scholarship on the transition period. Additionally, a number of research 
companies such as Datafohla, Latinobarómetro and Afrobarometer have surveyed 
the changing perspectives on amnesty, the transitional justice efforts and the 
contemporary debates around impunity and the crimes of the past.1075 While the 
surveys do not always account for the age of respondents, changes in opinion can 
still be tracked. All these indicators provide a clearer picture on the potential shifts 
in perspective influenced by generational change.  
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The case studies point to the persistence demands for justice, with the added 
complication of collective memory in shaping how people perceive justice. Each 
country also points to the increasingly limited options available to political elites 
attempting to engage with these demands. A clear picture regarding demographic 
changes emerges in each case study, though in Brazil and Chile the pictures that 
have developed are more similar with each other than they are with the one that has 
developed in South Africa. In Chile, the discourse regarding justice measures is still 
heavily influenced by experience, with victims still playing a significant role in the 
debate. There is, however, a shift. Protest group the FUNA is notably 
intergenerational, with protests focusing on the injustices of the past as well as 
current human rights violations.1076 Some commentators have critiqued this 
demographic spread during mass mobilization efforts, arguing that it complicates 
questions of justice. Zalaquette expressed concern over the development of an 
identity centred on the victim experience.1077 Members of FUNA protest outside 
the homes and workplaces of Pinochet allies, outing them as part of the 
authoritarian regime and using the concept of shame as a form of justice.1078 Other 
forms of mass mobilization have continued to be a feature of the Chilean experience 
regarding justice for Pinochet-era CAH. In 2013, 60,000 protesters marked the 40th 
anniversary of the coup by taking to the streets of Santiago calling for the 
government to do more to address the need for further measures of justice.1079 
Public outcry was also able to influence government appointments, and Bachelet 
suggested that the repeal of the amnesty law was a priority for her government.1080 
Although the age of both the victims and perpetrators suggests that demands for 
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justice will begin to fade, the presence of groups such as FUNA and efforts to foster 
collective memory by victims groups, academics and in theatre and cinema support 
indicate a continuing discourse on the issue of justice that extends well beyond 
those who were directly affected by violence of the military regime.  
In a similar vein, albeit delayed, Brazil has seen an explosion of 
intergenerational interest in questions of historical justice. Society has become 
aware of the crimes of the regime, in a manner that had previously been hampered 
by the military and political elites’ pact of silence. Victims of regime were from a 
particular class and were not representative of the broader political groups in Brazil 
during the 1960s and 1970s. There was no official narrative established after the 
transition and for more than 20 years the political elites actively refused to support 
a truth commission. The current wave of interest in the authoritarian regime finds 
its roots in the legal efforts to have the law repealed in 2009, and in the international 
criticisms of the IACoHR.1081 In Brazil there is the currently widespread support 
for the repeal of the amnesty law despite the limited direct experience of the 
majority of Brazilians with the negative elements of the authoritarian regime.1082 
One caveat needs to be made here. While in recent surveys almost half of those 
polled viewed the repeal of amnesty as important, other issues such as widespread 
inequality and corruption, are viewed as more important.1083  
The hierarchy of priorities in Brazil, where justice for CAH are viewed as 
important but secondary to other societal issues, reflects similar perspectives 
expressed in South Africa. A number of victims’ groups continue to fight for further 
reparations as well as retributive justice measures in line with the expectations of 
the law mandating reconciliation. However, the widespread corruption and state 
capture, as well as a number of other political and economic crises, places the 
demand for justice as less important than for the majority of South Africans. This 
is not to say that the government’s current approach to amnesty has become 
acceptable, but rather there are more pressing concerns. Indeed, recent protests 
regarding fee hikes at universities and the glorification of apartheid and colonial era 
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leaders have exposed a demographic rift, with born-frees expressing frustration 
with the way the previous generations dealt with questions of justice (both 
economic and retributive) during the transition.1084  
H2 proposes that, with time, amnesty will become more acceptable. 
However, there is little evidence that subsequent generations will accept the 
amnesty laws without question. In fact, it seems that post-transitional demands for 
justice can be heavily influenced by collective narratives around the injustice, 
perpetuating feelings of victimhood and demands for action. All three case studies 
have seen continued challenges to the amnesty laws. The types of justice demanded 
by those born after the transition can change from individual retributive justice to 
more communal demands for justice. That said, while perpetrators survive, 
demands for traditional justice remain. This includes calls for the punishment of 
aged perpetrators including some who are well into their 90’s. Time and death will 
change this; however, what it leaves may not be any easier for political elites to 
manage. As seen in South Africa, demands for justice can be shaped into unrest, 
mass mobilization and violence.1085 Venter put it best when he pointed out that 
collective memory can become a genetic memory and this can easily translate into 
political demands.1086  
 
5.4 Can Justice be Sacrificed for Democracy? 
The question that underpins this research is whether justice can be sacrificed 
for democracy. Can the justifications for democracy outweigh the need for justice 
for the torture, kidnappings and assassinations of thousands of civilians by state 
operatives? Can a society simply move on with the promise of a political system 
that is by no means guaranteed or perfect? Can justice for individuals be 
compromised for the greater good of the state? Three hypotheses were developed 
to direct this research. These are as follows: 
H0) Amnesty legislation is compatible with expectations and norms of an 
entrenched liberal democracy; 
 H1) Amnesty is agreed to in good faith; 
 H2) Amnesty becomes widely acceptable with time as demographics shift.  
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These hypotheses were designed to investigate the role of amnesty laws 
during the transition and the impact that it has on the socio-political environment 
as democracy consolidates. Applied to the experiences of Brazil, Chile and South 
Africa, these hypotheses identify key elements of the transition and consolidation 
experience that can then be used in answering the fundamental research questions. 
Can amnesty be sustained in a liberal democratic state? An assessment of the three 
case studies indicate that no, this is not possible. From both a theoretical and 
practical standpoint, democracy and amnesty appear to be fundamentally opposed. 
The theoretical standpoint on this issue is clear. Amnesty introduces impunity into 
the transition process. This results in inequality amongst citizens. Former victims 
pay a much higher cost for democracy than the rest of society by losing their right 
to seek justice for the crimes committed against them and their families. Equality 
is a fundamental characteristic of democracy. By denying a section of society their 
right to justice, political elites create the potential for the development of two tiers 
in society and the emergence of a collective memory of victimhood. Additionally, 
amnesty laws have an impact on quality of democracy indicators by negatively 
impacting public perceptions and therefore influencing legitimacy. The impunity 
that results from amnesty undermines the public perception of democratic 
institutions, including the judiciary and police. This public perception can also feed 
into the understandings of justice. Theoretically, particularized amnesty was 
supposed to address concerns over blanket amnesty. However, particularized 
amnesty may still fail to meet the four indicators of perceived justice, and can still 
lead to a feeling of injustice within the community of victims. 
Building on this theoretical base, the three case studies have further 
illustrated the incompatibility of amnesty and democracy. In all three cases, 
amnesty has been implemented or maintained as part of the transition process. In 
Brazil and Chile, the incoming democratic leaders subsequently maintained the 
self-granted amnesties that predated the negotiations. In South Africa, amnesty was 
negotiated as part of the transition, building on a legacy of self-granted indemnity 
acts spanning thirty years. Regardless of how it was implemented, the amnesty laws 
became a central part of the transition process. However, the outcomes of the use 
of amnesty have been uneven.  
As discussed above, the Chilean case is an example of the democracy re-
emerging strongly, reducing the impact of the amnesty legislation on the quality of 
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the political system. There are a number of reasons that Chile was able to achieve 
this. Prior to the 1973 rupture, Chile’s democracy was unsettled and uneven yet also 
well established. Elections during the 1950s and 1960s were highly contested, with 
mostly peaceful transfers of power. While certainly not perfect, Chile’s earlier 
democratic system established a pattern that remained dormant during the Pinochet 
regime, but not destroyed. Many of the opposition leaders that played a key role in 
the transition were prominent in the Congress during the Allende era, including 
Aylwin who was part of the PDC. Additionally, Pinochet reintroduced elements of 
democracy as early as 1980, seeking legitimacy from democratic norms. Chilean 
culture has long been considered highly legalistic, which in 1990 aided the 
redevelopment of democratic norms. This legalistic approach also contributed to 
the public perception that the plebiscite result had to be adhered to, regardless of 
personal opinion.  
Within the first decade of democracy, the Chilean democratic leadership 
was also able to subjugate the military interests into the wider democratic project, 
reducing the threat of a democratic reversal. The military initially held on to the 
belief that it was the saviour of Chile against the scourge of socialism. While 
committed to upholding the result of plebiscite, the military under the leadership of 
Pinochet defended its prerogatives through the transition period. They rejected the 
Rettig report and officers were twice recalled to the barracks in a direct threat to 
democracy during the early stages of democratization. However, with the 
convictions against Contreras and the judicial action against Pinochet, the military 
began to move to embrace a more traditional civilian-military relationship.   
Another key element of Chile’s transition was the early truth commission. 
By establishing an official narrative from almost the first days of the new 
democracy through the Rettig Report, the Concertación government had some 
control over how the transitional justice process progressed. Importantly, the 
collective memory of the nation, particularly beyond the core group of victims, was 
shaped by the findings presented in the Rettig Report. Despite widespread concerns 
over the truth commission’s failures, such as its weak legal status and refusal to 
identify perpetrators, the information provided began a discourse around the crimes 
of the past. The evidence presented in the Rettig report also contributed to judicial 
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efforts of the late 1990s, as well as providing a foundation for the formation of the 
Mesa de Diálogo and Valech Commission.1087    
One point of difference in Chile’s approach to amnesty and justice has been 
the judiciary’s occasional willingness to hear historical cases. That is not to say that 
there has been widespread court acceptance of cases challenging amnesty, however 
changes made to the institutional structure of the courts by Frei in 1997/98 opened 
the courts to post-Pinochet era judges. Amnesty is still used as a reason not to 
convict some perpetrators, while others have been convicted and given extremely 
lenient sentences. However, the courts have been open to handing down 
convictions, such as in the case of Contreras.1088 Despite the amnesty decree, 260 
people have been convicted of dictatorship-era crimes, though only 60 have spent 
time in jail. At the time of his death, Pinochet was facing both domestic and 
international court cases.   
The willingness of the political elites to continue to discuss the Pinochet era 
crimes, amnesty and the possibility of change, have all undermined the blanket 
impunity promised as part of the negotiations. While Aylwin and Frei were 
committed to maintaining the amnesty decree, they did so in the face of early 
debates over whether or not the decree should be revoked. Current president 
Bachelet has proposed another repeal, though this is facing conservative resistance 
at a time that the right is seeing a resurgence of popularity in the figure of former 
president Piñera. Regardless of whether this law remains, the fact that there is open 
debate over the status of the law is valuable in undermining the legitimacy of the 
amnesty law. 
Ultimately, the amnesty decree is less powerful in Chile in the face of 
democratic development and debate. The open discourse around amnesty at the elite 
level, even in the face of significant reluctance by some actors, has proven to be 
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effective in reducing the power of the blanket immunity and ensuring some access 
to justice. However, this does not mean that the victims believe that they have 
experienced justice.  Many perpetrators have passed away, leaving groups to find 
alternatives to measures of justice such as memorialization. The difficulty arises 
with the emergence of a collective memory that continues to struggle with the lack 
of traditional justice measures, and the mobilization efforts that go with it. This, 
however, is less of a concern than in other states where the debate over justice has 
been silenced. 
Brazil, on the other hand, has had a much more straightforward interaction 
with amnesty. The elites have generally refused to engage with concerns over the 
1979 amnesty law. The failure to address questions on justice hasn’t reduced the 
demands for action. Rather, it has delayed action on those demands to be dealt with 
by future generations. Additionally, amnesty has left a legacy of impunity that has 
directly impacted on the country’s political development. Brazilian democracy has 
developed, however it has struggled to deepen in a manner that will ensure its 
longevity.  Brazil’s democracy faces a number of struggles. Prior to the 1964 coup, 
the political system was dominated by populist rhetoric, with military involvement 
seen as a consistent characteristic of the process.  The 1964-1984 dictatorship was 
able to reduce the efficacy of the opposition and to dismantle many elements of the 
previous political structure. Since the transition, democracy has been slow to move 
beyond the basic procedural typology. Evidence of this can be seen in rampant 
political corruption and security issues that continue to plague the country, as well 
as the issues surrounding the rise of Temer in what has been described as a 
legislative coup.1089 Impunity for state sponsored crimes has become a 
characteristic of the democratic period, with the police, armed services and political 
elites continuing the norms established during the authoritarian regime.  
The role of the military during and after the transition has been a point of 
difficulty for the development of Brazil’s democracy. The military controlled the 
path and speed of the transition, reducing the impact of the opposition’s input. The 
first civilian leader was deeply connected to the military establishment. At no point 
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was there any clear break between the leadership and the military, though there has 
been a slow civilianization. While civil-military relations have generally 
normalized in the later period, the military reaction was a concern during the 2016 
impeachment crisis, with some protesters calling on the armed forces to step in 
again. That the military is still seen as a potential political player is obviously a 
concern for the country’s democracy and reflects, in part, a lack of discourse around 
past CAH committed by the former regime.  
The refusal to establish a clear narrative at the early stages of the transition 
has been a fundamental characteristic of the Brazilian experience. While Brasil 
Nunca Mais was a best seller, the political and military elites followed the policy 
of “oblivion” – complete forgetting. This discouraged any debate over the CAH of 
the past regime. Reparations were paid, in accordance with the 1988 Constitution, 
however very little was publically known about the actions of the military regime. 
Amnesty was first questioned in 2009, with the OAB case before the Supreme 
Court, sparking a flood of academic and media commentary on the past. The 
emerging discourse around the past regime’s CAH gained traction with efforts led 
by Lula, however concrete measures were initially thwarted by military resistance. 
The country’s truth commission only began its work in 2012. The long absence of 
significant discourse has had an impact on how the broader public view the past as 
well as influencing the type of achievable justice. It has also been very easy for the 
government to put aside the findings of the truth commission as other political crises 
have taken precedence.  
The political resistance to engaging with demands for justice has been 
mirrored by the refusal of the judiciary to address questions of justice for 
dictatorship era crimes. The 2009 Supreme Court case favoured the maintenance of 
amnesty on the argument that it allowed for democracy and was, therefore, a 
foundational element of Brazil’s political system. The STF also rejected 
international pressure form the IACoHR, claiming that the regional body had no 
jurisdiction. The court has shifted responsibility for challenging the amnesty law to 
the political elites, making the question of justice a political rather than judicial 
matter. 
Groups from within civil society and the legal community continue to push 
for an increase in measures of justice. However, in many respects, by failing to 
discuss the past and by maintaining amnesty without question, the state has failed 
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to make a clear break from the authoritarian regime. While democratic, many of the 
key characteristics of an entrenched liberal democracy have been undermined by 
impunity, torture, corruption and a perceptible lack of faith in the government and 
in the political process. 
South Africa’s democracy faces similar questions around public perceptions 
of democracy. Victims of South Africa’s apartheid regime have witnessed a 
particularly convoluted transitional justice process. The political elites promised 
particularized amnesty that would allow for some level of justice. However, both 
sides of the conflict largely ended up receiving an ad hoc blanket amnesty that failed 
to address the concerns of many victims. In this way, South Africans experienced 
not only a denial of justice but also a betrayal of the promised bargain that was 
meant to justify the limited transitional justice process. A second prong of that 
bargain, democracy, has also failed to eventuate as expected. Race and economic 
inequality is still a very significant issue. South Africa has regular multiparty 
elections, however there are fears that corruption and clientelism have come to 
dominate the process. There are growing fears that the ANC will refuse to let go of 
power, even in the face of a potential electoral defeat. This overall situation has 
inevitably led to a decline in support for the country’s democracy, and for many of 
the democratic institutions.  
Although now under a different name, the police in South Africa have 
struggled to move past the institutional norms of the apartheid era. Accusations of 
torture are widespread, as are high levels of impunity for criminal activity. The 
police continue to protect the interests of the wealthy, including policing private 
functions for the elites. Some of the issues facing the SAPS can be directly tied to 
both the culture of impunity that developed with the amnesty law as well as the high 
number of members of the apartheid era police that retained their positions in the 
democratic era. The heads of the new police service have struggled to eradicate the 
institutional norms that were entrenched during the authoritarian regime. 
While the TRC process has long been hailed as the way forward, a number 
of issues have continued to hijack its impact. Aside from the religious dimension 
of the commission and its limited judicial power, the TRC failed to gain buy-in 
from some of apartheid’s most well-known victims. The buy-in from the right, 
particularly the SADF and the SAP was poor, as was the participation by members 
of the political elite on both sides. From the beginning of the commission, the ANC 
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and NP used the courts to protect their interests, including protesting the findings 
of the final report. This has created a contested discourse around the crimes of the 
apartheid regime, as well as those committed by the ANC that went beyond the 
scope of typical armed political resistance.  Since the final report was handed to 
Mbeki, the ANC has steadfastly refused to follow the report’s recommendations. In 
fact, under the guidance of the ANC, particularized amnesty has essentially become 
a blanket amnesty.  
The judicial structure in South Africa has failed to inspire faith in 
transitional justice. Much like the SAPS, apartheid judges remained on the bench, 
leaving some with the sense that colour and class still matter. Also, the NPA, the 
organization tasked with pursuing justice in applicable cases, have failed to do so 
and have, at times, actively resisted victim’s demands for action in the face of 
significant evidence. A changing of the guard has taken time, leaving victims to 
decry the system without significant avenues for recourse. The complicated nature 
of South Africa’s transitional justice process is compounded but its failure to fulfil 
the entirety of the process. A sense of betrayal is layered on top of injustice, creating 
a collective memory of continuing victimhood that has proven relatively easy for 
outside interests to manipulate for political ends.  
Each case study reflects a different approach to the transition and 
transitional justice. However, the legacy of amnesty has been consistent for the two 
countries that failed to quickly entrench a clear democratic order. When the 
commitment to democracy has been limited, cultures of impunity that are directly 
related to the amnesty legislation are able to develop, and practices that are highly 
problematic, such as torture and corruption, are able to continue despite the 
democratization process. These complicate demands for justice as contemporary 
injustices take precedence. This is not to say that the injustices of the past are 
forgotten, they simply move in the hierarchy of priorities. A collective memory and 
identity can develop that can lead to mass mobilization and the manipulation of 
mass anger for political means. However, when democratic norms become quickly 
entrenched, victims’ groups and the wider public are able to challenge the political 
system and agitate for further justice measures. The equality promised by a fully 
entrenched liberal democracy enables justice demands and a political discourse that 
questions the legitimacy of the amnesty law. The evidence gathered from the three 
case studies indicates that democracy and amnesty are fundamentally incompatible. 
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A socio-political culture that emerges within a strong democracy will directly 
challenge the sustainability of amnesty laws. On the other hand, in weak 
democracies, amnesty laws are able to have a long-term impact that can undermine 
the democratic order through immunity, corruption and dictatorial behaviour and 
weakens the legitimacy of a number of fundamental democratic institutions. The 
three case studies used here are supported by the theoretical framework, which 
points to an incompatibility from a theoretical standpoint. An old Zulu proverb says 
a snake gives birth to a snake. Amnesty gives birth to norms that undermine the 
reason amnesty was granted in the first place.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This research has focused on the sustainability of amnesty legislation in 
entrenched liberal democracies with the goal of answering a core question: can 
justice be sacrificed democracy? The use of amnesty laws as part of the transition 
is the sacrifice of justice for democratization. However, there is no guarantee that 
democracy will consolidate in a manner that will make the sacrifice worthwhile. 
Additionally, there is no guarantee that the wider public will be free of all aspects 
of the authoritarian regime, particularly in terms of the security apparatus and 
inequality. This is an elite made bargain that required a significant sacrifice from 
those who were not even part of the discussion. This has the potential to be 
fundamentally disruptive for a nation’s political development and problematic for 
the shape of a community’s collective memory. This threat can persist decades and 
generations after the transition. The theory on democracy and justice indicate that 
the fundamental characteristics of each are incompatible with the theoretical 
requirements of amnesty law. In the real-world Brazil, Chile and South Africa give 
insight into just how incompatible these two concepts are. Even a moderately robust 
democracy, such as Chile, will undermine the efficacy of an amnesty law, leading 
to widespread debate and possibly repeal. On the other hand, an amnesty law in a 
weak democracy like Brazil and South Africa will undermine the political system. 
Negative elements of amnesty legislation, such as the culture of impunity, have 
been shown to continue when democratic norms have failed to be consolidated by 
the political elites.  
One of the primary arguments for the use of amnesty is that it is a necessary 
carrot for the authoritarian regime during the exceptional times of the negotiations. 
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Does this outweigh all arguments against the agreement to implement or maintain 
amnesty? No. Some commentators argue that there are a narrow number of states 
where amnesty can be used.1090 Perhaps it was the only option for South Africa, due 
to the level of civil violence during the transition period. However, in the cases of 
Brazil and Chile, the need for blanket amnesty is less certain. The model of 
particularized amnesty, implemented to the letter of the law, could have provided 
these two societies with a middle way to manage both public expectations of justice 
and the outgoing regime’s demand for impunity. This is of course hypothetical and 
a possible avenue for future research. Regardless, it is clear that a commitment to 
establishing a robust democracy from an early stage of the transition can provide 
avenues for victims to seek equality in terms of justice.  If political elites feel that 
they have no other option but amnesty, they can mitigate some of the negative 
consequences of laws of impunity by ensuring a commitment to the quality of 
democracy indicators, allowing the space for amnesty to be repealed at a time when 
perceived risks are no longer seen as a threat to the political system.  
The theory and the case studies have highlighted a significant issue for 
transition literature. This research has shown that the debate must move beyond the 
justice vs peace paradigm. This research has shown that the discussion must extend 
to the decades after the transition, and must examine whether amnesty can be 
sustained in the context of a liberal democracy. Can victims accept a democratic 
socio-political environment where they are less equal than the rest of their society 
because they are never allowed to seek recompense for the crimes that were 
committed against them? Or will they push back, and force a change in political 
discourse, in law or in governability? The evidence points to the latter and this could 
push future transitions to seek alternate options during negotiations. Overriding and 
ignoring claims for justice has the potential to create a collective memory and 
identity around victimhood that can sustain frustration and anger across 
generations, giving birth to demands for justice where the victims and perpetrators 
are long dead and a tangible solution has become almost impossible.  
  
																																																						
1090 Varney, Personal Interview. 
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